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But what was to be done about the impossibility of 
seeing into other people’s souls?
—Ellen Spolsky, Word vs Image
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We live in other people’s heads: avidly, reluctantly, consciously, unawares, mistakenly, inescapably. Our social life is a constant 
negotiation among what we think we know about each other’s thoughts 
and feelings, what we want each other to think we know, and what we 
would dearly love to know but don’t.
We’ve been doing this for hundreds of thousands of years. Cognitive 
scientists have a special term for the evolved cognitive adaptation that 
makes us attribute mental states to ourselves and to other people; they 
call it theory of mind or mind reading. Though it may sound like telepa-
thy, theory of mind is actually its opposite. Telepathy implies perfect self-
conscious access to someone’s thinking. Mind reading is approximate 
guessing and imperfect interpretation, most of it taking place below the 
radar of our consciousness.
Our culture is both a product of theory of mind and its stomping 
ground. We enter it by attributing mental states to everybody from Bart 
Simpson to Plato and from Mona Lisa to the drafters of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Cultural representations, high and low, exploit the fact that we 
live in other people’s heads yet have no direct access to their thoughts 
and feelings. Novels, movies, paintings, and situation comedies all build 
on theory of mind, experiment with it, and feed it elaborate social fan-
tasies.
One such fantasy is the fantasy of perfect access to mind through 
body. We get to see fictional characters at the exact moment when their 
Preface: Fantasies of Access
        xi
In which Bart Simpson is thinking; Mona Lisa is smiling; the purpose of 
this book is revealed; its genre is canvassed; and a long-due gratitude is 
expressed.
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xii          P R E FA C E
body language betrays their real feelings. This is in contrast to real life, 
in which there is always a possibility that we will misinterpret seemingly 
transparent body language, particularly in a complex social situation, 
or that people will perform transparent body language to influence our 
perception of their mental states.
The fantasy of perfect access to mind through body is old, but it 
takes surprising new forms in different historical periods and genres: thir-
teenth-century Chinese operas; medieval ribald tales; eighteenth-century 
French paintings; nineteenth-century English novels; twentieth-century 
movies, musicals, photography, and stand-up comedy; and twenty-first 
century reality television. This book is about how this fantasy works, 
when it stops working, and why we can’t get enough of it.
Though dealing with novels, film, and art, this is neither literary or 
film criticism nor art history. I don’t offer a comprehensive analysis of 
a particular writer, movie, painting, genre, or motif, and I steer clear of 
specialized vocabulary. Most works under discussion have been exten-
sively analyzed by others. Whenever I can, I happily point to instances 
of compatibility with existing studies, but, fruitful as I believe it to be, a 
sustained exploration of such compatibility is beyond the scope of this 
project. Pressed for the genre of what I do here, I would call it “cognitive 
cultural studies,” though I think of it mainly as a book-length thought 
experiment: an attempt to view a variety of cultural phenomena from 
one particular perspective made possible by research in cognitive science 
and to push that perspective as far as possible.1
Writing up this thought experiment took five years and as many 
drafts, and I have incurred many intellectual debts along the way. As 
always, I found support and inspiration among the community of schol-
ars working with cognitive approaches to literature and culture: Porter 
Abbott, Frederick Luis Aldama, Mike S. Austin, Elaine Auyoung, Joseph 
Bizup, Mary Crane, Nancy Easterlin, William Flesch, Monika Fludernik, 
F. Elizabeth Hart, David Herman, Patrick Colm Hogan, Tony Jackson, 
Suzanne Keen, Jonathan Kramnick, Howard Mancing, Bruce McCo-
nachie, Alan Palmer, Isabel Jaén Portillo, Alan Richardson, Elaine Scarry, 
Vernon Shetley, Ellen Spolsky, Gabrielle Starr, Simon Stern, and Blakey 
Vermeule.
I am grateful to the Guggenheim Foundation and to the University of 
Kentucky College of Arts and Sciences, whose generous support enabled 
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Holquist, Doug Whalen, Philip Rubin, Ken Pugh, and other members of 
the Teagle-Haskins Collegium; to Kang-i Sun Chang, for her generous 
help with the Chinese opera; to Stephen Kern for his similarly gener-
ous assistance with proposal compositions; to Evelyn Birge Vitz, whose 
inspiring approach to performance turned me to embodied transparency 
in medieval literature; to James Phelan, for his crucial early advice about 
transparent bodies and narrative; to Ralph James Savarese for introduc-
ing me to disability studies sensitive to the possibilities opened by the 
autistic view of the world, as opposed to just its limitations, and for 
stepping in at the last moment to correct relevant parts of my argument; 
and to Jason Flahardy at the University of Kentucky Special Collections 
and Kathryn Wong Rutledge and Mary Lou Cahal from the University of 
Kentucky Teaching Academic Support Center for their invaluable work 
on illustrations.
At the Johns Hopkins University Press I am grateful to Trevor Lip-
scombe, Matt McAdam, and Deborah Bors. I also thank my copyeditor 
Joe Abbott, and, most important, the anonymous reader whose com-
ments made me revise large portions of the book.
Finally, I thank Etel Sverdlov for regularly offering words of wis-
dom and comfort, and Joel Kniaz for his incredible patience in offering 
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In which the author first tries to read the mind of a stranger at the library 
and then realizes that she doesn’t know how to talk about it  / an Israeli 
immigration clerk makes a surprising gesture with her hand  / emperor 
Caracalla feels threatened  / a British soccer player hopes to be mobbed 
by his teammates  / a tightrope walker faces competition from a Whee-lo 
toy  / Mona Lisa keeps smiling  / and Andy Kaufman looks sincere.
ONE
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Culture of Greedy  
Mind Readers
        1
I am writing this in a quiet library hall lined with long desks. In front of me I see a young woman turning around and glancing at the 
three whispering and occasionally laughing students to her left. I think 
the noise bothers her, and she wants to show it. But I could be wrong. 
Perhaps, bored after hours of sitting still, she appreciates this momentary 
diversion and wants to see its source. Or perhaps she wonders if she 
knows any of them. Or perhaps she is a sociologist and something about 
their group dynamics has caught her attention. I don’t know her, so I 
am not likely ever to find out what she is actually thinking as she turns 
around. Still, I automatically interpret her body language in terms of her 
unobservable thoughts and feelings: she feels this; she wants that; she 
wants them to think that she thinks this or that; she wants other people 
to know that she is responding to that group’s behavior.
 And you are not in the least surprised by my reasoning. You, too, 
take it for granted that there must be some thought, desire, or intention 
behind her body language. Our everyday social interactions are unimagi-
nable without this kind of intuitive reasoning: to make sense of any hu-
man action, we must see it in terms of a mental state that prompted it.
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 We’ve been doing this day and night for hundreds of thousands 
of years. (At night we attribute intentions to creatures populating our 
dreams.) Psychologists have a special term for the evolved cognitive 
adaptation that makes us see behavior as caused by underlying mental 
states. They call it theory of mind, also known as folk psychology and 
mind reading. The latter term is particularly inapt. Given how many of 
our attributions and interpretations of thoughts and feelings are wrong 
or only approximately correct, they might as well call it mind misreading. 
But since evolution doesn’t deal in perfection, we have to fumble through 
by “reading minds” as best we can. 
 In the last five years theory of mind has become a major research 
topic among cognitive, developmental, comparative, and social psychol-
ogists, as well as cognitive neuroscientists. Though everything they learn 
opens up more questions and will remain the subject of debates for years 
to come, theory of mind is increasingly thought of as a crucial cognitive 
endowment of our species—a cornerstone of imagination, pretense, mo-
rality, and language, indeed of every aspect of human sociality.
 As a cognitive adaptation, mind-reading ability may have developed 
during the Pleistocene period, from 1.8 million to 10 thousand years ago. 
According to evolutionary psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, the emer-
gence of theory of mind was evolution’s answer to the “staggeringly com-
plex” challenge faced by our ancestors, who needed to make sense of the 
behavior of other people in their group, which could include up to two 
hundred individuals. As Baron-Cohen points out, “Attributing mental 
states to a complex system (such as a human being) is by far the easiest 
way of understanding it,” that is, of “coming up with an explanation of 
the complex system’s behavior and predicting what it will do next.”1
 Studies in theory of mind suggest a new way of understanding what 
constitutes our human environment. Usually, the word environment 
brings to mind trees, air, water, roads, houses, and such. If we remember, 
however, that the human species is foremost a social species—that is, our 
need and ability to communicate with others underlies every aspect of 
our existence—we realize that our environment can also be defined as 
other minds.2 We spend our lives breathing in oxygen, whether we are 
aware of this or not. But—no less important—we also spend our lives 
interpreting and imagining minds, whether we are aware of this or not.
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When We Read Minds, Do We Know It? (The First Misconception)
When people first hear about theory of mind, they often come away with 
two misconceptions. One results from imperfect terminology.3 The word 
theory in “theory of mind” and the word reading in “mind reading” 
are potentially misleading. They seem to imply that we attribute states 
of mind intentionally and consciously: that is, when we read minds, we 
know that we are reading them.
 Think again of my library example. It may have appeared from my 
description that I sat there droning silently to myself, “Hmm, I wonder 
why that woman in front of me is turning around and looking at those 
guys. Perhaps she appreciates this momentary diversion and wants to see 
its source. Or perhaps she wonders if she knows any of them.” But of 
course it didn’t happen that way. I wrote this event out for you as a se-
quence of fully articulated propositions because this is how we write and 
talk, but I certainly didn’t experience it in such a neat, ordered, verbal 
fashion. I somehow “felt” all these possibilities almost at the same time, 
without intending to do so and without paying much attention to myself 
doing so.
 It’s difficult for us to appreciate just how much mind reading takes 
place on a level inaccessible to our consciousness. While our perceptual 
systems eagerly register information about people’s bodies and their fa-
cial expressions, these systems do not necessarily make all of that in-
formation available to us for our conscious interpretation. Think of the 
functioning of “mirror neurons.” Studies of imitation in monkeys and 
humans, made possible by advances in functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) technology, have discovered a “neural mirror system that 
demonstrates an internal correlation between the representations of per-
ceptual and motor functionalities.”4 What this means is that “an action is 
understood when its observation causes the motor system of the observer 
to ‘resonate.’ ” So, for example, when you observe someone reaching for 
a cup, the “same population of neurons that control the execution of 
grasping movements becomes active in [your own] motor areas.”5 At 
least on some level your brain does not seem to distinguish between your 
doing something and another person’s (whom you observe) doing it.6 So 
you understand an action of another person—that is, you attribute a cer-
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tain mental state to her—“She wants to grab that cup!”—because your 
mirror neurons are activated, but you have no control over or conscious 
awareness of their activation.
 In fact, you don’t even have to observe the action: the sound of an 
action (e.g., pressing a piano key) activates mirror neurons, too. Studies 
involving congenitally blind participants show that the “putative mirror 
neuron system can develop independently of vision.” In this case, the 
system “projects the perceiver’s own motor programs onto the sensory 
evidence of other people’s actions rather than objectively mirroring the 
details of how the other has performed the action.”7
 Because the jury is still out on the role of mirror neurons and many 
aspects of that research remain controversial, my argument in this book 
does not depend on this research.8 Still, with or without mirror neurons, 
we must have neural circuitry that is powerfully attuned to the presence, 
behavior, and emotional display of other members of our species. This 
attunement begins early (some form of it is already present in newborns), 
and it takes numerous nuanced forms as we grow into our environment. 
We are intensely aware of the body language and facial expressions of 
other people, even if the full extent and significance of such awareness 
escape our conscious notice.9
 So when I was looking at that woman in the library turning around 
to look at the noisemakers, some of my mirror neurons must have been 
busy “being her,” that is, perceiving the noise to her/my left and treat-
ing it as a disturbance, a welcome diversion, or a social opportunity. 
But then it also means that some of my mirror neurons must have been 
busy “being” those noisy people to the left. Otherwise I wouldn’t have 
been able to infer that, by turning toward them, the woman was count-
ing on their noticing her body language and interpreting it as meaning 
something about her attitude toward their actions. In other words, to 
the degree to which we—myself, that woman, and the people in that 
group—were aware of each other and were making sense of each other’s 
behavior—our mirror neurons must have been involved in a three-way 
mutual modeling of our possible mental states.
 I am having a surprisingly difficult time writing these things out. It 
makes me think that we don’t have the vocabulary to explain how the 
functioning of mirror neuron systems underlies everyday mind attribu-
tion. It is so much easier to describe the workings of theory of mind the 
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way I did in the beginning of this chapter. There I didn’t try to model this 
mutually reflecting three-way process. Instead, I used the neat division 
between “me,” ”her,” and “them” and simply attributed separate mental 
states to myself, to the woman, and to the group on her left.
 For this is how we talk and write—and how I will have to talk 
throughout this book. To make the discussion of mental states manage-
able, we make it sound neatly isolated, evenly paced, intentional, self-
conscious, and fully verbalized, as in, “I suspect that she is thinking that 
they don’t realize that she is having a difficult time concentrating when 
they are whispering and laughing.” Still, even if we have no choice but 
to talk about it this way, we should remember that this is not how our 
theory of mind really works. It’s fast, messy, intuitive, not particularly 
conscious, and mostly not verbalized.
When We Read Minds, Do We Read Them Correctly? (The  
Second Misconception)
The second misconception about theory of mind is that reading minds 
means reading them correctly—a gussied-up version of plain old telepa-
thy. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth (if anything, theory 
of mind is much more interesting than telepathy). Our mind-reading ad-
aptations focus our interpretation of people’s behavior on their mental 
states, but the interpretations themselves range from being completely 
wrong to only approximately accurate.
 Here is one way to illustrate the difference between attributing men-
tal states constantly and attributing them correctly. Foreign visitors or re-
cent immigrants are bound to misinterpret certain gestures used by locals 
and hence misunderstand their intentions on such occasions. We treat 
these cases of miscommunication as striking and significant, but what’s 
really striking and significant about them is the shared assumption, taken 
completely for granted by both newcomers and locals, that body lan-
guage should be read in terms of underlying mental states. This assump-
tion remains firmly in place no matter how many times communication 
fails as a result of misinterpreted gestures.
 Consider the story of one such failure told by the literary critic Kla-
rina Priborkin, born in Russia and now living in Israel, who remembers 
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her family’s first interaction with the Israeli immigration authorities upon 
entering the country:
Losing patience after standing in line for several hours, the air-con-
ditioning not working, some of the people who came with us on the 
plane decided to approach the authorities to ask how long this was 
going to take. When they returned, all they could report was that the 
clerk showed them a very strange gesture that somewhat resembled 
an offensive Russian gesture of “figa” [hand clenched in fist; thumb 
protruding between index finger and middle finger]. At least now we 
had something to pass the time, arguing about the meaning of the 
mysterious gesture. Later we learned that it is the Israeli gesture for 
“have patience!”10
Priborkin’s story presents a strong argument against a universal language 
of gestures: a gesture deemed offensive by one culture may be consid-
ered conciliatory by another. Note, however, how the same story pro-
vides strong evidence for the universal adaptation for mind reading. Try 
answering the following questions without postulating some cognitive 
system (whatever you may want to call it) that irrevocably binds observ-
able behavior to unobservable mental states:
 First, what made the clerk assume that the newcomers would pay at-
tention to her body language and thus notice the gesture she was making 
with her hand? After all, once they asked her the question, they could be 
looking at the nearby window as they waited for her reply. Second, what 
made the clerk assume that the newcomers would interpret her gesture as 
having a particular meaning? And why did the newcomers assume that 
this particular bodily movement of the clerk should have meaning, that 
is, be interpreted as indicative of a certain mental state? After all, they 
could have thought that her index finger was itching and she was unself-
consciously scratching it with her thumb.
 For the sake of argument try answering these questions without 
bringing in theory of mind. You would have to propose that from our 
earliest childhood we are told by adults who surround us: “Pay attention 
to the bodies, my child. Note particularly the eyes, but do not neglect the 
mouth, either. A brow can tell you a lot about what the person is think-
ing. A wrinkled nose conveys much meaning. Hands are very important, 
but so can feet be, if properly attended to, in certain circumstances.”
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 We don’t often talk to children like this. True, when I read books 
with my toddler, I occasionally say to him things along the lines of “Mimi 
is unhappy because she lost her pet; she is crying; see that tear on her 
cheek?” or “See, Poombah is smiling because he likes what he did to the 
weaver.” But comments such as these hardly add up to the incredibly 
powerful system of education that would have to be in place in every 
culture on Earth, from Abkhazia to Zuni, to bring about a universal tra-
dition of interpreting body language as indicative of mental states.
 And this fantastic system of education is what we would have to 
imagine—along with explaining just how it happens to come into exis-
tence in every single human society—if, for some reason, we don’t want 
to postulate a cognitive adaptation for mind reading. In contrast, if we 
postulate such an adaptation, we say that our comments about Mimi’s 
tears and Poombah’s smiles merely reinforce rapidly maturing mind-
reading predispositions of our preverbal audience rather than miracu-
lously creating such predispositions from scratch. Indeed, developmental 
psychologists now study mindreading in seven-month-old infants,11 and 
their research “has pointed to gradual, continuous, and universal stages 
in [theory of mind] development, that emerge in infancy and continue to 
progress during childhood and into early adolescence.”12
 To continue on a personal note: having emigrated from Russia to the 
United States in my early twenties and thus having had to consciously 
learn that the same gesture may mean very different things in the two 
countries, I always feel funny when I hear people emphasize such differ-
ences. Their arguments remind me that we tend to focus on exceptions 
and thus do not see the forest for the trees. Of course, I am quite aware 
of certain disparities between Russian and American body language; I 
learned about some of them through embarrassing personal experience. 
At the same time, however, I know that such disparities are completely 
dwarfed by what the two cultures have in common, that is, by the func-
tioning of our theory of mind.
 The very ability to notice cultural differences is evidence of theory of 
mind at work. For instance, cultures have different rules for emotional 
display. A “major task faced by the child in middle childhood is to learn 
the culture’s display rules governing the conditions that are appropri-
ate for the display of specific emotions, that is, situations in which the 
automatic urge to communicate the emotion currently experienced must 
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be inhibited and either an alternative expression displayed or nothing re-
vealed.” But to observe and learn display rules one has to negotiate com-
plex social stimuli—that is, read, misread, and reread minds constantly.13
 In other words, we would have an extremely difficult time adjust-
ing to new cultures (by figuring out, for example, local rules regarding 
display of emotions) were not all of our social interactions underwritten 
by the same evolved cognitive tendency to view observable behavior as 
caused by unobservable thoughts and feelings. The reason we can learn 
that in Russia “figa” means “when hell freezes over” while in Israel a 
somewhat similar gesture means “have patience” is that we have a strong 
cognitive predisposition to read gestures in terms of underlying mental 
states. Hence, to read minds constantly and unselfconsciously does not 
mean to read them correctly in any absolute sense. The most striking 
misreading of another’s intentions is still mind reading—a fully realized 
exercise of our theory-of-mind adaptations.
 So to come back to the cup-grasping example: your neural circuitry 
(whether represented by mirror neurons or some other dedicated sys-
tems) must underlie your understanding of my intention to grasp the cup, 
but you may never know, for example, if I reached for that cup because I 
was thirsty or because, for whatever reasons, I wanted you to think that I 
was thirsty. Thus any act of mind reading is fraught with possibilities for 
miscommunication and misinterpretation.
Greedy Mind Readers
In the rest of this chapter I argue that theory of mind is what makes our 
culture, as we know it, possible. It’s a big claim, and it rests on two as-
sumptions.
 The first assumption is that our cognitive adaptations for mind read-
ing are promiscuous, voracious, and proactive. They’re always at work, 
stimulated either by actual or by imaginary interactions with other peo-
ple. Encountering a body constitutes a powerful prompt for starting to 
attribute mental states. The body does not have to be real. Think of our 
reaction to people that we “meet” on canvases, on movie screens, or on 
the pages of a book. Although on some level we know that they are mere 
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phantoms, our cognitive adaptations for mind reading still get in gear 
and start churning out interpretations of their thoughts and feelings.
 We take all of this completely for granted, but pause for a moment 
and consider how strange this really is. “Caracalla’s brow is knotted, and 
he abruptly turns his head over his left shoulder, as if he suspects danger 
from behind.”14 This sentence comes from a widely used art history text-
book, Gardner’s Art through the Ages. It describes a marble bust of the 
emperor Caracalla in the collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
(fig. 1). But Caracalla had been dead for eighteen hundred years! What is dis-
played at the Met is a carved chunk of marble! Still, what does our theory 
of mind care about such details? When confronted with that chunk of 
marble, we immediately interpret its bulges and concavities as indicative 
of a mental state, such as distrust. Alive or dead, marble or enamel, a 
human figure can’t fail to provide grist for the mill of our insatiable mind-
reading adaptations.
 When I say “human figure,” I mean both the full body and just the 
face. Faces, of course, are objects of our theory of mind’s particular at-
tention (though it seems that different cultures foster different strategies 
for “scanning” faces).15 We are “addicted” to them from infancy.16 As 
we grow older, we start seeing faces at the slightest suggestion: in clouds, 
in the random arrangement of dots, in chunks of marble.17 We see them 
there not because of some general preference for facelike shapes but be-
cause we are foremost social beings, and facial expressions promise us ac-
cess to the information most important for our well-being: other people’s 
minds.18 Whether or not they deliver on this promise is another question; 
I will return to it shortly.
 To begin to appreciate the insatiable greediness of our mind-reading 
adaptations, it is useful to compare them to our adaptations for seeing. 
Because our species evolved to take in so much information about our 
environment visually, we simply cannot help seeing once we open our 
eyes in the morning (unless, of course, our visual system is severely dam-
aged). The “predominance of sight” has had a profound influence on hu-
man culture: just think what a staggering range of daily practices directly 
depends on our ability to see.19
 It’s the same with mind reading, perhaps even more so: after all, 
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blind people can’t see, but they can attribute mental states.20 As evolu-
tionary psychologist Jesse M. Bering puts it, after a certain age people 
“cannot turn off their mind-reading skills even if they want to. All human 
actions are forevermore perceived to be the products of unobservable 
mental states, and every behavior, therefore, is subject to intense socio-
cognitive scrutiny.”21 Hence, although we are far from grasping the full 
extent to which our lives are structured by adaptations for mind reading, 
we should expect cultural effects of those adaptations to prove just as 
profound and far-ranging as the effects of the ability to see.
FIGURE 1.  Portrait head of Caracalla (Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius Antonius), ca. AD 217–30. Late Severan. Marble, 
height 14¼ in.
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 To get some idea of the scope of these effects, let’s begin on a per-
sonal level. Talking to my friend and following her train of thoughts of-
fers the most immediate input for my theory of mind. So, too, when she 
is away, does imagining what she might be thinking at this moment. So, 
too, if she dies, does imagining what she would have thought on such and 
such occasion.22
 I want more, however. I want to hear stories about what other people 
did and what they looked like when they did it so that I can imagine what 
they thought and felt at those times. Those people can be members of 
my family or complete strangers or people that never existed. They don’t 
even have to be human: androids, talking animals, dancing candelabras, 
and twinkling stars will do. I can listen to such stories; I can read them; I 
can hear them sung; I can watch them danced or mimed or projected on 
a flat surface; I can look at them carved into stone, painted on walls, or 
reproduced in art books. Because I want to see bodies in action so that I 
can think about their intentions, sometimes I make up those stories my-
self in whatever way I can: whether painting, dancing, singing, or writ-
ing. In my particular case this may involve writing about what fictional 
characters and their creators might have meant when they did this or said 
that, as well as about what other scholars, dead or alive, might have said 
or did say about this or that. Literary critics make a living by reading and 
misreading minds.
 I am talking about myself here. Now think: if other people have the 
same need to process mental states, what kind of culture must emerge in 
response to this need? This culture has to continuously feed this need, yet 
it will never be able to fully satisfy it since new mind-reading cravings 
arise all the time. It is a culture of greedy mind readers (bound to become 
even greedier with the advent of a media-saturated society, as new modes 
of storytelling seem to appear constantly). A case in point: five years ago 
I could not foresee that today I would need to read a particular blog 
regularly. Back then I didn’t even know what blogging was. And now I 
am addicted to this blogger’s way of thinking: I crave my daily fix of her 
mental states.
 Here are some phenomena that one might encounter in a culture of 
greedy mind readers: stories that depict people’s response to their percep-
tion of other minds (such as novels); arrangements that let us read mental 
states into sequences of movements set to music (such as ballet); specially 
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designated social spaces in which we can appreciate the gap between 
what people feel and what they would feel had they known as much, or 
as little, about their situation as we do (such as theater); events during 
which numerous physical bodies form complex patterns guided by the 
shared understanding of intentions (such as team sports); and artifacts 
that coordinate text and images so that the information about people’s 
feelings that we get from looking at their body language elaborates, con-
tradicts, or otherwise complicates the verbal descriptions of their feelings 
(such as graphic narratives).
 I am obviously talking about cultures that I am most familiar with. 
Had I been born in Bali and moved first to Java and then to South Su-
lawesi instead of being born in Russia and moving first to Latvia and then 
to the United States, my examples might have featured more prominently 
theater-performed puppet shows, forms of dancing that tell stories about 
ancient Buddhist kingdoms, wood carvings, or funereal rites.23 There is 
no predicting what forms cultural phenomena that feed our theory of 
mind will take in a concrete historical moment in a particular society. We 
can predict, however, that no cultural form will endure unless it lets us 
attribute mental states to somebody or something.
 Imagine the impossible: our theory of mind is switched off. How 
many cultural institutions that let us read minds into behavior would 
survive? Who would attend bullfighting, pantomime, basketball games, 
opera, finger-shadows theater, or tightrope walking? If you doubt that 
tightrope walking engages our theory of mind, consider this: we know 
that the performer does not want to die and that she knows that what she 
is doing is dangerous; moreover, she knows that we know that she knows 
that what she is doings dangerous. That’s why a performer sometimes 
pretends to slip and nearly fall down, eliciting a collective gasp from 
her audience below. She is playing with our minds, making us imagine 
what she must feel as she narrowly escapes death. Take this unconscious 
attribution of mental states out of the act of tightrope walking and see 
how interesting it remains. In fact, drained of all mind-reading, tightrope 
walking is exactly as interesting as a Whee-lo toy rolling back and forth 
on its magnetic axle.
 Just so, watching a basketball game without attributing intentions to 
players is as enticing as watching falling snowflakes—both are random 
movements, fascinating for about two minutes, and then your mind wan-
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ders off. Opera is a pain: bodies moving haphazardly across a stage, burst-
ing into song at random intervals. Finger shadows: why is that woman 
moving her hands this way? With our theory of mind intact, we say it’s 
because she wants to imitate the movement of a dog’s tail—she wants to 
amuse us. But without theory of mind her random twitching and twisting 
of hands seems incomprehensible, unsettling, perhaps threatening.
 Now think about the fate of social, political, and economic networks 
built around a variety of orally transmitted narratives, public rituals, 
novels, movies, plays, cartoons, news reports, sporting events, online 
discussions, and, more fundamentally, our everyday conversations about 
people’s plans, thoughts, and feelings. These networks would crumble 
because they are only sustained by our ability and need to read mental 
states into behavior. And once the networks of the culture of greedy mind 
readers are gone, what’s left?
The Best and the Worst
Here is the second of the two assumptions behind my claim that theory of 
mind makes human culture possible: bodies are simultaneously the best 
and worst source of information about people’s thoughts and feelings.
 That is, we perceive bodies as both the best and the worst. On the 
one hand we put tremendous value on the information about people’s 
mental states that we glean from their body language. On the other hand 
we are always ready to turn about and treat this information as particu-
larly unreliable. This paradoxical double perspective is fundamental and 
inescapable; it informs all of our social life and cultural representations.
 To appreciate the power of this double perspective, imagine that 
right now you and I are talking face-to-face. Let’s say you are trying to 
convince me of something. As we go on, you know that I am not merely 
listening to your words but also paying attention to your face, move-
ments, and appearance. That is, you generally can’t know what particu-
lar grin or shrug or shift in affect I notice and consider significant at a 
given moment; indeed, I don’t know either. Still, our long evolutionary 
history as a social species—expressed in our cognitive adaptations for 
mind reading—ensures that you intuitively expect me to read your body 
as indicative of your thoughts, desires, and intentions and that my read-
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   13 3/2/12   12:44 PM
14          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
ing of your body will be crucial for the outcome of our communication.24 
Moreover, the same long evolutionary history ensures that I intuitively 
know that you expect me to read your body in this fashion. That is, I 
know that you will perform your body language, though not necessarily 
consciously or intentionally, to influence my perception of your mental 
states.
 This means that I have to constantly negotiate between trusting this 
or that aspect of your observable behavior more than another. Were I to 
put this negotiation into words—which will sound funny because we do 
not consciously articulate it to ourselves this way—it might go as follows: 
“Did she smile just now because she liked what I said or because she 
wanted me to think that she liked what I said, or because she was think-
ing of how well she handled an argument yesterday, or was she thinking 
of something altogether unrelated?”
 Thus, we treat with caution the information about the person’s state 
of mind inferred from her observable behavior precisely because we can’t 
help treating observable behavior as a highly valuable source of informa-
tion about her mind—and we both know it. Because we read intentions 
into bodies throughout our evolution as a social species, we are now 
stuck, for better or for worse, with cognitive adaptations that forcefully 
focus our attention on the body.
 Nor would we want to completely distrust the body—our far-from-
perfect readings of each other get us through the day. Still, as we auto-
matically interpret each other’s observable behavior in terms of underly-
ing mental states, on some level we keep active the hypothesis that the 
observable behavior is misleading. (Note, too, that it does not have to be 
intentionally misleading. If I meet a person whose natural expression is a 
frown, I may incorrectly assume that he does not like me. The body may 
misrepresent the mind.)
From Private Mind Reading to Cultural Arms Race
So we are in a bind. We have the hungry theory of mind that needs con-
stant input in the form of observable behavior indicative of unobserv-
able mental states. And we have the body on which our theory of mind 
evolved to focus so that it can get such input. And that body, by virtue of 
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being the object of our theory of mind’s obsessive attention, is a tremen-
dously valuable and, as such, potentially misleading source of informa-
tion about the person’s mental state.
 I am making this argument based on research in different branches 
of psychology, specifically, evolutionary psychology, developmental psy-
chology, and cognitive neuroscience. When I turn to other academic 
disciplines, however, such as sociology and literary criticism, I see some 
exciting overlap of ideas. For instance, in 1969 the sociologist Erving 
Goffman observed that in human communication, increased reliability 
leads to increased unreliability:
The more the observer relies on seeking out foolproof cues, the more 
vulnerable he should appreciate he has become to the exploitation of 
his efforts. For, after all, the most reliance-inspiring conduct on the 
subject’s part is exactly the conduct that it would be most advanta-
geous for him to fake if he wanted to hoodwink the observer. The 
very fact that the observer finds himself looking to a particular bit of 
evidence as an incorruptible check on what is or might be corrupted 
is the very reason why he should be suspicious of this evidence; for 
the best evidence for him is also the best evidence for the subject to 
tamper with.25
Goffman’s larger argument about the vulnerability of incorruptible evi-
dence works perfectly with my more specific argument about body lan-
guage and mental states. To the extent to which our mind-reading ad-
aptations make us see bodies as providing “foolproof” cues to thoughts 
and feelings, we remain vulnerable to convincingly faked body language.
 Similarly, scholars in literary and cultural studies have commented 
extensively on the protean nature of the body as they have sought to ex-
pand the concept of performance beyond the theatrical stage to a broad 
range of everyday practices.26 Research on theory of mind lends strong 
support to their insights. Because we are drawn to each other’s bodies in 
our quest to figure out each other’s thoughts and intentions, we end up 
performing our bodies (to adapt a term from cultural studies) to shape 
other people’s perceptions of our mental states.27
 Again, this may seem like a mere description of private interpersonal 
dynamics, but let’s expand it to our culture as a whole. It turns out that a 
broad variety of daily practices reflect the dual position of the body as a 
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valuable yet unreliable source of information about the mind. For exam-
ple, our social infrastructure seems to be chock-full of devices designed 
to bypass the body in reading a person’s intentions. We use blood and 
hair samples, credit and medical histories, and fingerprinting to avoid 
the situation in which we have to make an important decision based on 
information provided solely by the person’s observable behavior.28
 Some of these devices work better than others, but none are perfect. 
We may not yet be living in the future depicted in the movie Gattaca 
(1997), whose protagonist, Vincent, fakes his blood and hair samples 
to deceive others about his intentions. (To be precise, he deceives oth-
ers about his genetic identity, but, in Vincent’s world, genetic identity is 
synonymous with intentions: it is supposed to determine what a person 
should dare to aspire to and what he should think of his place in soci-
ety and relations with others.) Still, that sci-fi moment does capture an 
important sociocognitive feature of our world. There is a constant arms 
race going on between cultural institutions trying to claim some aspects 
of the body as essential, unfakeable, and intentionality-free and individu-
als finding ways to perform even those seemingly unperformable aspects 
of the body.29 A memory from a real-life dystopia: in the 1980s I learned that I 
would be required to take an eye exam in order to go to college. I don’t 
remember the details, but being very nearsighted in Soviet Russia barred 
one from a number of activities, including getting a driver’s license, par-
ticipating in certain sports, giving birth without surgical intervention (it 
was thought that one’s retina could detach during labor), and, appar-
ently, studying at Moscow State University (MGU). At least that’s what 
they said in my home town in the Ural Mountains when I started putting 
together my college application. And, no, I didn’t plan to be a fighter 
pilot; I wanted to major in journalism.
 I had to find a way to fake an acceptable level of nearsightedness 
during the eye exam. I procured—I don’t remember how—a copy of the 
eye chart and learned it by heart using mnemonics. That is, I composed 
a short verse, with two words in the first line, three words in the second, 
five in the third, five in the fourth, etc.—all beginning with the letters on 
the chart. I still know that doggerel by heart, so if there is a chance that 
Russian eye charts haven’t kept up with other changes in that country, 
such as the prices of oil and law enforcement officers, I could still, per-
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haps, pass there as someone worthy of driving a car, playing tennis, and 
going to college.
 I did get into the formidable MGU and ended up receiving an edu-
cation that was mostly a joke. So my plan must have worked, to some 
extent, even though I don’t remember any details from my visit to the eye 
doctor. What I do remember, however—and that’s why I am telling this 
story—is how determined I was to fake that seemingly unfakeable, seem-
ingly essential physical attribute: good vision. If they wanted to decide 
my future based on their reading of my body, I would make them see that 
body in a way that suited my intentions and not their arbitrary assump-
tions about what a nearsighted person could or couldn’t do.
 So for every effort to read a body for incontrovertible evidence of 
something essential about a person, there will be a countereffort directed 
at manipulating the mind that is supposed to be doing that reading. The 
countereffort may fail but not for want of trying. The arms race between 
those who want to fix the meaning of the body and those who want to 
influence the mind that fixes the meaning may take different forms in dif-
ferent historical contexts, but it seems to be an unavoidable feature of a 
culture of greedy mind readers.30
Conclusion: To Know and Know Not
We read minds all the time yet remain open to the possibility that our 
readings are wrong. With such a peculiar setup in place, what should we 
expect from our cultural representations? Of course, this big question 
cannot be answered in one book. But as a starting point, let us consider 
step-by-step what it means to live in a world in which we know, and at 
the same time don’t know, what other people are thinking.31
 First, we assume that there must be a mental state behind an observ-
able behavior. Say you see somebody jumping up in the middle of a meet-
ing. Try making sense of his action without talking about his presumed 
mental state; for example, he had an idea; he remembered something sud-
denly; he wanted to see how high he could jump; he felt something sharp 
on the seat beneath him; he saw a snake and was terrified; he wanted to 
determine whether everybody was awake.
 Our belief that there must be a mental state behind a behavior is itself 
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   17 3/2/12   12:44 PM
18          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
a cognitive artifact that reflects the way we perceive people. The question 
of whether my colleague over there truly and really had some thought, 
feeling, or emotion that prompted him to jump is relatively irrelevant.32 
What is relevant is that for us, that jump signals an underlying mental 
state.33
 Second, even though we know that there must be a mental state be-
hind a behavior, we don’t really know what that state is. There is al-
ways a possibility that something else is going on behind even the most 
seemingly transparent behavior. We can remember situations when our 
thoughts did not fit the circumstances, and no observable behavior could 
reveal them to people around us—or so we hope. On these occasions we 
say to ourselves, “Thank God, we can’t read each other’s minds, so that 
they have no way of knowing what is going through my head.”
 Third, even though we can’t really know what other people are think-
ing, we conduct our daily lives on the assumption that we do, more or 
less. To borrow from a related discussion by the cognitive literary critic 
Ellen Spolsky, our everyday mind-attributions are “good enough.”34 Ob-
viously, I can’t be entirely sure what that woman is really thinking as she 
strides determinedly toward that particular weightlifting machine, but it 
has served me well in the past and is likely to serve me well in the future to 
assume that she wants to use it right away, which means that for the next 
five minutes I’d better turn to a different machine. Such rough-and-ready 
interpretations get us through the day. To quote cognitive evolutionary 
anthropologist Dan Sperber, in “our everyday striving to understand oth-
ers, we make do with partial and speculative interpretations (the more 
different from us the others, the more speculative the interpretation). For 
all their incompleteness and uncertainty, these interpretations help us—
us individuals, us peoples—to live with one another.”35
 Were we to stop and try to figure out what the people around us are 
really thinking, we would become socially incapacitated, overwhelmed 
with possible interpretations, and unable to commit to any course of 
action. Perhaps the reason that we even notice our moments of “Thank 
God, we can’t read each other’s minds!” is that they stand out amid our 
daily unreflective mind attribution. They interrupt its course. They force 
us to juxtapose a good enough mind attribution—that is, what people are 
likely to be thinking in such a situation—with an exact and unexpected 
mind attribution: what I really thought in that situation.
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 Fourth, because we go around knowing that there must be a mental 
state behind a behavior, and because we don’t really know what that state 
is, even as we act as if we know, cultural representations exploit this pre-
carious state of knowing and not knowing. A writer makes us think that 
a protagonist goes into a catatonic stupor because she is distraught by the 
news that her husband was killed in an accident only to reveal later that 
she could not move because she was overcome with happiness over her 
sudden freedom. An artist paints a smiling woman but gives us no con-
text in which to interpret that smile and thus leaves us forever intrigued 
about her thoughts. A stand-up comedian exploits various contexts in 
which people in his culture are strongly expected to be sincere—using the 
body language appropriate to each of these heartfelt occasions—only to 
drive his audience to such a state of bewilderment and skepticism that 
when he actually dies from kidney failure caused by cancer, they don’t 
believe it.36 The more we look for the “true” mind in the body, the less we 
can hope to find, yet every screen, every stage, every page offers us new 
ways of looking.
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In which a new concept is introduced  / a phobia is revealed  / a four-
letter word makes a bold-faced appearance (but the French take the 
blame)  / Frederick Wentworth betrays himself  / Elizabeth Bennet rejects 
Mr. Darcy  / Bridget Jones triumphs over a rival  / Tom Jones can’t see 
what’s in front of his eyes  / and the author admits that she has no clue what 
her nearest and dearest are thinking.
TWO
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I Know What You’re Thinking, 
Mr. Darcy!
Embodied Transparency
Jane Austen’s novel Persuasion (1816) tells the story of a woman who, unmarried and unhappy at twenty-seven, suddenly finds her-
self thrust into the company of a man whom she has loved but was per-
suaded to give up eight years ago. The objections that her friends had to 
him (poor, lacking social connections) are moot today, for he has made 
a brilliant and lucrative career in the Royal Navy. But it’s too late. He is 
not interested in her anymore, looking instead for someone with courage 
and conviction, someone whose opinion won’t be swayed by shortsighted 
well-wishers. Perhaps someone younger, too.
 Or so Anne Elliot thinks. Dispirited as she is, she is only too ready to 
read Captain Wentworth’s behavior toward her as mere polite indiffer-
ence. Whenever they see each other, which usually happens at the house 
of Anne’s relatives, the Musgroves, he comes across as happy, satisfied 
with himself, and as civil toward her as he would be toward any other 
old acquaintance:
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It was a merry, joyous party, and no one seemed in higher spirits than 
Captain Wentworth. She felt that he had every thing to elevate him, 
which general attention and deference, and especially the attention of 
all the young women could do. . . . If he were a little spoilt by such 
universal, such eager admiration, who could wonder?
 These were some of the thoughts which occupied Anne, while 
her fingers were mechanically at work, proceeding for half an hour 
together, equally without error, and without consciousness. Once 
she felt that he was looking at herself, observing her altered features, 
perhaps, trying to trace in them the ruins of the face which had once 
charmed him; and once she knew that he must have spoken of her: 
she was hardly aware of it till she heard the answer; but then she 
was sure of his having asked his partner whether Miss Elliot never 
danced? The answer was, “Oh! no, never; she has quite given up 
dancing. She had rather play. She is never tired of playing.” Once, 
too, he spoke to her. She had left the instrument on the dancing being 
over, and he had sat down to try to make out an air which he wished 
to give the Miss Musgroves an idea of. Unintentionally she returned 
to that part of the room; he saw her, and instantly rising, said, with 
studied politeness—
 “I beg your pardon, madam, this is your seat”; and though she 
immediately drew back with a decided negative, he was not to be in-
duced to sit down again.
 Anne did not wish for more of such looks and speeches. His cold 
politeness, his ceremonious grace, were worse than any thing.1
There is a moment during the party, however, that contrasts sharply with 
Frederick Wentworth’s general affect of vague politeness and compla-
cency, a moment in which Anne feels that she knows exactly what he 
is thinking. At one point, Mrs. Musgrove speaks to him about her late 
son, Richard, who used to serve under his command and, though an un-
promising and careless young man, apparently behaved somewhat more 
conscientiously when supervised by Captain Wentworth:
“Poor dear fellow!” continued Mrs. Musgrove; “he was grown so 
steady, and such an excellent correspondent, while he was under your 
care! Ah! it would have been a happy thing, if he had never left you. I 
assure you, Captain Wentworth, we are very sorry he ever left you.”
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 There was a momentary expression in Captain Wentworth’s face 
at this speech, a certain glance of his bright eye, and curl of his hand-
some mouth, which convinced Anne, that instead of sharing in Mrs. 
Musgrove’s kind wishes, as to her son, he had probably been at some 
pains to get rid of him; but it was too transient an indulgence of self-
amusement to be detected by any who understood him less than her-
self; in another moment he was perfectly collected and serious, and, 
almost instantly afterwards coming up to the sofa, on which she and 
Mrs. Musgrove were sitting, took a place by the latter, and entered 
into conversation with her, in a low voice, about her son, doing it 
with so much sympathy and natural grace, as shewed the kindest con-
sideration for all that was real and unabsurd in the parent’s feelings. 
(63–64, emphasis added)
 There is a striking contrast between the Frederick of the rest of the 
chapter, whose thoughts and feelings can only be guessed at, and the 
Frederick of this passage, whose involuntary look and smile render him 
transparent to Anne. She gathers that Frederick didn’t think highly of 
Dick Musgrove and that he wants to conceal that from the young man’s 
mother. This moment of perfect access is over almost immediately—in 
the long quote above I italicized the phrases that emphasize just how 
transient it is—yet it’s there for Anne to notice with a pang of old inti-
macy.
 I came up with a special term to describe the moments in fictional 
narratives when characters’ body language involuntarily betrays their 
feelings, particularly if they want to conceal them from others, as Freder-
ick Wentworth does. I call it embodied transparency and believe that the 
pleasure that we as readers derive from such moments is best explained 
by thinking about what they do to our theory of mind. (What they do 
to the characters inside the story is a different matter; many characters 
don’t even notice them.) Instances of embodied transparency offer us 
something that we hold at a premium in our everyday life and never 
get much of: the experience of perfect access to other people’s minds in 
complex social situations. As such, they must be immensely flattering to 
our theory-of-mind adaptations, which evolved to read minds through 
bodies but have to constantly contend with the possibility of misreading 
and resulting social failure.2
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 Embodied transparency is but one of many ways in which fiction 
engages our mind-reading adaptations. As I argued in Why We Read 
Fiction, theory of mind makes fiction, as we know it, possible.3 To read 
a work of fiction is to attribute mental states to fictional characters, to 
the writer, and to oneself—the exact balance and configuration of these 
three types of attribution depending on the genre and style of the specific 
piece.4
 What my earlier broader argument about fiction and theory of mind 
has in common with my present argument about embodied transpar-
ency is an emphasis on the social. Theory of mind evolved to track men-
tal states involved in real-life social interactions, but on some level our 
mind-reading adaptations do not distinguish between the mental states 
of real people and those of fictional characters.5 Fictional narratives feed 
our hungry theory of mind, giving us carefully crafted, emotionally and 
aesthetically compelling social contexts shot through with mind-reading 
opportunities. The pleasure afforded by following minds on the page is 
thus to a significant degree a social pleasure—an illusory but satisfying 
confirmation that we remain competent players in the social game that is 
our life.
 But this is how what I do here is different from what I did in Why We 
Read Fiction. In that book I showed that modernist fiction, novels featur-
ing unreliable narrators, and detective stories play with our mind-reading 
adaptations by keeping them off-balance. That is, they make us weigh 
and reweigh the truth-value of information that we glean by following 
mental states that are strategically embedded within other mental states. 
For instance, we gather that character A wants character B to think that 
character C has betrayed B, yet we are not sure about character A’s moti-
vation and thus don’t know if she is honest with B. Thus Why We Read 
Fiction focuses on the mind-reading uncertainty that the manipulation 
of mental states induces in us: the characters manipulate mental states of 
each other, the narrator manipulates mental states of the reader, and so 
forth.
 In contrast, here I look at mind-reading certainty and body language 
as the path to that certainty. This means that while in Why We Read Fic-
tion body language is dealt with only incidentally, here it assumes center 
stage. This focus on the body limits my argument in one way and opens 
it up in another. It limits what I can say about prose fiction because fic-
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tion writers use embodied transparency sparingly. Austen, for instance, 
would rather rely on the prerogative of the omniscient narrator to tell the 
reader what her character is thinking (as in the case of Anne, above), or 
else would make us grope in the dark along with one character, trying to 
guess what’s on the other character’s mind (as we are groping along with 
Anne, trying to guess if Captain Wentworth still cares about her).
 But if embodied transparency is relatively rare in prose fiction, it’s 
abundantly present in visual media: movies, musicals, paintings, and re-
ality shows. So focusing on the body as the direct pathway to mind opens 
up new ways of looking at a variety of cultural phenomena. What’s inter-
esting about this wider view is how many “rules” for depicting embodied 
transparency turn out to translate across genres. In the rest of this chap-
ter I will talk about these rules in fiction, setting the stage for my discus-
sion of visual representations in chapters 5 through 10.
How Is Embodied Transparency in Fiction Different from Embodied 
Transparency in Real Life?
When I claim that fictional moments of embodied transparency treat us 
with the direct access to other people’s minds that we never get enough of 
in real life, I don’t mean that in real life we never get to intuit what other 
people think or feel based on their observable body language. Of course 
we do! (Or at least we think we do, which is the same.) What I mean, 
rather, is that in real life we almost never encounter the combination of 
direct access and social complexity that fiction offers us on a regular 
basis.
 Think about it this way. In real life the correlation between social 
complexity and transparency is negative. The more socially complex the 
situation is—that is, the more mental states we need to follow in order to 
grasp it—the more possibilities there are for misinterpreting what seems 
to be transparent body language. In fiction the correlation is positive. 
Writers build extremely involved social situations to bring characters to 
a point at which their bodies fully reveal their minds.
 Hence in a novel it is because character A thinks that she knows what 
character W may think, both about character R and about an appropri-
ate emotional response to character M’s feelings about character R, that 
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readers believe that they know what character W is thinking when he 
glances up and curls “his handsome mouth” in a certain way. In contrast, 
in real life we may observe person W glancing up and half-smiling, and 
we may even know how he feels about M’s attitude toward R, but there 
are still so many opportunities for misreading W’s body language on this 
particular occasion that we would be either naive or delusional to think 
that we know exactly what is going through his mind. We may think that 
he is amused by what M says about R, while in reality he may be thinking 
of how much his dog loves its new toy.
 So when we look for cases of embodied transparency in our everyday 
life, more often than not we come up with socially impoverished situa-
tions, that is, situations that don’t require attribution of mental states em-
bedded within other mental states embedded within other mental states 
(as in “A wants B to think that C didn’t want B to know about X”). I 
briskly pass the service desk while exiting the gym but then realize that I 
forgot my bicycle helmet back in the locker. I turn around and approach 
the desk with an ingratiating smile, hoping that they’ll just let me in and 
that I won’t have to fish for the gym ID in my backpack. The girl at the 
service desk must have been watching me exit and then stop suddenly 
and turn around, because even before I begin to explain, she nods, says, 
“Forgot something?” and lets me in. For the last ten seconds my body 
language has been perfectly transparent to her, but this instance of em-
bodied transparency involves only two mental states—she knows that 
I want to retrieve a forgotten object—so it is boring. Nothing to write 
novels about.
 Not to forget about such obvious physiological examples of real-life 
embodied transparency as sneezing, having erections and orgasms,6 burp-
ing, passing gas, jerking away one’s hand when accidentally touching a 
hot stove, and so forth. Once again, none of these are interesting unless 
we start adding more mental states to them, but as we do, transparency 
evaporates.
 Take orgasm. On the one hand erotic love seems to create compelling 
contexts for embodied transparency (indeed, the term intimacy itself, as 
it is currently used in our culture, appears to reflect this ideal of perfect 
access). On the other hand orgasm can be faked, and, if it isn’t, it can 
still be “performed,” that is, rendered more visually and aurally expres-
sive. Look how it changes the mind-reading dynamics of the situation. 
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A person who consciously intensifies the performance of her orgasm is 
attempting to manipulate the mind of her partner—that is, she wants him 
or her to believe that she feels X. Conversely, the partner, who is aware of 
the possibility of such a performance, may wonder if the person who is 
having an orgasm really “means it” or if she wants him or her to believe 
that she feels X. Argh! The complexity of the situation increases at the 
expense of transparency—a zero-sum game that haunts real life but can 
be escaped in fiction.
 As I keep searching for other instances of everyday embodied trans-
parency—besides achieving wordless understanding at service desks, 
jerking a hand away from a hot stove, sneezing, and having honest-to-
goodness orgasms—I turn to babies and pets. Babies certainly represent 
a fascinating example of the trade-off between social complexity and 
transparency. Although even a five-month-old can manipulate a parent 
by crying, not because he is hungry or colicky but because he wants to be 
picked up and cuddled (thus essentially “performing” pain and distress 
for his receptive audience), babies are still quite transparent much of the 
time. When a one-year-old reaches for a ball, that ball is what she wants. 
When she embarks toward it across the room, her single-mindedness of 
purpose is a sight to behold. When a fifteen-month-old insists on being 
read this but not that book, he does it not because he wants to impress 
his parents in a certain way—that is, not because he wants his parents 
to think that he thinks X—but because this book is what he absolutely 
wants to be read right now. When he smiles, he means it, and he certainly 
means it when he laughs.
 Obviously, there are many reasons, ranging from the effects of oxy-
tocin to cultural traditions, why people like babies, but I believe that this 
capacity for embodied transparency contributes to the delight we take in 
them. Our theory-of-mind adaptations seem to go into high gear when 
we sense a possibility of witnessing a real—that is, not put-on or per-
formed—emotion; and babies tend to rivet our attention with the trans-
parency of their emotions practically all the time.
 Think, too, what underlies the compliment that we pay to a person 
when we say that he or she is “childlike.” When we do so, we typically 
refer to the immediacy and freshness of that individual’s emotional re-
sponses; we appreciate the candor, the lack of pretense. But what un-
derlies this compliment (if we look at it squarely from a mind-reading 
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perspective, which is not a perspective we’d be consciously aware of) is 
that we feel that we can read their emotional responses, and we like that.
 Pets can offer us real-life embodied transparency, dogs perhaps more 
so than cats (though cat owners may disagree). Certain lizards are de-
lightful pets because they change their skin color depending on their emo-
tions.
 As these last examples show, I have reached the bottom of a barrel 
that was not particularly deep to begin with. Real life is either stingy 
or not very socially exciting when it comes to embodied transparency. 
If it were different—that is, if we could regularly come upon socially 
complex embodied transparency in real life—fictional stories featuring 
transparency would have had no chance. We would have remained glued 
to watching other people (and ourselves) interacting with each other and 
betraying their (and our own) feelings in wonderfully informative ways. 
But as it is, watchful as we may be, embodied transparency that does 
come our way can’t hold a candle to that available in books and movies.
 But if real life is a tightfisted bore, what do fiction and, especially, 
movies—reservoirs of titillating, socially rich transparency—do to us? 
Does consuming embodied transparency on the page, onstage, and on-
screen sharpen our appetite for it in our everyday life? Do we start per-
ceiving people around us as more transparent than they are? Or do we 
get addicted to shows and stories that offer us a steady supply of readable 
bodies?
 I think the latter is certainly the case, and the former might be the 
case; but I wouldn’t know how to test it. An experiment demonstrating 
that after watching a lot of reality TV a person is more prone to believe 
that people around her often inadvertently reveal their feelings may be 
confusing causation with correlation and, anyway, won’t say much about 
the long-term social effects of watching such shows.
 One reason that embodied transparency in a complex social situation 
exists only in fiction, movies, and television shows may have to do with 
the way our consciousness operates. Fictional representations can suc-
cessfully create the illusion of transparency because fictional minds are, 
in principle, fully knowable while, in real life, the very notion of fully 
knowing one’s mind or someone else’s mind is problematic.
 What does it mean to “really” know your mind? As evolutionary 
psychologist Robert Kurzban shows in his remarkable recent book, Why 
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Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, it means to subscribe, without even be-
ing aware of it, to a version of the notorious Cartesian theater (a concept 
introduced by the philosopher Daniel Dennett): the homuncular “you” at 
the center of your consciousness observing what your “mind” is up to.7 
But there is no theater in the brain and no “you” in the best seat of the 
house, deciding which of the feelings currently on display are “real” and 
which are only approximately real or downright fake.
 It may be even worse than that. It seems that parts of your brain don’t 
communicate with each other—the “brain might be designed to keep 
certain parts of information away from other parts”—and they “can si-
multaneously hold different, mutually contradictory views.”8 This means 
that consciousness is gappy and discontinuous all the way through9 and 
not amenable to any kind of full introspection, or “transparency,” either 
from the inside or the outside. (Once more, we are talking about complex 
social situations; a person screaming desperately at the sight of the mur-
derer with an ax is transparent both from the inside and the outside.)
 But if one can hold several contradictory views simultaneously, what 
can body language presumably betraying “real” feelings in fact betray? 
If we assume that the inadvertently revealed feelings exist on a conscious 
level—that is, if the person is aware of these feelings—we are in trouble 
because what she is aware of is not more “real” than what she is not 
aware of. And if we assume that the inadvertently revealed feelings are 
those that the person is not in the least aware of, how can we say that 
these are her “real” feelings?
 What possessed her to do that? What possessed me to do this? I don’t 
know. At times we face the deeply uncomfortable realization that we may 
never fully comprehend the mental states behind this or that action of 
our own or of other people that seems so strange, so meaningless, so out-
of-character. “If you are like me,” Kurzban writes, “you have often—
and quite honestly—answered the question ‘Why did you do that?’ with 
‘I have absolutely no idea.’ ”10 Our theory of mind is not terribly well 
equipped to deal with a discontinuous consciousness (i.e., a conscious-
ness defined by a lack of communication between different parts of the 
brain) and with the behavior that comes out of this discontinuity.
 But, equipped or not, theory of mind never quits. So we keep coming 
up with explanations—“surely, I must have wanted X when I did that!” 
“Oh, he must have been thinking Z when he did this!”—even as the ex-
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planations ring hollow. We may turn to essentialism: “He acted this way 
because this is just the way he is.” But essentialist thinking is not very sat-
isfying either because it seeks to shut down our theory of mind, and good 
luck with that! In the midst of our best essentialist effort we still keep 
wondering if there could be some motivation, desire, or thought that we 
haven’t considered and that may yet explain inexplicable behavior.11
 Not so with fictional characters. Unpredictable as a character can be 
and discontinuous as her consciousness may seem, it’s hard for us to let go 
of the intuition that someone, somewhere, under certain circumstances, 
has, or used to have, a privileged insight into that consciousness.12 When 
a story is marked off as fictional (which is a complex cultural process that 
exploits our cognitive adaptations for source-monitoring),13 it’s perceived 
as a story with a mind behind it: the mind of its author, even if the author 
is anonymous or unknown.14 This makes the minds of characters within 
the story knowable, at least in principle. So if the author is inclined to 
work in some moments of embodied transparency, this transparency can 
be believable in a way that real-life transparency can’t be.
 (The real-life analogy to this mind-knowing author is, of course, God. 
If you can’t fathom why someone did something, you can still throw a 
bone to your hungry theory of mind by saying, “Only God knows what 
he was thinking when he did that!” But if your personal universe admits 
no God, your theory of mind is out of luck.)15
Three Rules for Embodied Transparency in Prose Fiction
There seem to be three “rules” for constructing moments of embodied 
transparency in prose fiction. The first rule is contrasts: an author has 
to build up a context in which the character’s transparency stands out 
sharply against the relative lack of transparency of other characters or of 
the same character a moment ago or a moment after. The second rule is 
transience: to be believable, instances of transparency must be brief. The 
third rule is restraint: more often than not, characters struggle to conceal 
their feelings and by doing so become transparent.
 These rules are not absolute. As I will shortly show, certain genres, 
such as fairy tales and stories featuring unreliable narrators, violate them 
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routinely. Yet they are consistent enough for me to suggest that when we 
encounter what seems to be an instance of embodied transparency in fic-
tion, these rules are worth checking for. Whether followed or violated, 
they come through in interestingly idiosyncratic ways.
 What are the origins of these rules? The need for contrasts might be 
the fictional narrative’s holdover from visual cognition. Any art that ap-
peals to the eye must cultivate gradients. As art historian Ernst Gombrich 
has observed, “Even newly hatched chickens classify their impressions 
according to relationships.”16 So, perhaps, to the extent to which we vi-
sualize what we read, thinking of characters in relative terms (e.g., he 
looks happier than his friend; she is taller than her sisters; his face is more 
expressive than hers) enhances the image’s sensory appeal.17
 The emphasis on transience seems to be directly related to our daily 
practices of mind reading. Imagine a context in which a person seems 
momentarily transparent to the people around her, and ask yourself how 
long this transparency can last before it turns into a performance.
 Say that you know me well and know that I am deathly afraid of 
mice. At some point in a public place, somebody points to the ground 
close to my feet and exclaims, “Mouse!” Most likely, I will let out a 
shriek, and, for that second, you can be quite sure that you know what I 
feel: fear, disgust, and the wish to get further away from the mouse, wher-
ever it is. Just then I will be transparent—that is, as transparent as people 
can be in real life. But if I continue shrieking or looking terrified for more 
than a second, what started out as transparency is likely to have changed 
into performance. (Unless my shrieks are an indication of drunkenness 
or mental breakdown—in which case I am still transparent—but altered 
mental states form a category of their own.) That is, it’s possible that 
by continuing to shriek I am trying to impress others in a certain way: 
perhaps I want to come across as weak and feminine—if my culture con-
siders displays of weakness in women attractive—or simply want to hold 
everybody’s attention. But whatever my motivation, you’re not sure what 
it is, which means that I am not transparent anymore.
 It is the same with fictional characters. The longer the character 
seems to be transparent, the more likely it is that, knowing that other 
characters are reading her body language as indicative of her mental 
states, she is trying to manipulate their thinking. There is a very small 
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window of opportunity during which a sober, sane character, not in an 
acute life-threatening situation, can be seen as transparent without laps-
ing into affectation and thus becoming opaque again.
 The other side of the need for transience is ethics. If a character is 
forced into being transparent while another character is watching, and all 
this goes on for too long, the observer will soon be perceived as sadistic. 
And if you are a writer and you want your hero or heroine to remain 
sympathetic, you don’t put them in a situation in which they begin to en-
joy the spectacle of someone else’s transparency. (I will discuss shortly the 
first marriage proposal scene from Pride and Prejudice, in which Austen 
makes sure to tell us that Elizabeth feels “dreadful” as she watches Mr. 
Darcy’s struggle to conceal his anger and shock, even though that mo-
ment of struggle, and hence transparency, must have been quite brief.)
 This reflects in interesting ways what happens in real life when bod-
ies betray people’s feelings in full view of others—when, for instance, a 
person bursts into tears or blushes violently. Although people respond 
to such situations in a variety of ways, depending on the context, one 
recognizable reaction is to avert one’s gaze or, at least, to make a show 
of averting one’s gaze. What this reaction seems to imply is that people 
are put at a social disadvantage when their faces “leak” emotions against 
their wills, so it is wrong of others to use such moments of weakness to 
learn something about the “leaking” person’s real feelings and exploit 
that knowledge in subsequent dealings with them.
 The phenomenon of leakage has been much debated by psycholo-
gists. Some think that it doesn’t really exist. That is, people certainly 
exhibit involuntary body language, including bursting into tears and 
blushing, but this language may not be as informative about “true” men-
tal states as it is made out to be. (This view is compatible with but not 
identical to Kurzban’s broader questioning of the concept of “true” feel-
ings.) Thus psychologist Alan J. Fridlund argues that, from the evolution-
ary perspective, it makes no sense to expect that natural selection would 
favor a system of signaling that provides information “detrimental to the 
signaler” and that “displays generally should not necessarily occur when 
one is emotional at all, but when they will do the most good for the dis-
player.”18
 In other words social rules against staring at people when they invol-
untarily display their feelings are based on our biased view of the body 
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as a uniquely valuable source of information about the mind. This view 
may reflect our evolutionary history as a mind-reading species (i.e., we 
read bodies for information about mental states for hundreds of thou-
sands of years, and we are pretty much stuck with doing this) but may 
overestimate the actual ability of body language to provide direct access 
to mental states.
 So when writers keep embodied transparency brief so as not to let 
other characters observe it for long, they follow our intuition that bodies 
that leak feelings are socially vulnerable. This intuition may be correct 
only to some limited extent—social vulnerability can certainly be dis-
played strategically so as to “do the most good for the displayer”—but 
fictional narratives tend to abide by this conventional view. As long as 
the body is perceived as the privileged pathway to a person’s mind, au-
thors will not allow a sympathetic character to dwell on someone else’s 
transparency to her heart’s content. And she would not entertain such a 
heartless desire, anyway.
 Finally, the rule of restraint may have something to do with our intui-
tive fascination with complex mental states. Characters who are aware 
that other people are trying to read their body language, and hence at-
tempt to control their body language to influence those people’s percep-
tions of their mental states, may come across as more interesting than 
characters who simply let it all out. Restraint calls for a third-level em-
bedment of mental states (as in, “I don’t want her to know what I am 
feeling”), and, as I have suggested elsewhere, we may find particularly 
enjoyable cultural representations that cultivate this level of “sociocogni-
tive complexity.”19
Concealing Anger
Remember the two passages from Persuasion quoted above, one in which 
the author tells us what a character (Anne Elliott) feels, using the prerog-
ative of omniscient narration, and another in which she makes a charac-
ter’s body show his true feelings, forcing him (Frederick Wentworth) into 
a state of embodied transparency? Here is another such juxtaposition of 
telling and making transparent, now from Austen’s Pride and Prejudice 
(1813).
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 Mr. Darcy tells Elizabeth Bennet that he loves her and asks her to 
marry him. His proposal is not accepted kindly, and as the conversa-
tion goes on, both protagonists get angry. Note, however, that while we 
merely hear of Elizabeth’s anger from the omniscient narrator, we actu-
ally see Mr. Darcy’s anger and his attempts to conceal it.
 Here is Elizabeth listening to Mr. Darcy’s confession that he “strug-
gled . . . in vain” to repress his love for her, a confession that may have 
been meant to flatter her but that she finds insulting:
In spite of her deeply-rooted dislike, she could not be insensible to the 
compliment of such a man’s affections, and though her intentions did 
not vary for an instant, she was first sorry for the pain he was [about] 
to receive; till, roused to resentment by his subsequent language, she 
lost all compassion in anger. She tried, however, to compose herself to 
answer him with patience, when he should have done.20
Elizabeth does not fully succeed in composing herself. Toward the end 
of Mr. Darcy’s speech, “the colour [rises] into her cheeks” (fig. 2). But 
heightened color is not by itself a sign of anger. It can be interpreted as 
indicative of a variety of mental states, some even flattering to the suitor. 
In contrast, when, after hearing Elizabeth’s response to his proposal, Mr. 
Darcy gets angry, his body provides direct and unequivocal access to his 
feelings (fig. 3):
Mr. Darcy, who was leaning against the mantelpiece with his eyes 
fixed on her face, seemed to catch her words with no less resentment 
than surprise. His complexion became pale with anger, and the dis-
turbance of his mind was visible in every feature. He was struggling 
for the appearance of composure, and would not open his lips, till he 
believed himself to have attained it. (129, emphasis added) Observe our three rules at work in this scene (and as you do, apply 
them also to the passages from Persuasion discussed earlier). First, note 
the contrasts that go into constructing Mr. Darcy’s transparency. Not 
only is he now more readable than Elizabeth, but he is also more readable 
than himself earlier in the novel and a moment before. In the first sen-
tence of the last quoted passage, he is described as seeming to catch her 
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words with no less resentment than surprise. That is, there is still some 
possibility of misinterpreting his body language at that point: he seems to 
be resentful and surprised, but he might not actually be so. Then the next 
sentence (“His complexion became pale with anger . . .”) leaves no doubt 
that his body reflects his mind fully and faithfully.
 After a period of inner struggle (observe the rule of restraint in ac-
tion!)—which leaves him transparent still, for the struggle is visible to 
Elizabeth—Darcy attains, or believes he has attained, “the appearance of 
composure.” This quick sequence of contrasts, this change from seeming 
to being and then back to seeming—he seems resentful; he is angry; he is 
struggling; he seems composed—creates the impression that the moment 
of perfect access cannot last long, thus sharpening our appreciation for 
the vision of a body caught in spontaneous emotion.
 True, Austen emphasizes that time slows down for Elizabeth as she 
watches Darcy’s internal struggle—“the pause was to Elizabeth’s feel-
ings dreadful” (130)—but we know that this pause could not really have 
FIGURE 2. Jennifer Ehle as Elizabeth Bennet in the first proposal scene from 
the 1996 BBC production of Pride and Prejudice.
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lasted very long. Brevity makes it ethically defensible, too: we don’t want 
to think that Elizabeth actually enjoys watching Mr. Darcy at his most 
transparent.21
 Anger, incidentally, is a particularly interesting emotion among those 
that a character may struggle to suppress. Social psychologist Larissa 
Z. Tiedens has demonstrated that anger appears to be “one of the few 
emotions for which suppression can actually foster affiliation—people 
like someone more if he or she restrains from displaying anger.”22 Fiction 
writers have always anticipated psychologists in their intuitive grasp of 
interpersonal dynamics. Here Austen does it again. We like Mr. Darcy; 
we have liked him for the last two hundred years. But now, with the 
advance of studies in cognitive and social psychology, we can see in a 
new light the small details that contribute to making him an appealing 
character, in spite of all his pride and snobbery.
 This is not to say that concealing anger works like a charm in all 
fictional contexts. We are not automatically enamored of every character 
struggling to suppress his or her wrath. Rather, a moment of such sup-
FIGURE 3. Colin Firth as Mr. Darcy in the first proposal scene from the 
1996 BBC production of Pride and Prejudice.
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pression can increase our liking for a character when used strategically 
in conjunction with other rhetorical techniques. (Or perhaps I should 
say psychological techniques, for what is rhetoric but a skillful verbal 
manipulation of our cognitive predispositions?)
Concealing Disappointment
Here is an example of embodied transparency from a more recent novel, 
Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason (1999). Fielding’s 
treatment of transparency is particularly interesting because, written from 
the first-person point of view and obsessed with the issue of gender and 
communication, her novel provides an apparently exhaustive report of 
Bridget’s feelings and those of women surrounding her. (Men’s minds re-
main strategically obscured—in the tradition of Austen, whose Pride and 
Prejudice and Persuasion inspired the “Bridget Jones” duology.) There 
seems to be no need for special moments of embodied transparency.
 But even here such moments are presented as rare and valuable flashes 
of insight. For example, there is the scene at a ski resort in which Bridget 
is talking to her boyfriend, Mark Darcy, and an attractive woman, Re-
becca, who is trying to steal Mark from Bridget. Rebecca invites Mark 
and Bridget to a skiing party, where she would have more opportunities 
to flirt with Mark, especially if Bridget, a poor skier, could be separated 
from him:
“Oh, it’s so exhilarating,” said Rebecca, putting her goggles on her 
head and laughing into Mark’s face. “Listen, do you both want to 
have supper with us tonight? We are going to have a fondue up the 
mountain, then a torchlight ski down—oh sorry, Bridget, but you 
could come down in the cable car.”
 “No,” said Mark abruptly, “I missed Valentine’s Day so I’m tak-
ing Bridget for a Valentine’s dinner.”
 The good thing about Rebecca is there is always a split second 
when she gives herself away by looking really pissed-off.
 “Okey-dokey, whatever, have a fun time,” she said, flashed the 
toothpaste advert smile, then put her goggles on and skied off with a 
flourish towards the town.23
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 The rule of contrasts and the rule of transience are prominent here, 
more so than the rule of restraint. First, Rebecca’s involuntary giving 
“herself away by looking really pissed-off” is contrasted with her fake 
spontaneity one moment earlier (when she appears unable to contain her 
good spirits buoyed by skiing) and her fake friendliness right after (when 
she smiles broadly to show that she does not mind Mark’s rejection). Her 
bodily display of feelings is also contrasted with Mark’s opacity. When 
Mark says “no,” it comes across as “abrupt,” which means that nothing 
in his body language has prepared the two women for what he was about 
to say.
 Second, Fielding has Bridget actively draw our attention to the tran-
sience of this revelatory moment: Rebecca looks pissed off only for a 
“split second,” so one is lucky to catch it. Everything happens too fast for 
anybody to register Rebecca’s struggle to hide her disappointment. Hence 
we get no explicit description of such a struggle. Do we still read it into the 
scene? Perhaps it is there, though not described explicitly, hiding between 
Rebecca’s looking pissed off and flashing the toothpaste advert smile?
Magical Exceptions
Now think of narratives whose genre conventions exempt them from the 
rule of transience, such as myths and fairy tales or modern-day stories 
with elements of magic. For instance, in the movie What Women Want 
(2000) Mel Gibson’s character, Nick Marshall, falls into a bathtub with 
a hairdryer and is jolted by electricity, which makes it possible for him 
to hear the innermost thoughts of women around him. This fantastic 
premise makes the issue of transience moot: women are transparent to 
Nick all the time.
 What electricity does to Nick, fairies do to the knight from the me-
dieval French fabliau “Le chevalier qui fist parler les cons” (“The Knight 
Who Made Cunts Speak”). They give the poor but “gallant” protagonist 
a marvelous gift: he can literally force women’s body parts to talk against 
their owners’ wills. As one of the fairies explains:
 Sir knight, my gift’s no small one:
 wherever you go, west or east,
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 you shall not find a maid or a beast,
 so she have two eyes, whose cunt can refrain
 from answering you if you but deign
 to speak to it.
 Another fairy continues:
 Sir knight, to this second gift I add,
 as is just and right, that if the cunt
 be blocked or stoppered up in front
 and cannot answer you straightway,
 the arsehole will, without delay,
 speak for it, if you give leave,
 no matter whom it hurt or grieve.24
 The knight soon finds himself a guest in the castle of a count and 
countess where he has ample opportunity to display his new magical 
powers to the mortification of his hostess and her female servants. As 
the scholar of French literature, Evelyn Birge Vitz, observes, this “fabliau 
enacts the desire (of men) to hear the lower, interior parts of the female 
body speak up—and for these parts, unlike women’s mouths, to tell the 
truth.”25 In other words the same intense interest in correlating body 
language with “true” states of mind drives depictions of embodied trans-
parency in a novel by Jane Austen and in a bawdy medieval tale. The 
fantastic premise of the latter, however, makes transience less of an issue: 
to the embarrassment of the female protagonists their lower body parts 
can, in principle, hold forth for any length of time.
 I expect to find the same disregard for the rule of transience in tales 
featuring supernatural agents and events in a variety of historical pe-
riods and national literatures. The underlying assumption here is that 
authors always look for new ways to bring about embodied transparency 
and that when they work with genres that allow the bending of reality, 
they use that license with vengeance to make bodies transparent. If we 
are reading, watching, or listening to a story in which magic allows the 
protagonist to know what others think, we are with him or her all the 
way—we want as much of it as we can get.
 At least for a while, that is. For, ethics may start whimpering in the 
background, and the author may feel compelled to tax the protagonist 
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with the sin of pride, which then necessitates punishment and rescinding 
of the magic powers.
Who Gets to See Transparent Bodies?
It may seem, based on my examples from Austen, Helen Fielding, What 
Women Want, and “The Knight Who Made Cunts Speak,” that embod-
ied transparency always finds an appreciative spectator within the story 
itself. When Mr. Darcy looks angry, Elizabeth is there to observe him 
and interpret his body language. When Rebecca looks pissed off, Bridget 
is there to notice it. When Helen Hunt’s character is brainstorming an 
advertising slogan, Mel Gibson’s character is there to eavesdrop on her 
thoughts and steal them for his own professional advancement. And the 
knight is there when the countess’s . . . you get the picture. But the situa-
tion is really more complex. Many fictional characters remain oblivious 
of others’ momentary transparency because they do not have enough 
context to interpret it.
 Thus in Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749) there is a scene in which 
the virtuous Mr. Allworthy, the adopted father of the title character, is 
talking about love as “the only foundation of happiness in a married 
state.” Present at this heartfelt “sermon” is one Doctor Blifil, the brother 
of the man who is about to marry Mr. Allworthy’s sister, Bridget. Doc-
tor Blifil knows that his brother is marrying not for love but in hopes of 
inheriting Mr. Allworthy’s estate, so it costs him some effort to refrain 
from sneering as he listens to the good man’s idealistic exhortations. As 
Fielding puts it, Doctor Blifil has to take “some pains to preserve now 
and then a small discomposure of his muscles.”26
 We infer that Allworthy remains oblivious to these half-smothered 
facial contortions.27 Or, perhaps, he does see them but perceives them as 
mere facial ticks. In any case they do not have for him the same meaning they 
have for us. We look at Doctor Blifil, and we see what Mr. Allworthy does 
not see: a body that desperately does not want to be read and thus is read-
able in this desire not to be read. In that moment Doctor Blifil is transpar-
ent, but we are the only appreciative audience for his transparency.
 We know what the Doctor’s writhing mug entails because Fielding 
wants us to know. In contrast consider another occasion when a char-
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acter is going through an orgy of grimacing to conceal his feelings, but 
Fielding does not want us to know what it means, at least not until we 
come to the end of the book.
 Bridget Allworthy does marry the venal Blifil. Eventually, both die. 
Their son, the young Blifil, plots to make Tom Jones look bad in Mr. All-
worthy’s eyes. He finally succeeds, and Tom is kicked off Mr. Allworthy’s 
estate. During his subsequent journey to London Tom comes across an 
old Gloucester acquaintance, Mr. Dowling, the lawyer. The two men sit 
down to a bottle of wine. At some point the conversation turns to Blifil, 
and when Dowling learns of Tom’s poor opinion of that young man, he 
observes that “it is a pity such a person should inherit the great estate of 
your uncle Allworthy.” Tom’s reply—“Alas, sir, you do me an honour to 
which I have no title. . . . I assure you, sir, I am no relation of Mr. Allwor-
thy”—makes it clear that he doesn’t know that on her deathbed Bridget 
Blifil confessed that Tom is her illegitimate son and hence Allworthy’s 
nephew.
 As Dowling listens to Tom’s earnest professions that he has never 
thought himself entitled to any part of Allworthy’s estate, he realizes that 
the young man in front of him has been cheated out of his family and for-
tune. For Dowling was there with Bridget as she lay dying and wrote to 
Allworthy about her confession. If Tom is still ignorant about his origins, 
it means that Allworthy himself or someone in his household (perhaps 
the young Blifil?) intentionally suppressed the information.
 Surprised as he is by what he hears, Dowling is not about to dis-
close the truth now. Instead, he tries “to hide” his feelings from Tom “by 
winking, nodding, sneering, and grinning” (576). We see his grimacing, 
but we don’t know what it means. We do not learn about Tom’s parent-
age for another three hundred pages. Only after we finish the book can 
we go back to that scene in the tavern and realize that Dowling’s body 
language was making him transparent—that he was perfectly readable in 
his desperate desire not to be readable—but there was nobody there with 
enough knowledge of the situation to appreciate his struggle to conceal 
his feelings.
 We are entering interesting territory with this last example of trans-
parency that characters don’t see at all and readers can appreciate only 
when they reread the novel. We can call it “protocinematic” because this 
is what movies often do. They make us observe a character’s body lan-
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guage—not perceived by other characters—but we don’t learn until later 
what it meant. Or we call it protodetective—as in detective stories. For 
there, too, once the secret is finally revealed, we have to go back and re-
think the clues, including people’s body language. (And, indeed, because 
of various clues scattered throughout Tom Jones, Fielding’s novel has 
been called an early example of a detective narrative.)
Conclusion: What’s in It for Us?
In the next chapter I turn to literary examples of embodied transparency 
that range from ethically iffy to disturbing. Before we move on, however, 
here is a practical question to consider: what’s the payoff of foisting this 
new concept onto readers, especially those weary of the proliferation of 
jargon in cultural criticism?
 The concept of embodied transparency is useful because it allows us 
to recognize a common pattern that cuts across genres, historical periods, 
and national representational traditions, a pattern rooted in our imper-
fect and powerful adaptations for mind-reading. After all, we wouldn’t 
usually consider side by side a medieval tale about a knight whose special 
talent cannot be described without using four-letter words, a movie pre-
mised on Mel Gibson’s character falling into a bathtub, a reality show 
in which a participant is put in an embarrassing situation and filmed in 
close-up as she becomes aware of just how embarrassing the situation is, 
and a Jane Austen novel in which one protagonist is closely observed by 
another as he glances up and smiles almost imperceptibly in response to 
someone’s remark.
 Recognizing these diverse narratives as creating contexts for moments 
of embodied transparency does not detract from their historical unique-
ness or their complex involvement with their respective genres—and why 
should it? It does, however, allow us to recognize ourselves as always 
trying to imagine what things would be like were bodies perfectly read= 
able—laughing at some of our imaginings, sighing wistfully at others.
 And yet—here is something to keep in mind in the middle of this 
talk of embodied transparency as a recurrent pattern: it is relatively rare 
in prose fiction, especially compared to other techniques used to give us 
direct access to characters’ feelings. Cognitive narratologist Alan Palmer 
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   42 3/2/12   12:44 PM
I  K N O W  W H AT  YO U ’ R E  T H I N K I N G ,  M R .  D A R C Y !           43
points out that one “of the pleasures of reading novels is the enjoyment 
of being told what a variety of fictional people are thinking. . . . This is a 
relief from the business of real life, much of which requires the ability to 
decode accurately the behavior of others.”28 Because it’s important that 
we don’t start seeing embodied transparency at the drop of a hat, I will 
close with more examples of writers telling us what “fictional people are 
thinking” without recourse to embodied transparency (even when char-
acters’ bodies are described in some detail):
 “Levin was insufferably bored with the ladies that evening”—this is 
Lev Tolstoy in Anna Karenina, using third-person omniscient narration.29
 “Conscience that had slept so long, begun to awake, and I began to 
reproach my self with my past life, in which I had so evidently by uncom-
mon wickedness, provok’d the justice of God to lay me under uncommon 
strokes, and to deal with me in so vindictive a manner”—this is Daniel 
Defoe in Robinson Crusoe using the technique of first-person narrator.30
 “The hair was curled, and the maid sent away, and Emma sat down 
to think and be miserable. It was a wretched business indeed. Such an 
overflow of everything she had been wishing for. Such a development of 
everything most unwelcome! Such a blow for Harriet!”—this is Austen 
in Emma, using the technique of free indirect discourse.31
 “That night in the mess after the spaghetti course, which every one 
ate very quickly and seriously, lifting the spaghetti on the fork until the 
loose strands hung clear then lowering it into the mouth, or else using 
a continuous lift and sucking into the mouth, helping ourselves to wine 
from the grass-covered gallon flask; it swung in a metal cradle and you 
pulled the neck of the flask down with the forefinger and the wine, clear 
red, tannic and lovely, poured out into the glass held with the same hand; 
after this course, the captain commenced picking on the priest”—this is 
Hemingway in A Farewell to Arms, using his trademark technique of 
forcing readers to intuit mental states behind his characters’ nondescript 
behavior.32
 A novel can thus feature third- or first-person narration, or free in-
direct discourse, or it can force us to guess the mental states behind am-
biguous body language, or it can rely on any combination of these tech-
niques. On top of that, it may (or may not!) include scenes in which the 
character’s body speaks her mind directly, and these are the moments that 
I am after.
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In which readers encounter a third writer named Fielding  / a rich man plays 
with a poor man’s feelings while a beautiful girl watches  / an old man plays 
with a young man’s feelings while a beautiful girl has no clue  / and the pro-
tagonist of Fight Club shows that he cares.
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Sadistic Benefactors
 Whom best I love, I cross; to make my gift,
 The more delay’d, delighted.
          —Shakespeare, Cymbeline 5.4.101–2
Some fictional characters get a glimpse of other characters’ true feelings; others don’t notice a thing; and some may even get a 
chance to think back and realize what this or that look or gesture truly 
meant.
 There is also another category of characters—those who are not con-
tent with merely glimpsing other people’s feelings. Instead, they want to 
script such moments of transparency themselves. That is, they want to 
force others into revealing their feelings through body language.
 This last emotional terrain is often explored by horror stories and 
psychological thrillers. As literary critic Walter Benn Michaels puts it in 
his discussion of American Psycho, “You can be confident that the girl 
screaming when you shoot her with a nail gun is not performing (in the 
sense of faking) her pain.”1 To avoid or soften the charge of sadism lev-
eled against characters who instigate embodied transparency in others, 
their actions can be shown to be driven by revenge (as in The Count of 
Monte Cristo) or, paradoxically, by affection or desire to do good.
 The ethics of the latter situation are extremely ambiguous. An under-
tow of emotional sadism runs through them. Yet such characters don’t 
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engage in what can be characterized as straightforward torture. In fact, 
they may sincerely believe that their actions will ultimately benefit the 
people whom they are forcing into transparency. To reflect this ambigu-
ity, I call such characters sadistic benefactors.2
 One sadistic benefactor makes his appearance in a work by yet an-
other Fielding: Sarah, Henry’s sister. In her novel The History of Ophelia 
(1760) a rich man sends a poor man on an emotional roller coaster to 
enjoy the spectacle of his feelings. Yet he acts on the benevolent principle 
of Jupiter from Shakespeare’s Cymbeline: he “crosses,” that is, inflicts 
pain on, those whom he loves “best” in order to intensify their subse-
quent joy. (I bring up Jupiter on purpose. When it comes to deities, their 
supernatural powers create endless opportunities for forcing mortals into 
embodied transparency. Were I to write about fictions of transparency in 
the ancient world, gods would figure in my account most prominently.)
 Here is how Fielding builds up to that eventual joy. The novel’s pro-
tagonist, Lord Dorchester, comes across a starving half-pay soldier, Cap-
tain Traverse, and decides to help him. Through his connections at court, 
Dorchester secretly procures Traverse a choice of two jobs. He begins, 
however, by telling the captain only of the first job, one that Dorchester 
knows Traverse will not be able to take because of family circumstances. 
The poor captain, unwilling to appear ungrateful, receives “this News 
with as much Gratitude as if it had been the very Thing he wished” and 
turns it down politely. Lord Dorchester then expresses his disappoint-
ment in such guilt-inducing terms as to drive the captain to break down 
in tears when he thinks nobody is watching. (In fact, several people are 
watching, including Lord Dorchester’s love interest, Ophelia, the young 
girl who is telling the story.)3
 Not yet content with this show of emotion, Lord Dorchester then 
reveals the captain’s family waiting in the next room and urges him again 
to take the first job. In response Traverse “faint[s] away instantly,” terri-
fying his wife and making the onlookers fear for his life. When he comes 
to, Lord Dorchester augments “the general Joy” that his recovery occa-
sions by telling him of the second job, one that is completely acceptable 
and will save the whole family from starvation. The joy now increases 
“to a great Degree of Extacy,” rising to a “Height that must have been 
painful.” The captain and his wife look on the “Lord with Adoration, 
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and [give] way to Raptures that would have forced a Heart the most 
insensible to the Sensations of others, to partake of theirs” (1:254–55).
 We can call Dorchester’s behavior sadistic and think of him as a 
mini-Jupiter of that claustrophobic world, but there is no way of telling 
if Fielding herself viewed him thus.4 All we can safely assume about her 
thoughts on the subject is that, as many writers before and after her, she 
was intuitively interested in figuring out how to put characters in situ-
ations in which their bodies reveal their minds. She drew on available 
cultural contexts of her day: a fascination with private philanthropy, an 
obsession with social class, and the conventions of contemporary senti-
mental discourse (in which men may cry and faint and express their emo-
tions relatively freely). Admittedly, she may have pushed these conven-
tions a bit too far in having Dorchester mastermind the touching scene 
instead of letting it happen by chance.
 Two years later, another eighteenth-century writer profoundly in-
vested in sentimentalism brought forth an even more manipulative sadis-
tic benefactor. Jean-Jacques, the narrator of Rousseau’s Emile (1762), is 
a strange case. He is a hybrid between fictional character and Rousseau’s 
own self; other people in the novel are figments of Jean-Jacques’s imagi-
nation—he makes them up as he moves along to illustrate his philosophi-
cal and pedagogical points. He tells us, too, that he makes them up, but 
we soon forget this and, courtesy of our theory of mind, begin treating 
them not as abstract entities used for object lessons but as regular fic-
tional characters (that is, as independent agents capable of a rich array of 
thoughts and feelings).
 One such character is a young man named Emile, who has been un-
der Jean-Jacques’s tutelage from early childhood. Toward the end of the 
novel Emile meets the woman of his dreams, Sophie. Now she is all he 
can think about. Jean-Jacques wholeheartedly approves of his choice, for 
it was he who brought the young people together (indeed, he invented 
Sophie just for this occasion and told us so). Still, he also believes that his 
pupil has yet much to learn about himself and the world. Jean-Jacques 
thus needs to convince Emile that he has to leave Sophie for two years in 
order to complete his education as a man and as a citizen. Then he can 
come back to her ready to assume the duties of the head of the family. 
This is a difficult case to argue, and Jean-Jacques decides that, in order 
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to win, he first has to put Emile in a state of emotional turmoil seemingly 
unrelated to the topic at hand. Here is how he goes about it:
One morning, when they have not seen each other for two days, I 
enter Emile’s room with a letter in my hand; staring fixedly at him, I 
say, “What would you do if you were informed that Sophie is dead?” 
He lets out a great cry, gets up, striking his hands together, and looks 
wild-eyed at me without saying a single word. “Respond then,” I 
continue with the same tranquility. Then, irritated by my coolness, 
Emile approaches, his eyes inflamed with anger, and stops in an al-
most threatening posture: “What would I do . . . I don’t know. But 
what I do know is that I would never again in my life see the man 
who had informed me.” “Reassure yourself,” I respond smiling. “She 
is alive. She is well. She thinks of you, and we are expected this eve-
ning. But let us go and take a stroll, and we will chat.”
 The passion with which he is preoccupied no longer permits him 
to give himself to purely reasoned conversations as he had before. I 
have to interest him by this very passion to make him attentive to my 
lessons. This is what I have done by this terrible preamble. I am now 
quite sure that he will listen to me.5
 Readers familiar with the story of Jean-Jacques’s relationship with 
Emile won’t be surprised by his approach. Jean-Jacques has raised Emile 
in such a way that he can read “in his face all the movements of his 
soul” (226). This is to say, he has been manipulating the boy since their 
first days together. Still, the above passage stands out in its emotional 
violence. The tutor’s “cool” intimations that Sophie might be dead come 
closer to sadism than anything else he has ever done to his impressionable 
charge.
 We know why he is doing it. Because of his passion for Sophie, Emile 
has recently been less available to his tutor. Jean-Jacques needs to re-
store Emile’s absolute transparency. Forcing him onto an emotional roller 
coaster—she is dead; no, she is alive and thinking about you—achieves 
that goal. Note how the text testifies to the tutor’s regained ability to 
read Emile’s mind perfectly: Jean-Jacques thinks that Emile is “irritated 
by [his] coolness,” angry with him, and “almost” ready to attack him. 
When, shortly after, the young man speaks, his words prove that Jean-
Jacques has been reading his body language correctly: Emile says that he 
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would remain forever hostile toward a man who informs him of Sophie’s 
death.
 Jean-Jacques’s treatment of Emile would be unforgivable had he not 
acted in the young man’s best interests. It makes Emile transparent and 
pliable, open to Jean-Jacques’s subsequent arguments about the impor-
tance of parting with Sophie for two years. The temporary anguish into 
which Emile is plunged is thus a precondition for his future happiness. 
Moreover, by this point in the story we have no doubt that Jean-Jacques 
loves Emile more than anything in the world—albeit because he does 
not have anybody else in the world. This overarching narrative of love 
is called forth to excuse and redeem the act of forcing emotional trans-
parency onto the young man. The benefit vastly outweighs the cost, and 
Jean-Jacques remains beloved by Emile, Sophie, and (later) their children.
 Enter present-day sadistic benefactor Tyler Durden, from Chuck 
Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996). Tyler holds a gun to the head of a man 
he’s just met (who turns out to be a twenty-three-year-old college drop-
out) and extracts from him the promise that he will go back to school 
to finish his degree in veterinary medicine. Tyler wants to impress on 
“Raymond Hessel” (the name he reads off the man’s driver’s license) an 
important life lesson: death can strike any minute, so study hard and fol-
low your dreams.
 But before Tyler gets to the salutary follow-your-dreams part, he uses 
every grisly cliché to convince Raymond of his imminent and terrible 
demise. He explains to the crying man how he will “cool” down, passing 
from a “person” to an “object” and how his “Mom and Dad would have 
to call old doctor whoever and get [their son’s] dental records because 
there wouldn’t be much left of [his] face.” The scene is structured so 
that Tyler seems to merely report the images arising in his victim’s mind. 
Raymond is forced into embodied transparency: half-paralyzed with fear, 
crying harder and harder, following meekly Tyler’s orders, thinking of 
things that Tyler tells him to think of (fig. 4). When Tyler finally lets Raymond go, his thoughts stay on him as he 
muses with great satisfaction: “Raymond fucking Hessel, your dinner 
is going to taste better than any meal you’ve ever eaten, and tomorrow 
will be the most beautiful day of your entire life.”6 Like Jupiter and Lord 
Dorchester, Tyler apparently believes that to intensify somebody’s hap-
piness you must first make them truly miserable. More important, like 
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Lord Dorchester, Tyler treasures every moment of transparency he can 
wring out of his victim. He enjoys knowing exactly what Raymond is 
thinking now and what he will be thinking tomorrow.
 Or does he?
 In Fight Club Palahniuk uses the literary convention of unreliable 
narration; that is, we can’t trust the narrator’s account of events.7 Bear-
ing this in mind, look again at the scene in which Tyler reads his victim’s 
body as an open book: “You [are] going to cool, the amazing miracle of 
death. One minute, you’re a person, the next minute you’re an object, 
and Mom and Dad would have to call old doctor whoever and get your 
dental records because there wouldn’t be much left of your face, and 
Mom and Dad, they’d always expected so much more from you and, no, 
life wasn’t fair and now it was come to this” (153).
 If we return to this scene after we have finished the novel and found 
out that Tyler is an unreliable narrator, we may start seeing problems 
with this assured interpretation of Raymond’s body language. We may 
notice, for example, that Tyler’s account of Raymond’s thoughts draws 
on conventional images provided by crime dramas. We have a visual rep-
ertoire of scenes associated with violent deaths, for example: cut to the 
bereaved family; cut to the corpse in the morgue; cut to the dentist, or 
some other doctor, confirming the victim’s identity; and so forth. This 
FIGURE 4. Left to right: Joon B. Kim, Brad Pitt, and Edward Norton in the 
“Raymond Hessel” scene from David Fincher’s Fight Club.
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stale, depersonalized repertoire is what Tyler dips into for his “report” 
from Raymond’s head.
 Similarly, when Tyler confidently foretells what Raymond will be 
thinking even after he is out of Tyler’s clutches (“tomorrow will be the 
most beautiful day of your entire life”), I see his point. I can certainly 
imagine how tomorrow Raymond might feel almost unbearably happy 
to be alive and thankful for every crumb that passes his lips and for every 
leaf that he sees trembling in the wind. I can also imagine Raymond rac-
ing to school, profoundly grateful for the opportunity to “work [his] ass 
off” (154) on various difficult subjects, just as Tyler told him he should. 
Finally, I can imagine Raymond eventually becoming a successful veteri-
narian, loved by his family, respected by his neighbors, and remembering 
now and then with wonder and gratitude that fateful moment when a 
stranger with a gun forced him to turn his life around and make the most 
of it.
 But then I can also imagine Raymond falling into a profound depres-
sion soon after his encounter with Tyler, thinking obsessively that his life 
depends on the whim of some jerk with a gun, and killing himself one day 
after school.
 Or he may get a gun of his own and hunt down Tyler.8
 In other words Raymond’s body remains transparent and his mind 
accessible as long as we consider this scene in isolation from the tradi-
tion of unreliable narration. For within this tradition, when a first-person 
narrator reports another character’s thoughts, he is almost immediately 
suspect, and his reporting must be scrutinized for signs of inconsistency, 
vested interests, or madness. So Palahniuk’s readers believe that Tyler re-
ally knows what Raymond is thinking only as long as they are not aware 
that Tyler is an unreliable narrator. Once they are aware of it, they have 
the option—which, of course, they may not choose—of assuming that 
they have learned little about Raymond’s actual feelings on the occasion.
 Incidentally, even if we do not consider this episode in relation to the 
convention of unreliable narration, something else in it alerts us to the 
likely gap between Tyler’s assured interpretation of Raymond’s body and 
Raymond’s actual mental state. That something else is the violation of 
the rule of transience, the second rule for constructing scenes of embod-
ied transparency. Tyler keeps reading Raymond’s mind for three straight 
pages. This implies transparency enduring far beyond what we’ve seen 
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in our other examples, in which transparency lasted for a split second or 
several seconds.
 Of course, Tyler may believe, egomaniac that he is, that he can keep 
Raymond transparent for as long as he pleases. The longer they are con-
versing, however, the more open we are to the possibility that after a 
while Raymond intuits something about the twisted psychology of his 
captor and starts performing his fear and despair at the top of his lungs. 
This is just a speculation. I don’t have any direct textual evidence that 
Raymond is performing his feelings. It just seems to me that when em-
bodied transparency is induced, observed, and reported by an unreliable 
narrator, readers may begin to wonder. Can’t transparency—if it seems to 
go on and on—morph into performance without the unreliable narrator’s 
noticing it?
 The literary convention of unreliable narration thus has an inter-
esting relationship with embodied transparency. On the one hand, this 
convention offers writers more opportunities for putting characters into 
situations in which their bodies betray their feelings. On the other hand, 
toward the end of the story readers often realize that they cannot trust 
any accounts of embodied transparency if the voice behind those ac-
counts has been that of an unreliable narrator.9
 This, in turn, raises a question about the relationship between mind 
reading and power. Of the three sadistic benefactors discussed in this 
chapter—four, if we count Jupiter—Tyler is the only one who has no 
real power over his victim outside of the immediate (i.e., gun-wielding) 
context. Jupiter can torture mortals because he is a god. Lord Dorchester 
can torture Captain Traverse because, for a poor soldier in eighteenth-
century England, a lord is the closest thing to a god. Jean-Jacque can 
torture Emile because he is the only adult in charge of this otherwise ef-
fectively parentless child. (Also, speaking of gods, Jean-Jacques created 
Emile and told us so.) Tyler has nothing going for him, except the gun, 
the empty street, and the stories that he tells himself about his power to 
read people’s minds and change their lives.
 The glaring mind-reading asymmetry implied by sadistic benefac-
tion (e.g., Lord Dorchester manipulates Captain Traverse’s mind while 
Captain Traverse has no access to Lord Dorchester’s mind) is thus al-
ways a reflection of an existing power asymmetry: gods vs. mortals, rich 
vs. poor, adults vs. children. Access to minds means power; the effective 
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manipulation of minds constitutes abuse of this power.10 Unreliable nar-
rators such as Tyler, who have no objective claim to any kind of power 
(godhead, riches, or parenthood), go directly for its characteristic mani-
festation: the ability to control other minds. To the extent to which we 
believe that they succeed, we underappreciate their unreliability; that is, 
we invest them with more power than they actually have.
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In which Clarissa is fooled while Evelina watches a fool  / Lev Tolstoy, Ernst 
Lubitsch, and Alfred Hitchcock walk into a hippodrome  / and readers are 
made to think first of Cary Grant and then of Colin Firth.
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Theaters, Hippodromes, and 
Other Mousetraps
Why Going to the Theater Is Good for a Story
Why do we go to the theater? A theory-of-mind hardliner such as myself, determined to see everything through the lens of mind 
reading, would say we go to the theater to give our greedy theory of mind 
a very particular and rich treat. We watch actors’ facial expressions and 
body language; we correlate them with given social contexts; and we fol-
low sequences of emotions displayed by one actor over time and ranges 
of emotion displayed by different actors at the same time. That is, we go 
to the theater to feel—to experience a rich gamut of emotions while sur-
rounded by people who are going through similar sensations—but this 
complex emotional experience is inextricably bound with our reading of 
the characters’ mental states.
 Why do fictional characters go to the theater? They do it because the 
author has to develop the story, and sending protagonists to the theater 
propels the plot forward. Theater is a place where they can run into other 
people, such as lovers or enemies; where they can hear important gossip, 
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get kidnapped, become aware of their changed social status, and leave or 
receive an indelible first impression.
 It is also a place where they can catch a glimpse of unguarded body 
language and thus learn something important about other characters’ 
feelings.
 You may notice as you read various fictional accounts of the the-
atergoing experience, that sometimes there is a spectator in the audience 
who does not watch the stage or only watches it with one eye while keep-
ing the other on fellow spectators and their involuntary reactions to the 
play. There is Hamlet closely observing his uncle during the loaded stage 
reenactment of “The Murder of Gonzago” and interpreting the king’s 
spontaneous body language as proof of his guilt. There is Clarissa, from 
Samuel Richardson’s eponymous novel (1747–48), watching a play and 
feeling “greatly moved by it” yet also, out of the corner of her eye, check-
ing whether or not the man she is with, Robert Lovelace, is “sensibly 
touched with some of the most affecting scenes.”1 There is Katie Carr, 
a protagonist of Nick Hornby’s novel How to Be Good (2001), loving 
“every second of the play” yet spending “almost as much time” observ-
ing the complex emotions written on her husband’s face as he follows the 
performance.2
 This practice of surreptitious observation is not accidental. It adds 
up to an important narrative convention: bringing protagonists to the 
theater opens up yet another possibility for embodied transparency. This 
convention depends on a very particular cultural assumption about the-
atergoing: people go to the theater to watch the characters onstage and 
interpret their behavior, which means that for the duration of the perfor-
mance they let down their guard because nobody is watching them and 
interpreting their behavior. That is, in a social setting that clearly marks 
off some people as performers and others as spectators, and in which the 
performers’ success is judged by the spectators’ attention (the best per-
formances keep their audiences spellbound), spectators relax and let their 
bodies show their emotions.
 This means, of course, that if somebody else in the audience happens 
to ignore the actors and focuses instead on fellow spectators, that person 
can learn quite a bit about another’s true feelings.
 At least this is how it works for Hamlet, Clarissa, and Katie Carr. 
Once more, we have to remember the difference between embodied trans-
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parency in real life and in fiction. In real life I don’t think I’ve ever tried to 
learn anything about another person’s state of mind by watching them as 
they watch a play. First of all, it’s dark. And even when it’s not dark (as 
in smaller, experimental theaters), I can only see part of a person’s face, 
and I am more interested in what’s happening onstage, anyway.
 Also, the negative correlation between social complexity and trans-
parency is still valid. Let’s say I do observe some spontaneous body lan-
guage of the person I’m with. The more interesting, that is, the more 
socially complex, narrative I come up with to interpret it, the more likely 
I am to be wrong. OK—he dabs a tear during that affecting scene, so 
this means . . . what? That he feels bad about making me feel lonely two 
weeks ago when we talked about X—and this is because the heroine’s 
predicament reminds me in some complicated ways of my own, so I as-
sume that he, too, is thinking about it this way? Right . . .
 Not so with the fictional theatergoers. They can read complex mental 
states into the faces of other spectators with perfect fluency. Here is Katie 
Carr interpreting her husband’s spontaneous reaction to a play with an 
almost disconcerting assurance. David has always hated theater, but he 
is determined to enjoy it this time. Katie finds his inner struggle, plainly 
written on his face, as gripping and informative as what is taking place 
onstage:
I love every second of the play. I drink it, like someone with dehydra-
tion might drink a glass of iced water. I love being made to think about 
something else other than my work and my marriage, and I love its wit 
and its seriousness, and I vow for the millionth time to nourish my-
self in this way on a more regular basis. . . . I spend almost as much 
time trying to snatch glimpses of David’s profile as I do watching the 
stage, though. Something weird has happened, definitely, because the 
struggle to enjoy the evening is written on David’s face: a war is tak-
ing place there, around the eyes and lips and the forehead. The old 
David wants to frown and scowl and make faces to indicate his con-
tempt for everything; the new one is clearly trying to learn how to en-
joy himself in a place of entertainment, watching a new and brilliant 
piece of work from one of the world’s leading playwrights. (69)
 Readers of How to Be Good may remember that David has just un-
dergone a personality change and that Katie finds the thought processes 
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of the “new” David so puzzling that “he is beginning to give [her] the 
creeps” (73). So the personal dynamic of this scene contrasts sharply—
and, for Katie, pleasurably—with the current goings-on in the Carr 
household. Whereas at home Katie feels that she doesn’t “really know” 
David, at the theater she can read him as an open book.
 Remember the last time something like this happened to you? Me 
neither.
Performance Creeps Back In
To recap: when a writer wants to put a character into a situation in which 
his or her mental state is radically legible to an interested party (especially 
if that party is generally unsure what the other is thinking), bringing them 
both to the theater is one viable narrative strategy. Theater is good for a 
story because it can create an immediate opening for embodied transpar-
ency.
 This recipe for privileged mind reading is not foolproof, however. 
In fact, no such recipe can remain foolproof for long because—remem-
ber?—as the best source of information about the mind, the body is also 
the most suspect source of information about the mind. Whenever a 
cultural setting becomes a recognizable context for fictional embodied 
transparency, it is immediately ready for subversion. Precisely because it 
is now known as a space where characters’ bodies leak their feelings, it 
can be used for a more devious performance of these feelings.
 Theater in particular has long been vulnerable to this kind of dou-
ble billing. The same novel can include one scene in which a character 
observes another character at the theater and learns something crucial 
about him based on his spontaneous body language; and another scene 
in which a character goes to the theater knowing that his body will be 
scrutinized for spontaneous emotions and carefully stages his display of 
emotions to manipulate the naive observer.
 In How to Be Good Hornby chooses to keep the matter simple and 
to portray the theater as a reliable setting for embodied transparency. So, 
obviously, this option is still available to a writer. See, however, what hap-
pens in another novel, written two-and-a-half centuries ago, which fea-
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tures not one but two protagonists uncertain about each other’s thoughts 
and feelings.
 Richardson’s Clarissa relies on the sentimental cliché of theater as 
catalyst for spontaneous displays of emotion and simultaneously sub-
verts this cliché. At one point the novel’s villain, Robert Lovelace, invites 
Clarissa Harlowe, an eighteen-year-old paragon of virtue, and his love in-
terest, to see a tragedy. Lovelace is certain that however affected Clarissa 
might be by the play, she will also be watching him and judging his moral 
worth and true sentiments (of which she is not at all sure) by his reaction 
to what is happening onstage.
 Lovelace is ready to put on a suitable performance of his exalted feel-
ings. And not just that. He also takes along his accomplice, a prostitute 
named Polly, whom he passes off as an upright and sensitive young lady. 
Clarissa is thus to be impressed both by Lovelace and the company he 
keeps. Polly, however, needs some coaching, and Lovelace provides it. As 
he reports in a letter to his confidant, “I have directed [Polly] where to 
weep—and this not only to show her humanity (a weeping eye indicates 
a gentle heart), but to have a pretence to hide her face with her fan or 
handkerchief.”3
 The plan works beautifully. As Clarissa reports afterwards in a let-
ter to her confidante: “I was at the play last night with Mr. Lovelace 
and Miss Horton [i.e., Polly]. It is, you know, a deep and most affecting 
tragedy in the reading. . . . You will not wonder that Miss Horton, as well 
as I, was greatly moved at the representation, when I tell you, and have 
some pleasure in telling you, that Mr. Lovelace himself was very sensibly 
touched with some of the most affecting scenes. I mention this in praise 
of the author’s performance; for I take Mr. Lovelace to be one of the most 
hard-hearted men in the world” (640).
 What Richardson appears to be saying here is that only naives, such 
as Clarissa, still believe that people stop performing their bodies once 
they direct their attention to the stage. Lovelace and Polly seem to know 
that the real performance—and the most exquisite fakery—only begins 
then.
 Except that it is not that simple. Here and elsewhere in Clarissa Rich-
ardson manages to send up sentimentalist assumptions and to rely on 
them at the same time. True, Polly successfully fakes a kind heart and 
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lofty sensibility, and so does Lovelace. But even as he cynically plots their 
“involuntary” behavior in the theater, Lovelace inadvertently admits that 
he actually believes that watching a play can and will reveal the true 
nature of a spectator. When he says that one reason he “directed [Polly] 
where to weep” was that she would have a “pretence to hide her face 
with her fan or handkerchief,” this means that he expects that Polly will 
be naturally inclined to laugh during the “most affecting scenes” and 
thus will need a fan or handkerchief to cover her face lest her laughter 
betray her actual lack of kindness, good understanding, and virtue.
 For, as Lovelace adds in the same breath, theater does carry the “heart 
. . . out of itself” (640), and spontaneous nonscripted bodily reactions to 
what happens onstage do reveal something about a person. Polly’s laugh-
ter will show her true self unless she takes care to cover it up. In other 
words theater does work as a context for embodied transparency, but it is 
fragile and vulnerable to subversion (and Clarissa learns this to her cost).
 What makes this particular theatergoing experience especially open 
to manipulation is that Clarissa constantly searches for deeper meaning 
in everything that Lovelace does. His every action must stand for some-
thing else, revealing some essential moral quality. So she can’t simply go 
to the theater with Lovelace and enjoy the show: she has to observe and 
judge him all the time (fig. 5). It is almost inevitable, then, that knowing 
that she does this, Lovelace would use the occasion to pretend to em-
body the moral virtues that he wants her to think he possesses. Here and 
elsewhere in the novel, so much is at stake for Lovelace and Clarissa—
so desperately does each want to figure out what the other is thinking 
and to bend the other’s will to his or her own—that every opening for 
embodied transparency becomes instead an opportunity for a targeted 
performance.
Unruly Audiences
“For my part,” said Mr. Lovel, “I confess I seldom listen to the players: one 
has so much to do, in looking about, and finding out one’s acquaintance, 
that, really, one has no time to mind the stage. Pray,”—(most affectionately 
fixing his eyes upon a diamond-ring on his little finger) “pray—what was 
the play to-night?”
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 “Why, what the D—l,”—cried the Captain, “do you come to the play, 
without knowing what it is?”
 “O yes, Sir, yes, very frequently: I have no time to read play-bills; one 
merely comes to meet one’s friends, and shew that one’s alive.”
                                                                       —Frances Burney, Evelina
Is it possible that in some cultures theater would not be perceived as a 
convincing context for embodied transparency in fiction? After all, my ar-
gument assumes a very particular type of spectators: those who sit quietly 
and follow the events on the stage with bated breath, losing themselves in 
these events to such a degree as to forget to control their body language. 
This picture may reflect (and idealize) our own cultural practices but not 
those of theatergoers in other historical periods.
 Eighteenth-century novels such as Richardson’s Clarissa or Frances 
Burney’s Evelina (1778) represent good test cases for this question be-
FIGURE 5. Clarissa (Saskia Wickham) observes Lovelace (Sean Bean) at the  
theater in the 1991 BBC series Clarissa.
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cause eighteenth-century English spectators did not treat events onstage 
with the reverence that we do. That is, then as now, people certainly went 
to the theater to feel, to have the experience of the heart carried “out of 
itself.” To a much greater degree than we do today, however, they also 
saw in theater an opportunity to socialize: to catch up with the latest gos-
sip and to make new acquaintances. People attended the same play mul-
tiple times—not necessarily because they admired the acting but because 
theater was the place to go in the evening to see one’s friends, and there 
weren’t many other entertainment outlets available. Spectators thought 
little about talking to others during the performance, which meant that 
actors had to speak their lines over the constant din rising from the audi-
ence.
 It matters, too, that today, once the play begins, the lights in the 
house go off, so we can’t see each other, whereas back then, the house 
was fully lit the whole time, which meant that members of the audience 
could see each other and read each other’s body language to their hearts’ 
content. Presumably, this must have rendered them more self-conscious 
and less likely to “lose” themselves in the events onstage.
 This is not to say that eighteenth-century theatergoers did not care 
about what happened on the stage. They did. Not paying any attention 
to acting was considered affectation. Mr. Lovel from Evelina, who claims 
to “seldom listen to the players,” is a pretentious fop. (In contrast, the 
novel’s sympathetic protagonist, a sensitive young girl named Evelina, 
is shown to lose herself in a particularly “slow and pathetic” aria at the 
Opera.)4 However noisy and unruly eighteenth-century theater may seem 
by our standards, good performances did command the audience’s at-
tention, while great performances—for example, by Thomas Betterton, 
Barton Booth, David Garrick, or Sarah Siddons—were known to make 
the whole house hold its collective breath and remain completely quiet 
for long periods.
 Henry Siddons, the son of Sarah Siddons and himself an actor and 
playwright, left us the following meditation on the range of behaviors 
exhibited by late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century the-
atergoers:
When a person sits at the theatre, after having seen a play acted 
three or four times, his mind naturally becomes vacant and inactive. 
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If among the spectators he chances to recognize a youth, to whom 
the same is new, this object affords him, and many others, a more 
entertaining fund of observation than all that is going forward on the 
stage.
 This novice of an auditor, carried away by the illusion, imitates 
all he sees, even to the actions of the players, though in a mode less 
decisive. Without knowing what is going to be said, he is serious, 
or contented, according to the tone which the performers happen to 
take. His eyes become a mirror, faithfully reflecting the varying ges-
tures of the several personages concerned.
 Ill humour, irony, anger, curiosity, contempt, in a word, all the 
passions of the author are repeated in the lines of his countenance. 
This imitative picture is only interrupted whilst his proper sentiments, 
crossing exterior objects, seek for modes of expressing themselves.5
 Observe particularly the young man caught mid-embodied transpar-
ency: strikingly unselfconscious and completely absorbed by the perfor-
mance. Our direct access to his feelings won’t last, of course; to make it 
more convincing, Siddons stresses its transience. The “youth” is in thrall 
now, but this spell will be broken any second as his attention wanders off 
to other “exterior objects.”
 So when Lovelace manipulates the sentimental assumption that sen-
sitive spectators forget themselves during an affecting performance and 
allow their bodies show their feelings, his very cynicism proves that this 
assumption was very much in place in England by the late 1740s. It was 
in place in spite of the fact that eighteenth-century audience members 
talked during the play and watched each other as much as they watched 
the players. Theater, in other words, can serve as a recognizable context 
for embodied transparency in fiction even in cultures whose traditions of 
spectatorship differ from ours—which means that it can also serve as a 
context for faked transparency.
Faking It at the Races
Are there other social settings, besides theater, in which unsuspecting 
spectators can be turned into objects of observation? It turns out that 
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horse races work very similarly. Writers use races to create situations in 
which one member of the audience turns away from horses and riders 
and is struck by the spontaneous body language of another.
 Consider the famous scene from Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1877) in 
which Alexei Alexandrovich Karenin is made to realize how deeply his 
wife, Anna, is in love with another man, Vronsky, and, worse yet, how 
incapable she is of concealing her feelings:
Alexei Alexandrovich was not interested in the race and therefore did 
not watch the riders, but began absentmindedly surveying the specta-
tors with his weary eyes. His gaze rested on Anna.
 Her face was pale and stern. She obviously saw nothing and no 
one except one man. Her hand convulsively clutched her fan, and she 
held her breath. He looked at her and hastily turned away, scrutiniz-
ing other faces.
 “Yes, that lady and the others are also very upset,” Alexei Al-
exandrovich said to himself. He wanted not to look at her, but his 
glance was involuntarily drawn to her. He peered into that face, try-
ing not to read what was so clearly written on it, and against his will, 
read in it with horror what he didn’t want to know.
 The first fall—Kuzovlev at the stream—upset everyone, but 
Alexei Alexandrovich saw clearly in Anna’s pale, triumphant face 
that the one she was watching had not fallen. When, after Makhotin 
and Vronsky cleared the big barrier, the very next officer fell on his 
head and knocked himself out, and a rustle of horror passed through 
all the public, Alexei Alexandrovich saw that Anna didn’t even notice 
it and hardly understood what the people around her were talking 
about. But he peered at her more and more often and with greater 
persistence. Anna, all absorbed in watching the racing Vronsky, could 
feel the gaze of her husband’s cold eyes fixed at her from the side.
 She turned around for an instant, looked at him questioningly, 
and with a slight frown turned away again.
 “Ah, I don’t care,” she all but said to him and never once 
glanced at him after that.6
 On the way back from the races Alexei Alexandrovich points out 
to his wife the impropriety of her behavior, trying to pull her back into 
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his stifling world in which respectable appearances must trump feelings. 
Anna, who has just witnessed Vronsky’s fall from the horse and knows 
that he is alive but not much more (and who is, moreover, pregnant with 
Vronsky’s child), is unable to do what her husband wants her to: deny 
everything and laugh at his suspicions with merry indifference. Instead, 
she announces that she loves Vronsky, that she is his mistress, and that 
she “fears and hates” her husband. By precipitating this confession, the 
moment of embodied transparency thus serves as a turning point in the 
novel.
 Still, compared to theater, a hippodrome can elicit only a limited 
range of emotions from the enthralled spectator. The premise of the sit-
uation is that the observer must learn something important about the 
feelings of the spectator who is watching the horses. And what can the 
observer learn? He can learn either of two things: that the spectator is 
in some sort of financial trouble and has a lot riding on the race or that 
the spectator is deeply emotionally involved with one of the riders. And, 
anyway, in the case of this second possibility, Tolstoy can be said to have 
cornered the market. What can be more emotionally engaging than the 
situation in which the spectator loves the rider and the observer is mar-
ried to the spectator?
 So an interesting development took place in the cinema when film 
directors adapted many established prose fiction tricks for building con-
texts for embodied transparency. In films observers still regularly ignore 
the horses to spy on their fellow spectators and learn something about 
their feelings, but the observed spectators don’t care about horses either. 
Instead, they often pretend to look at the horses, when, in fact, they are 
conducting their own business under the assumption that everybody else 
thinks that they are interested in the horses.
 On the one hand this opens up tremendously the range of emotions 
that the observed spectators can display, because it’s no longer about 
the financial outcome of the races or the well-being of a particular rider. 
On the other hand people who observe them are now more likely to be 
quite wrong in their interpretations of these emotional displays, precisely 
because it’s no longer about the outcome of the races or the well-being 
of a particular rider. One way to describe this situation is to say that this 
embodied transparency has run away from its context. Horses no longer 
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matter. (Or they matter only to the extent that the spectators think that 
they matter to others.) People go to races to conduct their affairs and to 
surreptitiously observe each other.
 (Don’t misunderstand me. I am not saying that this applies to all 
movies featuring horse races. I am talking only about the movies in which 
directors use racing to create contexts for embodied transparency: that 
is, in which there is an observer spying on an unsuspecting spectator. Of 
course, there are plenty of movies about races in which the focus is on 
horses and riders and not on spying audience members.)
 Think of the famous scene in Ernst Lubitsch’s silent film Lady Wind-
ermere’s Fan (1925), in which a group of aristocrats attend the races but 
nobody pays attention to the horses. Instead, they are preoccupied with 
spying on other spectators with every possible type of field glass, opera 
glass, and lorgnette (figs. 6 and 7). The most important bit of spying, however, takes an unaided eye: 
Lord Darlington (Ronald Colman) observes at close range the body lan-
FIGURE 6. Spying on other spectators in Ernst Lubitsch’s Lady Windermere’s Fan 
(Warner Bros., 1925).
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guage of his friend Lord Windermere (Bert Lytell) as he appears struck 
by the sight of the woman who has recently appeared in London and 
whom nobody knows, one Mrs. Erlynne (fig. 8). Darlington notices Win-
dermere’s interest in Mrs. Erlynne, his agitation as other people start 
gossiping about her, and his attempts to conceal his feelings and appear 
indifferent. Darlington seems to have caught Windermere at his most 
transparent, and he infers from what he sees that Windermere and Mrs. 
Erlynne are lovers. This discovery is important to Darlington because he 
is in love with Windermere’s wife and feels that Windermere’s infidelity 
gives him license to intensify the pursuit of Lady Windermere. Of course, we know that Darlington is wrong in his interpretation of 
Windermere’s motivation. Windermere is a loving and faithful husband. 
The reason that he responds to the sight of Mrs. Erlynne so strongly is 
that at this point he is the only person in their circle who knows that Mrs. 
Erlynne is his mother-in-law, whose reputation is forever tarnished by her 
past sexual behavior. To keep that information secret from his wife (who 
thinks that her mother is virtuous and dead) and the rest of their gossip-
mongering friends, he is paying Mrs. Erlynne off. Seeing her now so un-
expectedly, and at such close range, and hearing other people speculating 
FIGURE 7. Mrs. Erlynne (Irene Rich) is framed by binoculars in Ernst 
Lubitsch’s Lady Windermere’s Fan (Warner Bros., 1925).
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about who she might be makes him extremely uncomfortable. In other 
words even though Darlington is very perceptive about Windermere’s 
body language, we are the only truly appreciative audience for this mo-
ment of embodied transparency.
 To conceal his discomfort when others start gossiping about Mrs. Er-
lynne, Windermere pretends to care about the race, busying himself with 
the program. Similarly, to conceal his “aha” moment when he realizes 
that Windermere and Mrs. Erlynne have some kind of special relation-
ship, Darlington, too, pretends to think about the horses. He assumes a 
properly concerned look when Windermere turns to him with his pro-
gram in hand, matching the other man’s pretense with a pretense of his 
own, peering sympathetically into the program, all the while stealing sly 
glances at Windermere and enjoying his unconvincing show of interest in 
horses (fig. 9).
FIGURE 8. Lord Darlington (Ronald Colman) notices Lord Windermere’s (Bert 
Lytell’s) interest in Mrs. Erlynne in Ernst Lubitsch’s Lady Windermere’s Fan 
(Warner Bros., 1925).
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 Think, too, about the opening of this scene: a large group of men is 
diligently staring at the horses while Mrs. Erlynne (Irene Rich) is standing 
in their midst, but when she begins to walk away, they immediately turn 
and look after her. This sequence shows that they were thinking only of 
this unaccompanied female stranger in their midst all along. Here and 
elsewhere in this scene, paying attention to the race is only a pretext for 
doing something else (fig. 10). Horse races work the same way in Notorious, Alfred Hitchcock’s 
1946 movie with Ingrid Bergman, Cary Grant, and Claude Rains. Alicia 
Huberman (Bergman) and Devlin (Grant) are American agents working 
undercover in Rio de Janeiro to trap a group of Nazis, which includes Al-
exander Sebastian (Rains). Alicia and Devlin meet at the hippodrome to 
discuss the progress of their operation. When their conversation becomes 
too emotional for Alicia (for they also are in love with each other, but 
FIGURE 9. Lord Darlington and Lord Windermere feign interest in the program in 
Ernst Lubitsch’s Lady Windermere’s Fan (Warner Bros., 1925).
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   69 3/2/12   12:44 PM
70          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
Devlin is too ambivalent about his feelings to admit it), she energetically 
turns her attention to the horses. This is the famous shot in which we 
can’t see her face and only get a view of the race reflected in her binocu-
lars (fig. 11). And then it turns out that Alicia and Devlin were not the only ones 
to ignore the horses. All this time, Alex, who is in love with Alicia, was 
watching her from afar through his binoculars. But, as with other cin-
ematic instances of embodied transparency at the races, his interpreta-
tion of Alicia’s body language is both astute and wrong. He registers her 
strong emotions, but he is not sure what they mean. This is why in the 
conversation that follows Alicia can almost convince him that she “de-
tests” Devlin (a language that would have alarmed a man less blinded by 
love than Alex):
FIGURE 10. Who really cares about races? Men turn to look at Mrs. Erlynne in 
Ernst Lubitsch’s Lady Windermere’s Fan (Warner Bros., 1925).
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alicia. It was a wonderful race. Did you have much money on the winner?
alex. I didn’t see the race.
alicia. Didn’t you? I thought I saw you looking through your field glasses.
alex. I was watching you and your friend, Mr. Devlin. I presume that’s why 
you left my mother and me. You had an appointment to meet him.
alicia. Don’t be absurd. I met him purely by accident.
alex. You didn’t seem very anxious to get away from him.
alicia. Oh, he’s just . . .
alex. I watched you. I thought maybe you’re in love with him.
alicia. Don’t talk like that. I detest him.
alex. Really? He’s very good-looking.
alicia. Alex, I’ve told you before. Mr. Devlin doesn’t mean a thing to me.
alex. I’d like to be convinced. Would you maybe care to convince me, Ali-
cia, that Mr. Devlin means nothing to you?
FIGURE 11. Horse races in Alfred Hitchcock’s Notorious (RKO, 1946).
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 To “convince” Alex, Alicia has to marry him. Their marriage sets 
into motion the successful spying campaign against Alex’s Nazi friends, 
antagonizes Alicia and Devlin, and leads to Alicia’s near death at the end 
of the movie and Alex’s certain death once the credits come onscreen. 
A horse race is thus a setting that often turns around the lives of spy-
ing movie protagonists. It’s where they think they learn some important 
truths about the people whom they observe, while, in fact, it’s where they 
come up with wrong interpretations that serve to thicken the plot.
 There is a lovely ironic disconnect, in other words, between the 
world that the unsuspecting characters think they live in and the world 
the movie directors spring at them. In the first world horse races are 
still what they used to be in Anna Karenina: a straightforward setting 
for moments of embodied transparency. Hopeful Lord Darlingtons and 
Alexander Sebastians put on their hats and set off to the hippodrome to 
catch others at their unguarded moments. But when they arrive there, the 
hippodrome turns out to be a place where everybody is busy figuring out 
the angles, scheming, and pretending. Only no one warned them about 
it. So they proceed to diligently observe other people’s body language. 
Instead of reading minds, however, they end up misreading them (which 
is just what a good story needs).
Soccer: The Last Bulwark
But soccer is different. Cinema may have corrupted horse races but not 
athletic events. The stadium remains a reliable source of embodied trans-
parency. Characters still forget themselves when they watch football (i.e., 
British soccer), basketball, hockey, and other competitive sports, so a 
strategically placed observer can get an undiluted shot of direct mind 
reading.
 Take Nick Hornby’s Fever Pitch (1992)—an autobiographical mem-
oir of a football fan. The very first game that the protagonist attends, at 
the tender age of eleven, the game that, in Hornby’s scheme of things, 
rechannels his unhappiness about his parents’ divorce into his obsession 
with the team Arsenal—a fateful game!—is described in Fever Pitch as an 
occasion for direct access to other people’s minds. As the narrator puts it,
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I remember looking at the crowds more than at the players. . . .
 . . . What impressed me most was just how much most of the 
men around me hated, really hated being there. . . .
 I’d been to public entertainments before, of course; I’d been to 
the cinema and the pantomime and to see my mother sing in the 
chorus of the White Horse Inn at the Town Hall. But that was dif-
ferent. The audiences I had hitherto been a part of had paid to have 
a good time and, though occasionally one might spot a fidgety child 
or a yawning adult, I hadn’t ever noticed faces contorted by rage or 
despair or frustration. Entertainment as pain was an idea entirely new 
to me, and it seemed to be something I’d been waiting for.7
 I didn’t emphasize “hated, really hated” above—Hornby did—but I 
would have if he hadn’t. What this phrase shows is that the eleven-year-
old protagonist can see what men in the crowd really feel: rage, despair, 
and frustration. One doesn’t come across such rich fare at the theater, 
where an honest yawn is a rare treat. Attention, piety, appreciative laugh-
ter, thoughtful sadness, or boredom can all be put on to impress other 
spectators, but try faking unremitting pain and hatred!
 Though if you want to see bodies truly possessed by uncontrollable 
emotions, wait until Arsenal wins. At one point the narrator, now fully 
grown and fully addicted, is so overwhelmed by the unexpected triumph 
of his team that he is acting out his joy not knowing what he is doing, 
while the fans of the losing team are watching him: “It was the second 
of three or four lifetime football moments where my delirium was such 
that I had no idea what I was doing, where everything went blank for a 
few moments. I know that an old man behind me grabbed me around the 
neck and wouldn’t let go, and that when I returned to a state approaching 
normal consciousness the rest of the stadium was empty save for a few 
Tottenham fans who stood watching us, too stunned and sick to move” 
(181).
 What’s striking about this scene is how embodied transparency hits 
everyone: the observers and the observed. If the narrator does not know 
what his body is doing—if he is in such a state that he doesn’t have any 
mental picture of himself—this means that the Tottenham fans not only 
have direct access to his mind via his body language but that they also 
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will always know more about him at that moment than he, or his readers, 
can know. That is, the observers know what Hornby did when his mind 
went blank, and nobody else does. But at the same time, the narrator, 
once he comes to, can observe the body language of the Tottenham fans, 
who are quite transparent to him in their numbing despair. He knows 
they watch him not because they enjoy the spectacle of Arsenal fans’ 
victorious delirium but because they are “too stunned and sick to move.” 
One wonders to what degree they are aware of their body language just 
now, for the narrator’s temporary lack of self-consciousness is mirrored 
by their own.
 And then there is also the neck-grabbing old man, whose body lan-
guage makes him transparent to Hornby even as Hornby loses the aware-
ness of his own, and who must be unselfconscious about his actions while 
being wrapped up (so to speak) in Hornby. Embodied transparency 
sweeps over the fans like a storm: even as they see what it does to others, 
they can’t control what it does to them.
 I find it significant that both the book and the feature film based on 
it (the British version)8 turn to these moments of direct mind-access to 
explain the magnetism of the game, even though their explanations dif-
fer. Hornby thinks that one reason he needed soccer so badly was that 
the palpable pain of Arsenal supporters jived with his own depression. 
Or, as he puts it, “I go to football for loads of reasons, but I don’t go for 
entertainment, and when I look around me on a Saturday and see those 
panicky, glum faces, I see that others feel the same” (135–36).
 I agree that in darker moods one sometimes appreciates being around 
other unhappy people. But note a particular type of mind reading tak-
ing place here. The therapeutic times of shared anguish also happen to 
be the times when Hornby knows—or believes he knows, which is the 
same—what other people around him are feeling. These are moments of 
intense mind-reading pleasure. (Real stuff, too: not just actors onstage 
going through rehearsed paroxysms of passion.)
 To marvel at the irresistible pull of the game, the movie Fever Pitch 
takes up as its point of departure a passage from the memoir in which 
Hornby talks about the spectators’ “absorption” in what’s happening in 
the field.9 Observe as you read that passage, below, how the verb tense 
changes from past to present once we are inside the moment of embodied 
transparency, intensifying the impression of immediacy and transience:
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We beat Everton 3-1 that night, 4-1 on aggregate, a comfortable 
enough win which Arsenal fully deserved, but we had to wait for it. 
Four minutes before half-time Rocastle beat Everton’s offside trap, 
went round Southall, and stroked the ball well wide of a completely 
empty goal; and then three minutes later Hayes was through too, 
only this time Southall brought him down six inches from the goal 
line. Hayes took the penalty himself, and, like McClair, booted it 
well over the bar. And the crowd is going spare with frustration and 
worry; you look around and you see faces working, completely ab-
sorbed. (198)
 In the movie the protagonist, Paul Ashworth (based on Hornby), 
played by Colin Firth, sits home alone, watching a replay of an old match 
(fig. 12). He has just had a falling-out with his girlfriend, who is losing 
patience over his obsession with the game, and he is trying to understand 
what it is about football that draws him in so powerfully. We hear his thoughts in a voice-over when he as good as tells us 
that the most magical part of the game is the feeling of direct access to 
other minds that it seems to induce: “What about this? Three minutes to 
FIGURE 12. Colin Firth as Paul Ashworth in David Evans’s Fever Pitch (Channel 
Four Films, 1997).
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go and you are 2-1 up in a semifinal. You look around and see all those 
thousands of faces contorted with fear, and hope, and worry. Everyone 
lost. Everything else gone out their heads. Then the whistle blows, and 
everyone goes spare. For those few minutes you’re at the center of the 
world.”
 You are at the center of the world for those few minutes when you 
feel that you know what everybody else around you is thinking. It’s mind 
reading on a massive and yet intensely personal scale because your own 
feelings are reflected in the feelings of others. Their bodies are transpar-
ent to you, but so is yours to them, and yours to you through its reflection 
in theirs. The experience is brief, too, though these “few minutes” may 
feel longer or shorter, depending on what’s happening on the field.
 It seems, then, that at this point our cultural imagination still treats 
sporting events as a reliable venue for direct access to spectators’ minds. 
Theater stopped being such a venue a long time ago, with the advent of 
the novel, and so did, more recently—with the advent of cinema—horse 
races. But both real-life and fictional football fans can still look at other 
people around them in the stands and see strong feelings written large 
on their bodies while “everything else [has] gone out their heads.” No 
performance here, no trying to impress others one way or another.
 Most likely, this state of affairs won’t last. The culture of greedy 
mind readers subverts contexts for reliable transparency as soon as it 
becomes fully aware of them. Perhaps it’s only a question of time before 
we see a movie in which a modern-day Lovelace brings his Clarissa to a 
football game and fakes his emotions, hoping that she will attend to them 
instead of the events on the field. And, when that happens, who knows 
what will emerge as the next social setting in which being a spectator 
means being a show: passionate and transparent at the same time?
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In which readers return to Hitchcock’s Notorious and realize that neither a 
bowl of soup nor a cup of coffee are what they seem to be  / Matt Damon 
plays poker  / Humphrey Bogart loses the girl  / Helen Mirren loses a crum-
pet  / Ralph Fiennes loses his cool  / Hillary Clinton almost coughs  / and 
blame is wrongly assigned.
FIVE
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Movies
The Power of Restraint
W
e are now moving away from the printed page and toward 
visual and aural experiences of embodied transparency: mostly 
in movies, but with occasional glances at the theatrical stage.
 Movies, of course, are theory-of-mind-writ-large—competing with 
novels as feasts for greedy mind readers. To date I am aware of two 
excellent studies of theory of mind and feature films—Per Persson’s Un- 
derstanding Cinema: A Psychological Theory of Moving Imagery (2003); 
and Colin McGinn’s The Power of Movies: How Screen and Mind Inter- 
act (2007)—though this topic is so rich that I expect more books dealing 
with it to appear soon.1
 What I do in this chapter by no means adds up to a comprehen-
sive analysis of cinema and theory of mind; my focus is intentionally 
narrow. McGinn writes that onscreen “the eyes become liquid pools of 
dense feeling. It is as if we are seeing the emotions of the characters, so 
entwined are the images and the feelings (at least when the movie is do-
ing its job).”2 I start therefore with the assumption that if the movie is 
doing its job, it is already awash in embodied transparency. Still, not all 
transparency is created equal. Even in this saturated medium some mo-
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ments of access feel richer than others, an effect achieved by selectively 
obscuring the emotions of the characters. In what follows I look at one 
particular pattern of such strategic obstruction: moments when charac-
ters attempt to conceal or restrain their feelings and, by doing so, become 
more interestingly transparent than their freely emoting counterparts.
Beyond the Kuleshov Effect
What makes movies particularly conducive to embodied transparency 
is a combination of two factors: theory of mind and montage. We see 
a face on the screen and we are ready to assume (because our theory 
of mind never stops working!) that there is something on the person’s 
mind, and the technique of montage tells us what that something is. You 
may remember the famous experiment from the early days of cinema 
in which the Russian filmmaker Lev Kuleshov alternated the shot of an 
actor wearing the same neutral expression with the images of a bowl of 
soup, an old woman in a coffin, and a little girl. In each case audiences 
reported seeing a different emotion on the man’s face: hunger following 
the shot of soup, sadness following the shot of the coffin, and happiness 
following the shot of the little girl.
 The “Kuleshov effect” seems to imply that movie actors don’t have 
to do anything at all, while all that directors have to do is provide se-
quences of images juxtaposed with faces; audiences will supply the emo-
tions and thus the meaning of each scene. But while there is no question 
that cinema exists because of our readiness to read emotions into body 
language, the stories that movies actually tell are much more complex 
than a “story” born out of the juxtaposition of a man’s face and a bowl 
of soup. Consider the shot of Alicia’s face followed by a shot of a cup of 
coffee from Hitchcock’s Notorious (figs. 13 and 14). If we take it to mean 
that she is thirsty, we’re wrong. She is struck by the realization that her 
husband and mother-in-law are slowly poisoning her and that the cup of 
coffee in front of her contains another dose of that poison. To be able to 
interpret Alicia’s state of mind correctly and to grasp the meaning of the 
scene, we need the whole background narrative with its complex web of 
mind attributions: Alex and his mother have known for some time that 
Alicia is an American agent, but they can’t let other people in their Nazi 
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circle find this out because if they do, they’ll kill Alex; Alicia has just real-
ized that they know who she is and are determined to do her in, gradually 
and quietly. They are desperate, and she is in their power. In fact, she is 
completely in their power because if Devlin does not love her—and she 
begins to believe that he doesn’t—he won’t come to her rescue. As we 
sense Alicia’s terror, Notorious begins to feel like a horror movie. Directors thus both use the Kuleshov effect and go beyond it. They 
count on our reading an emotion into a face juxtaposed with a shot of an 
object, but they also make sure that to read that face correctly, we need 
much more than just this immediate sequence of shots: we need infor-
mation about everybody’s thoughts and feelings prior to this particular 
scene. Thus at any given point in the movie what drives our interpreta-
tion of a character’s mental state are our earlier interpretations of other 
mental states.
 Of course, keeping all these interpretations in mind and applying 
them to the present sequence of shots implies quite a bit of cognitive ef-
fort and uncertainty. We are way beyond the simple equation: a bowl of 
soup + a man’s face = the man is hungry. We know what one character 
thinks, we are not quite certain what another thinks, and we have no clue 
what the third thinks. For instance, does Devlin love Alicia? We suspect 
that he does, but we won’t find out for sure until the very end of the 
movie. Or, do Alex and his mother realize, as Alicia first looks at the cup 
of coffee and then glances up at them, that she is now aware of their plan 
to gradually poison her? We suspect they do, but it remains ambiguous.
 By introducing doubt and ambiguity into our interpretation of char-
acters’ mental states, directors create onscreen versions of real-life social 
complexity. This means that when they grant us our “aha!” moments—
that is, when they make us feel that we know exactly what the characters 
think—we appreciate it much more than we would have if the characters 
had been transparent all the time. The moments of occasional complete 
access make us feel like brilliant social players. We cherish these illusions 
of superior social discernment and power because they stand out both 
amidst our daily mess of mind-reading uncertainty and amidst the un-
certainty carefully constructed by film directors. (And of course certain 
cinematic genres make mind-reading uncertainty their raison d’être; in 
detective movies everything is geared toward preventing us from reading 
characters’ minds for as long as possible.)3
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 The shot of Alicia’s face as she looks first at the cup of coffee and 
then at her husband and mother-in-law is an instance of embodied trans-
parency. So is, a moment earlier, Alex’s worried exclamation as he stops 
his Nazi friend, Dr. Anderson, from accidentally picking up and drinking 
Alicia’s poisoned coffee. Once you start scrutinizing movies for such mo-
ments of perfect access, you realize that they occur often enough to make 
watching a movie a rather extraordinary mind-reading experience. You 
also notice that restraint—which, as you may remember, is one of the 
three “rules” for embodied transparency in the novel, though not, per-
haps, the most important one—assumes new importance on the screen. 
It seems that directors intuitively but persistently look for social contexts 
that allow characters to struggle to rein in their emotions.
 Why should it be so? What’s so special about restraint on the screen?
FIGURE 13. Alicia Huberman (Ingrid Bergman) looks at a cup of coffee in Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Notorious (RKO, 1946).
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Royal Path to Embodied Transparency
Humphrey Bogart told this story: When they were shooting Casablanca 
and S. Z. (Cuddles) Sakall or someone comes to him and says, “they want 
to play the ‘Marseillaise,’ what should we do?—the Nazis are here and we 
shouldn’t be playing the ‘Marseillaise,’ ” Humphrey Bogart just nods to the 
band, we cut to the band, and they start playing “bah-bah-bah-bah.”
 Someone asked what did he do to make that beautiful scene work. He 
says, “they called me in one day, Michael Curtiz, the director, said, ‘stand 
on the balcony over there, and when I say “action” take a beat and nod,’ ” 
which he did. That’s great acting. Why? What more could he possibly have 
done? He was required to nod, he nodded. There you have it. The audience 
is terribly moved by his simple restraint in an emotional situation—and this 
is the essence of good theater.
 —Mamet, On Directing Film
Mamet turns to the Bogart anecdote to illustrate his larger argument 
about what separates good acting from overacting. Instead of trying to 
FIGURE 14. Notorious: the coffee cup.
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portray emotions, actors should perform what he calls “uninflected” 
physical actions. A simple nod goes a long way because—remember the 
Kuleshov effect?—viewers read emotions into it based on the context of 
the scene.
 I wonder, though, how much we should make of Mamet’s saying 
that restraint in an emotional situation is “the essence of good theater” 
while describing a scene from a movie. Most likely he means “theater” 
broadly: as any performance, whether it takes place onstage or onscreen. 
But perhaps he does mean the theatrical stage, and his choice of example 
unintentionally reflects the fact that cinema may have more use for re-
straint than theater does.
 Restraint is an emotion that can be detected and appreciated if we 
look at the body closely. Both theater and cinema cultivate this kind of 
attention, but cinema can resort to crude force not available to theater. A 
close-up leaves us no choice but to attend to the character’s face, while in 
theater there is always a chance that spectators are looking somewhere 
else while a character pointedly does not move a muscle when one would 
expect him at least to blink. (Not to mention that if we are seated far 
away from the stage, we simply can’t see the facial expressions of actors, 
and the fine points of restraint are lost on us.)
 Note, too, that when Mamet talks about that scene in Casablanca, he 
doesn’t worry about distinguishing between the actor and his character. 
When he says that the “audience is terribly moved by his simple restraint 
in an emotional situation,” the pronoun his refers to Humphrey Bogart 
as much as to his character, Rick Blaine. This is quite understandable. 
As a director Mamet is concerned about the behavior of actors and the 
effect of their behavior on the audience. Bogart shows restraint by not 
overacting, indeed, by almost not acting at all—“he was required to nod, 
he nodded”—and the audience responds well to his insightful portrayal 
of the emotional situation.
 For the purpose of our discussion, however, I must distinguish be-
tween the actor and the role and ask why the audience should be moved 
by the restraint exhibited by a character. After all, it’s not like there is 
some absolute value placed on self-control in our culture, so that every 
exhibition of restraint is recognized and applauded as a sign of virtue. A 
stiff upper lip is appreciated by some people in some situations and dis-
approved by others. Moreover, there are many other moments in Casa-
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blanca when, instead of showing restraint, Rick displays strong emotions 
(as, for example, when he strikes the table with his fist and says about 
Ilsa’s sudden reappearance, “Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the 
world she walks into mine”). Such scenes are moving and memorable, 
and we hardly hold it against Rick when he lets it all out.
 I suggest, then, that we like it when characters show restraint, not 
because restraint is good in and of itself but because restraint may be 
used as a means for interestingly complex embodied transparency, more 
complex, for instance, than the one exhibited by Alex in Notorious when 
he gasps and stops Dr. Anderson from drinking the poisoned coffee, or 
even by Rick when he strikes the table with his fist. What is fascinating 
about restraint in the movies is that often we don’t even have to know 
what particular feeling the character is trying to restrain—what is trans-
parent is the struggle for self-control.
 For instance, we don’t know exactly what combination of pride, de-
fiance, hope, personal grief, and recklessness Rick is experiencing when 
he nods to the orchestra to let them play the “Marseillaise,” but we do 
know for sure that he is controlling himself by not saying anything or 
expressing any of these feelings directly. So he is transparent to us in his 
complexity, flattering, as it were, our theory of mind with a promise of 
access to not just one emotion but to a whole suite of emotions.
 Restraint, thus, is a royal path to embodied transparency in the mov-
ies because it can be superimposed on any emotional content, includ-
ing that which is not completely accessible to us. I said earlier, in my 
discussion of embodied transparency in the novel, that restraint allows 
for displays of appealingly complex mental states, as in, “I don’t want 
her to know what I am feeling.” Restraint on the screen allows for the 
same third-level cognitive embedment, yet on top of it, it can also visibly 
expand the palette of feelings that the character is endeavoring to con-
ceal. This third-level embedment becomes a third-level embedment with 
a flourish, as it were: “I don’t want her to know what I am feeling, but I 
am feeling an awful lot.” Hence both the novel Pride and Prejudice and 
its movie version tell us that Mr. Darcy tries to restrain his anger when 
Elizabeth turns down his marriage proposal, but we can read more than 
that into Colin Firth’s expression (see fig. 3). Once the actor’s face gets 
factored into the equation, our mind-reading adaptations have some-
thing extra to process.
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   85 3/2/12   12:44 PM
86          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
 It’s not accidental that the “neutral” face in Kuleshov’s experiment 
was that of the actor Ivan Mozzhukhin, known as the “Russian Val-
entino.” Since its early days the cinema has sought out actors who are 
particularly good at conveying the impression of complexity behind 
restraint. As Anthony Lane writes in his review of the movie Biutiful, 
“Bring me the head of Javier Bardem. Did you ever see a nobler nog-
gin? . . . The scene in which [Bardem’s character] finds [his son] alone, 
abandoned by his mother, with a bruised face, is deeply upsetting, and 
all the harder to erase because Bardem plays it so calmly, reigning in the 
urge to erupt. Dormant volcanoes, ready to rumble, are always the ones 
to watch.”4 The put-on calmness offers our theory of mind a delectable 
combination of complexity and access. (And certain movies are only too 
happy to turn our theory of mind into a gourmet.)
Photogenic Professions
Nowadays, people want glamour and tears, the grand performance. I’m not 
very good at that. I’ve never been. I prefer to keep my feelings to myself. 
And foolishly I believed that that’s what people wanted from their Queen. 
Not to make a fuss, nor wear one’s heart on one’s sleeve.
 —Queen Elizabeth II, The Queen
A person whose profession calls for the exercise of restraint makes for 
an interesting movie character. Doctor, lawyer, spy—anybody whose job 
involves dissociating herself from the immediate emotional content of 
a situation and thus suppressing her feelings—is excellent material for 
embodied transparency. And it is even better if she happens to be person-
ally invested in the situation at hand. Oh, the passions behind that calm 
facade! Cinema thrives on this kind of inner conflict.
 Stephen Frears’s movie The Queen (2006) goes for the ultimate case 
of professional restraint. Frears’s protagonist, Queen Elizabeth II (played 
by Helen Mirren), suppresses her emotions around the clock. The deco-
rum associated with royalty precludes her from wearing her heart on her 
sleeve, and she comes to love it. Restraint becomes her: Elizabeth takes 
pride in the “quiet dignity” with which she comports herself. She believes 
that this is what “the world has always admired her for.” When, after 
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Princess Diana’s death, the British people demand that their queen grieve 
and display her emotions for public consumption, she is shaken.
 She is shaken—but will she show it? The movie goads us with the 
promise of the queen’s emotional display. Other people around her—
Tony Blair, Cherie Blair, Prince Charles, and Prince Phillip—let us see 
their anger, impatience, fear, surprise. Will she?!
 I said before that restraint is a royal road to embodied transparency 
in cinema. Now make that a royal restraint—literally—and, as a director, 
you have a recipe for a very special treat for our mind-reading adapta-
tions. When the position of a protagonist is such that she must control 
and subdue her emotions not just from eight to five but constantly, you 
can build an entire movie around different shades and modes of restraint. 
This is another way of saying that you can pick and choose you moments 
of embodied transparency and pile them up as thickly as you want.
 Frears does precisely this. For instance, several times in the course of 
the movie, just as she is about to start eating, the queen is called to the 
phone for an urgent and stressful conversation with Tony Blair about the 
Diana crisis. At least on one such occasion, the queen has already opened 
up her mouth to bite off something distinctly yummy, and there is that 
phone call again. The queen restrains her emotions, of course, but we can 
imagine how she feels as she gives a brief parting look to the chocolate 
cake before leaving the room (fig. 15). A different show of restraint occurs when the queen learns from her 
adviser that a ceremonial procession known under the code name Tay 
Bridge will be used for Diana’s funeral. Tay Bridge was conceived and 
rehearsed for the future funeral of the Queen Mother, so Elizabeth must 
be struck with the impropriety of lavishing it on a disgraced daughter-in-
law, who is not even considered a member of the royal family anymore. 
But, however shocked she is, she suppresses it. All she does as her secre-
tary tells her about Tay Bridge is say quietly, “Anything else?” and briefly 
touch her forehead.
 The queen must exercise restraint even with her nearest and dearest. 
At one point she is driving the car, with her son Charles in the passenger 
seat, getting ready to stalk a deer. (At the royal estate in Balmoral they 
have to drive to the place of the hunt.) Charles keeps talking about how 
warm Diana was, how much the British public loved her and hated the 
rest of the royal family, and how afraid he is now of assassination. The 
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queen must be getting terribly annoyed, but she controls herself. All she 
does is observe cheerfully that she has just changed her mind, that she 
does not want to go deer stalking with Charles and the rest of the family, 
and that she will walk with her dogs instead. Then she gets out of the car.
 Even when she is alone, Elizabeth cannot relax for long. When dur-
ing a solitary ramble in Balmoral, her car breaks down as she drives 
through a shallow creek, and she is waiting for help to arrive, she begins 
to cry, worn out by the stress following Diana’s death and the pressure 
put on her by the media and her advisers (fig. 16). But even there, with 
nobody to observe her and appreciate her fabled “quiet dignity,” she cries 
with her face turned away from the camera (that is, from us). Just as she begins to turn toward us, a stag walks onto the shore, and 
Elizabeth is struck by its beauty. She looks at it first with deep admiration 
and then with intense alarm as she hears guns firing and dogs yelping, the 
deer-stalking party approaching. She shoos the stag away and then just 
stands there for several moments, taking in the river, the mountains, the 
sky, suddenly happy again, rejuvenated by the encounter. But then, once 
more, she feels compelled to restrain her emotions. She wipes her eyes 
and nose with a scarf and composes her features into an impenetrable, 
FIGURE 15. The queen (Helen Mirren) gives up her crumpet in Stephen Frears’s 
The Queen (Pathé, 2006).
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severe mask, ready to encounter the world as the imperturbable, dignified 
Queen Elizabeth.
 It’s a spectacular scene, perhaps the only time in the movie when the 
mask is completely off and we see the queen going through a succession 
of emotions. By now Frears has already trained us to be grateful for 
crumbs—for expressions of feeling so subtle as to be invisible—so we 
perceive this display as lavish and exceptional.
 In other words restraint exercised by the queen throughout the story 
works in two ways. First, on the occasions when she lets go of it and 
shows her emotions freely (as in the deer scene), it feels rare and valu-
able. Second, restraint creates an illusion of privileged access to complex 
emotions. For instance, the brief wistful look that the queen casts at the 
chocolate cake just before being whisked away to take Blair’s phone call 
momentarily conjures up an image of a disappointed child deprived of 
a treat. Young children can be embodied transparency personified, but 
this particular moment of restrained disappointment promises an open-
ing into a whole gamut of complex feelings. Of course we don’t see these 
feelings, but our theory of mind, all fired up by the present show of re-
straint and the previous information about the queen’s ambivalent atti-
tude toward Blair and Diana, keeps us guessing what they might be.
FIGURE 16. The queen cries with her back to the camera in Stephen Frears’s The 
Queen (Pathé, 2006).
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 Viewed from the cognitive perspective, the movie is but a sequence 
of embodied transparencies, each making our theory of mind buzz in a 
slightly different way. The transparency exhibited by freely emoting char-
acters (such as Tony Blair, Cherie Blair, Prince Phillip, and, presumably, 
formerly, Diana) feels different from the one snatched from the queen 
when she thinks nobody’s watching and different again from the one 
snatched from the queen when she thinks someone is watching. It only 
makes sense that the medium that supplies greedy mind readers with 
nonstop fantasies of access has to develop different strategies for deliver-
ing its “aha” moments.
Poker Faces
Doctors, lawyers, spies, and British queens are not the only ones who 
make promising movie characters because their line of work calls for 
the exercise of restraint. So do gamblers.5 Cinema loves poker faces—
that is, not real-life faces that show no emotions whatsoever; who wants 
those?!—but faces of people playing poker. We have long poker se-
quences—and thus displays of poker faces—in movies including Ocean’s 
Eleven, The Sting, Casino Royale, Cassandra’s Dream, and Rounders 
(fig. 17). The game of poker is particularly good for a movie because it comes 
with several layers of restraint. First, players must remain dispassionate 
during the game in order to conceal their true positions from others. Sec-
ond, frequently in the story more is riding on the outcome of the game 
than just the pile of money: the protagonist’s whole life will take a certain 
turn depending on whether he loses or wins. (If he wins, for example, he 
will be able to stay with the girl of his dreams, he won’t have to murder 
somebody he was contracted to murder for a hefty fee, etc.) So as he sits 
there at the card table, looking blandly indifferent, we know not only 
that he is waiting with bated breath to see who will get the cash but also 
that he feels agonizingly suspended between his two lives, passionately 
wishing for one, mortified at the thought of the other.
 And, again, because restraint can be superimposed on a variety of 
emotional contents (anger, grief, joy, painful uncertainty, disappoint-
ment)—we don’t need to know immediately whether the protagonist is 
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bluffing. We do know that whatever his feelings are, he labors to conceal 
them, and that’s the extent of his transparency until the end of the game. 
Of course, when the game is over and we do find out if he was bluffing, 
this retroactively deepens our impression of access. We can then look 
back at his behavior at the table and develop a more nuanced perception 
of fear and hope that must have consumed him as he sat there with a 
stony expression (or affected to appear serene and relaxed).
 That’s what movies (and poker reality shows) do. In May 2011, 
however, the American media got an opportunity to construct a plausible 
narrative of restraint and embodied transparency (not in these terms, of 
course) based on real-life historical events. Shortly after the killing of 
Osama bin Laden, journalists began commenting on the “poker face” 
that President Obama presented to the world as the secret raid on bin 
Laden’s compound in Pakistan was about to begin and on the “stone 
face” that he maintained later, while receiving updates as the actual raid 
unfolded in Abbottabad.
 Thus writing about the White House Correspondents’ dinner, at 
which Obama joked about Donald Trump and other people who wanted 
FIGURE 17. Mike McDermott (Matt Damon) at a card table in John Dahl’s 
Rounders (Miramax, 1998).
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to see his American birth certificate, the New Yorker’s David Remnick 
insisted that the “truly astonishing aspect of the dinner was not the po-
litical japery but Obama’s knowledge that, as soon as the weather in 
northern Pakistan cleared, his own black helicopters would ferry a crew 
of Navy SEALs to bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad.”6 Maureen 
Dowd of the New York Times observed how perfectly the “president’s 
studied cool and unreadable mien” served him on this occasion. Salon’s 
Peter Finocchiaro actually titled his short piece “Obama’s Poker Face,” 
posting a video of Obama laughing merrily at Seth Meyers’s joke about 
bin Laden’s apparent invulnerability, leaving it to us to arrive at the in-
evitable conclusion that the president’s laughter was covering some very 
specific thoughts about bin Laden’s impending fate.
 The New York Times article “Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden” pro-
vided memorable snapshots of embodied transparency involving both 
Obama and his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. It quoted one of 
Obama’s aides as saying that while the president and his national secu-
rity team were receiving updates on the raid, “Mr. Obama looked ‘stone 
faced.’ ”7 Although the accompanying photo showed Obama looking in-
tense and focused and not at all impassive, the aide’s comment about the 
president’s stone face—which, given how much was at stake during the 
thirty-eight-minute raid, must have concealed intense emotions—was im-
mediately picked up by news outlets in America and around the world.
 And so was the gesture of Hillary Clinton from the same photo. Clin-
ton is shown clasping her hand to her mouth, which can—and has been—
interpreted as reacting emotionally to what she is hearing and trying to 
restrain her emotions. Although later she said that it’s likely that she had 
been merely “preventing one of her early spring allergic coughs,”8 more 
interesting interpretations, all evoking embodied transparency (e.g., that 
her gesture betrayed “shock” even as she wanted to restrain herself) pro-
liferated in the press both in America and abroad.9
 True, responses to Obama’s and Clinton’s body language feed stereo-
types about gender and about the personal styles of these politicians. It’s 
also true that a photo op arranged on what its subjects must have known 
would be considered a historic occasion (no matter what the outcome of 
the raid) was unlikely to capture any authentic unpremeditated gestures. 
But, putting these considerations aside for a moment, the media-fueled 
obsession with Obama’s “stone face,” or “poker face” (which is assumed 
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to have been concealing strong emotions), and Clinton’s purported barely 
restrained “shock” shows how irresistibly fascinating transparent body 
language is, especially if it can be perceived as transpiring in “real life.”
Refusing to Watch
Emoting movie characters are not the only ones who can exhibit restraint 
and, by doing so, make our illusion of access more exciting. The same 
effect is achieved when other characters refuse to watch an individual 
who is experiencing strong emotions and the camera moves away from 
him or her at a crucial moment. The assumption behind this strategy is 
that sometimes people’s faces expose their feelings to such a degree that 
they become painful to watch, unless a person who watches has a sadis-
tic streak. It is transparency by omission: we can’t see the actual face, 
but our imagination magnifies its emotional nakedness. Robert Redford, 
director of the movie Quiz Show (1994), uses this strategy at a crucial 
moment both to intensify our impression of one character’s transparency 
and to make more sympathetic another character, who refuses to enjoy 
that show of transparency.
 It’s almost inevitable that Charles Van Doren (Ralph Fiennes), the 
protagonist of Quiz Show, plays poker and is good at it. Charles’s behav-
ior during the game—he is relaxed, smiling, alert, inscrutable, and bluff-
ing—models perfectly his behavior throughout the movie: he is charm-
ing, inscrutable, and lying. The film tells the story of the 1950s scandals 
surrounding television quiz shows such as Twenty One and Tic Tac 
Dough. An attractive instructor from Columbia University and scion of a 
prominent intellectual family, Charles Van Doren becomes the champion 
of Twenty One after dethroning another longtime winner, Herb Stempel 
(John Turturro), a “fat, annoying Jewish guy with a sidewall haircut,” 
presumably less palatable to the show’s gentile corporate sponsors.
 Van Doren’s rise is spectacular because the show is rigged. Stempel, 
Van Doren, and other champions who come before and after them are 
given answers beforehand and told exactly what to do on the air: how 
to behave to ratchet up the drama and whether to continue winning or 
to “take a dive.” (This is essentially protoreality TV, staged carefully 
to maintain the effect of immediacy and spontaneity. Stempel and Van 
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Doren could perform on their own—they are well informed and widely 
read—but the producers are putting on a show, which means leaving 
nothing to chance, scripting and intensifying every emotional moment.) 
Charles dislikes this deception, but once he is in, he upholds it. And his 
poker face serves him well.
 Still, the moment comes when, like the queen in Frears’s movie, 
Charles loses his cool. Forced to appear before a congressional commit-
tee investigating quiz shows, he has to tell the truth about having been 
supplied with answers and coached in his “spontaneous” intellectual 
breakthroughs and emotional reactions. Painful as his testimony is—with 
indignant reactions from the committee members and the attending pub-
lic—Charles manages to stay relatively composed. But when he leaves 
the room, accompanied by his parents, who are clearly shattered by these 
revelations but still supportive of their son and struggling to maintain 
their composure, he is attacked by journalists, who are determined to get 
under this patrician family’s skin.
 First they ask Charles if he knows that he has just been fired from 
NBC, where he had been promised a plum spot on an educational show, 
once his stint with Twenty One was over. Charles is taken aback, but still 
he says calmly that, no, he didn’t know that. The journalists then turn to 
his father:
journalist. Professor Van Doren, are you proud of your son?
father. I’ve always been proud of Charlie.
another journalist. Proud of what he did?
father. The most important thing now is for Charlie to get back to his 
teaching.
another journalist. Did you know that the Columbia Trustees are 
meeting right now? They’re going to ask for Charlie’s resignation.
At this point Charles Van Doren’s mother closes her eyes to hide her 
pain. The journalists have apparently succeeded in reducing her to pure 
anguish. But the father is still standing, so they focus on him again:
journalist. Professor Van Doren, you spent your whole career at Colum- 
bia. What’s your reaction to that?
The older Van Doren, speechless, rubs his temple. The journalists persist:
journalist. Professor Van Doren?
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 Something important happens then. Herbie Stempel, the previous 
champion of Twenty One, is also there in the hall. The present hearings 
have vindicated his earlier unsuccessful attempt to convince the congres-
sional committee that the show was rigged. Herbie has every reason to 
dislike Charles and rejoice in his fall from grace. When the journalists set 
upon the Van Dorens, Herbie watches Charlie’s face eagerly (fig. 18). But 
just as they pounce again on the older man—“Professor Van Doren?”—
Herbie can’t take it any longer and steps behind the corner so as not to 
see the painful scene Aware of his father’s acute suffering, Charles Van Doren manages to 
say, “Dad, go ahead with mother. I’ll meet you later.” “No reaction,” ob-
serves a journalist (satisfied, we presume, with bringing low yet another 
Van Doren) and redoubles his attack on the main victim: “Charles, a few 
more questions.” Just then another journalist spots Herbie around the 
corner. (fig. 19).
journalist. Herb Stempel. Herbie, how ’bout a picture—you and Van 
Doren together.
herb. No, not now. Christ, look at the guy.
journalist. Come on, the both of you.
FIGURE 18. Herbie (John Turturro) watches Charles’s (Ralph Fiennes’s) face 
eagerly in Robert Redford’s Quiz Show (Hollywood Pictures, 1994).
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herb. You know what the problem with you bums is? You don’t leave the 
guy alone unless you’re leaving him alone.
This is our last glimpse of Herb Stempel. The camera returns to Charles. 
The journalists are closing in on him: “Who do you blame, Charlie?” 
“Do you feel that the committee has treated you fairly?” “How is the 
pressure compared to Twenty One?” But just as it begins to look like 
Charles is about to break down, the camera moves back to the room 
where the producers of Twenty One are testifying before the congres-
sional committee.
 In other words we do not actually get to see the emotional disinte-
gration of the protagonist. When Charles loses it—that is, if he loses it: 
we will never know for sure—the camera is strategically somewhere else: 
first with Herb Stempel, then with the congressional committee. This is 
the same tack that Frears uses in The Queen when Elizabeth cries with 
her face turned away from us. Embodied transparency is strongly implied 
but not shown.
 One can argue that by not letting us see the protagonist’s face at 
this crucial moment, the directors follow the ancient theatrical principle 
of taking the tragedy offstage to make the viewers’ imagination work 
FIGURE 19. Herbie steps behind the corner in Robert Redford’s Quiz Show 
(Hollywood Pictures, 1994).
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harder. Just as murders and suicides may seem more striking when we 
don’t actually see them, so imagining Charlie when his poker face finally 
crumbles might be a more powerful emotional experience than actually 
seeing Ralph Fiennes’s expression at this point. When Herbie says to the 
journalist, “No, not now. Christ, look at the guy,” we must shudder at 
what we would see were we to “look at the guy.”
 But, apart from preventing us from looking at Charlie, Herb Stem-
pel’s reaction accomplishes something else. Until this moment Herbie 
was coming across as a bit of a schmuck: he lied and made stupid busi-
ness investments; his social skills seemed barely adequate, his emotional 
responses crude or naive. But his present decision not to watch Charlie’s 
face complicates all that. It reveals some essential nobility of his charac-
ter, and since this is our last encounter with Herbie, this perception stays 
with us after the movie is over.
 Embodied transparency can be used to communicate to us something 
important about the people who witness it. By saying this, I am expand-
ing the argument that I made in chapter 2, talking about Mr. Darcy’s 
trying—and failing—to conceal his anger at Elizabeth Bennet’s rejection, 
and Elizabeth’s discomfort during that “dreadful” pause.10 There I sug-
gested that if you are a writer and you want your character to remain 
sympathetic, you don’t put her in a situation in which she begins to enjoy 
the spectacle of someone else’s transparency, thus coming across as sadis-
tic. Here I am turning to situations in which characters are acutely aware 
of their position as witnesses of other people’s transparency and choose 
to do something about it.
 Herb Stempel’s choice is to consciously remove himself from the 
position of a privileged observer. His actions are particularly appealing 
because they represent a stark contrast to the behavior of the journal-
ists, who take pictures of Charles Van Doren and his parents while ag-
gressively forcing them into a state of transparency. Of course, we don’t 
have to think of their sadism as intentional and thus indicative of some 
major character flaw. We can say instead that they are only “doing their 
job.” Still, Herbie’s repeated refusal to go along with them—first by in-
stinctively stepping behind the corner and then by categorically rejecting 
a photo op with Charles, even though that would have brought him re-
newed publicity—marks him as a man of a finer moral caliber precisely 
because he would not do his job anymore.
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 For creating a spectacle of embodied transparency used to be his job, 
too. Participating in Twenty One meant pretending to be on the spot: 
visibly sweating in search of an answer, visibly rejoicing if the answer is 
correct, visibly despairing if it is wrong. Herb Stempel used to be part of 
a world in which embodied transparency is a valuable commodity—the 
world that digested Charles Van Doren, the world in which the journal-
ists feel it is their right and their duty to wring transparency out of their 
subjects—but he is not of that world anymore. In the moral economy 
endorsed by this movie, a refusal to buy and sell embodied transparency 
may yet redeem a character.
Who Subverted Quiz Shows?
By taking a moral stance against the commercialization of transparency, 
Quiz Show taps a puzzling cultural phenomenon that I can only explain 
in cognitive terms. Although some of the movie’s characters are quick to 
point out that “this is television after all” and that it’s naive to expect 
that a popular show should limit itself to unscripted emotional responses, 
these characters are not particularly sympathetic. Quiz Show shares at 
least some of the 1950s viewers’ indignation at being cheated out of real 
competition and real emotions.
 Whence comes this indignation? Why should anyone feel angry when 
they find out that the sweat glistening on the contestants’ foreheads isn’t 
a sign of real anxiety but rather a result of applying a moistened hand-
kerchief to create an impression of anxiety? And how can this half-a-cen-
tury-old anger still resonate with audiences today, enough for the director 
to center a morality tale around it?
 It’s possible that we are dealing here with the same phenomenon that 
I explored in Why We Read Fiction, in which I talk about people feeling 
angry on finding out that stories initially presented to them as real were 
actually fictional. I suggest in that book (taking as my starting point the 
work of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides on source-monitoring)11 that 
when we know that we are dealing with a fictional narrative, we process 
information contained in that narrative with a strong source tag point-
ing to its author, which prevents that information from circulating freely 
among our cognitive databases and impacting an unforeseeable variety 
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of real-life decisions. Hence adjusting our thinking as a result of learning 
that a story we thought was true is actually fictional may involve a cogni-
tive cleanup of proportions that we can’t even estimate, and it is our in-
tuitive awareness of the need for such an effortful cleanup that underlies 
our feelings of anger and betrayal.
 Here is how this unhappy awareness of the high cognitive cost may 
manifest itself in specific cultural circumstances. Say the viewers think 
that Charles Van Doren defeated Herb Stempel fair and square. An end-
less variety of cultural narratives about social class, ethnicity, and educa-
tion—narratives whose emotional valence differed widely from one group 
of viewers to another in 1950s America—swirl around this triumph of a 
polished privileged WASP over a nerdy middle-class Jew. The emotions 
provoked by these cultural narratives and their personal interpretations 
are real, so finding out that the whole thing has been but a performance 
calls for reevaluation of these emotions and narratives. This is a painful 
process rendered additionally unpleasant by the fact that one is not sure 
which personal narratives were impacted in which way. Did I decide not 
to go to college, after all, because of something that struck me as I was 
watching Herb Stempel sweating visibly in that little soundproof booth 
on the stage? And should I trust that intuition about myself now that I 
know that Stempel was playacting, and that I, obviously, don’t know 
anything about him?
 I am channeling a hypothetical young American in the 1950s, but 
there is no need for such fancy role-playing. Here is writer Gayle Pember-
ton reminiscing about a very real effect that watching Gloria Lockerman 
perform on a quiz show in 1955 had on her life. Gloria “was a young 
black child, like [Gayle], but she could spell anything” and thus “won 
scads of money on ‘The $64,000 Question.’ ” Gayle’s grandmother, usu-
ally scathingly critical of everybody’s performance, both on TV and in 
real life, told Gayle that she “ought to try to be like” Gloria.
 The remark “shocked” Gayle: “I was . . . thrown into despair. I had 
done well in school, as well as could be hoped. I was modestly proud of 
my accomplishments, and given the price I was paying every day—and 
paying in silence, for I never brought my agonies at school home with 
me—I didn’t need Gloria Lockerman thrown in my face. Gloria Locker-
man, like me, on television, spelling. I was perennially an early-round 
knockout in spelling bees.”
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 Almost forty years later, Pemberton, now a distinguished professor 
of English at Wesleyan University, muses that “Gloria Lockerman was 
partially responsible for ruining my life. I might have never ended up 
teaching literature if it had not been for her.”12 Given the personal impact 
that Gloria’s performance thus had on both adults and children, it’s not 
difficult to imagine how unsettled they would have been by a revelation 
that her performance and emotions on TV were, too, scripted by the 
show’s producers.
 (As a matter of fact, they weren’t scripted: several years later, The 
$64,000 Question did become embroiled in the quiz-show scandal, but 
their problems were of a different kind than those besetting Twenty-One 
and Tic-Tac Dough. The show’s corporate sponsors wanted to include 
celebrities as contestants while bumping non-celebrities no matter how 
well they performed and how much the public liked them. Gloria herself 
had decided to quit the show early because she didn’t want to risk it all 
on the $64,000 question, following the advice of her grandmother.)
 This is to say that we want to know the relative truth-value of a 
context in which we glimpse embodied transparency because it may help 
us keep track of our own emotions and decisions. Though on some level 
we don’t differentiate between reading the minds of real people and read-
ing those of imagined people—our theory of mind applies itself with a 
healthy appetite to both—we anticipate engaging in a different kind of 
personal cognitive management when dealing with real-life as opposed 
to fictional emotions. The quiz shows promised one kind of cognitive 
management and delivered another—that was their real “scandal.” The 
movie, taking its cue from the original public reaction, encourages us to 
think of the shows as having violated some moral norms, but it has a 
difficult time articulating what these norms actually are, and for good 
reason. To get at the bottom of how the quiz shows did the public wrong, 
we have to talk about the high cognitive cost that they imposed on their 
unsuspecting viewers, but this language is not yet an accepted part of our 
cultural analysis.
 Quiz Show thus reimagines a particular moment in the history of 
television when what seemed to be a reliable context for embodied trans-
parency—a heated competition between would-be experts in cultural 
and political trivia—became subverted. The movie portrays television 
producers and corporate sponsors as villainous agents behind this sub-
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version, but what we have learned about embodied transparency so far 
ought to make us less eager to assign blame.
 For this is the way of embodied transparency. It wanes as soon as 
it starts to blossom. By the time you finish your heartfelt scream at the 
sight of the mouse, you might’ve already been faking it for two seconds. 
A quiz show is no more immune to its participants’ performance of body 
language than was an eighteenth-century sentimental novel or is twenty-
first-century reality-television programming. Blame it on the cognitive 
phenomenon we are dealing with (our perception of the body as simul-
taneously the best and the most suspect source of information about the 
mind), and accept that the naked emotional face that we were prevented 
from seeing would have been the face of a performer.
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In which the makers of The Office reveal their recipe for making us 
cringe  / Hubert Humphrey and John F. Kennedy don’t care how they appear 
onscreen  / film directors hunt for body language that can’t be faked  / and 
Andy Kaufman talks of pulling off his own death.
SIX
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It’s another day at The Office—a British mock documentary about the “boss from hell,” David Brent (Ricky Gervais). A regional man-
ager of a paper company, David is about to interview two candidates 
for the position of secretary. This must be the worst time to hire new 
people—the branch is about to be downsized, and everybody is anxious 
about losing their jobs. But, as David pompously explains to the camera 
that follows him and his coworkers around the office, he “needs a secre-
tary,” so he is getting one.1
 The “lucky contestants” (as David calls them) are a man and a 
woman in their late twenties. David immediately focuses on the attrac-
tive woman. “She’ll brighten up the place, won’t she?”—he observes to 
Dawn (Lucy Davis), the office receptionist, in the full hearing of both 
candidates, then catches himself and adds, “if she gets the job.” “So will 
you”—he turns to the man—“because you are both equal. No foregone 
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conclusion. Based on interview and merit. It is up to me ultimately. But 
good luck. You’ll do well to impress me.”
 Used to David’s ways yet painfully ashamed of his antics in front of 
these two strangers, Dawn stands next to him silently. She knows that she 
is being doubly observed—both by the interviewees and by the documen-
tary film crew. She can’t afford to be caught on film openly rolling her 
eyes and expressing scorn at her boss’s behavior. So she keeps smoothing 
her hair and checking her nails, while avoiding any eye contact with the 
relentless camera (fig. 20). And it seems for a moment that Dawn will be able to escape the 
camera, busying herself with something else. Enraptured by the sexy in-
terviewee, David decides to take a picture of her—“Just for um . . . just 
for er . . . just for the files”—and sends Dawn down for a Polaroid. But 
when she brings it, he grabs it himself—“I’ll do it. I’ll do it”—and moves 
closer to the female candidate. “Let’s get that lovely smile on. . . . That’s 
nice. Oh, the hair all . . . lovely. That looks lovely. Lovely blue eyes. OK. 
Big smile. That was lovely. . . . Look at that.”
 As David is waiting for the picture to develop, he remembers the 
other candidate. “Do one of you as well,” he throws off and clicks the 
shutter in the young man’s general direction. “We are [interviewing] Stu-
art first,” Dawn reminds him in a hopeless attempt to maintain some 
semblance of decorum. “Let’s get him out of the way,” David agrees 
volubly. “Follow me.” The shot ends with Stuart getting up to follow Da-
vid to his office and Dawn closing the Polaroid camera, too embarrassed 
to look at either candidate.
 The Office feasts on such awkward moments. The documentary for-
mat allows the film crew to focus pitilessly on people’s faces just when 
they would rather not be seen, encouraging the kind of staring that 
would be considered rude in real life. As Gervais, who codirected the 
miniseries with Stephen Merchant, puts it, one “advantage” of having 
the ever-watchful camera in The Office is “that it would wind up the 
agony.”2 And although we may share some of that agony as we watch 
Dawn cringe and squirm, we remain glued to our screens.3 Dawn is trans-
parent, she knows she is transparent, she tries not to be, she can’t help it, 
and we get to see it all.
 Witness the first rule of transparency: The Office cultivates contrasts. 
Gervais and Merchant constantly prod us to gauge one character’s trans-
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parency as contrasted to that of other characters or to her own transpar-
ency a moment ago. For example, when David makes a fool of himself 
in front of Dawn and the two job candidates, both interviewees must be 
unpleasantly surprised by his behavior. Still, the scene is shot so as to 
emphasize the contrast between what we may infer about their respective 
feelings and what we may infer about Dawn’s feelings. We can see that 
Dawn goes through the agony of embarrassment and tries to conceal her 
disapproval of David’s actions. Because we can imagine how much men-
tal energy this must take, we feel that it is highly unlikely that Dawn is 
capable of thinking of anything else at this moment (say, about her fiancé, 
Lee; her coworker, Tim; or the book that she was reading earlier). Just 
now Dawn is strikingly transparent.
 Not so Karen and Stuart, the interviewees. Karen smiles a lot, and at 
one point she also shoots a curious glance at Dawn. We may infer that 
she is taken aback by David’s lack of professionalism but determined to 
get through the interview. Other than making this tentative inference, 
however, we have no way of knowing what goes through her head as she 
listens to David’s harangue.
 Stuart is even less transparent than Karen. We may guess that he is 
FIGURE 20. Lucy Davis and Ricky Gervais in Gervais and Stephen Merchant’s The 
Office (BBC, 2001–3).
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disappointed and angry and that he has already given up on the job and is 
now only keeping up the appearance of polite interest because the camera 
is present. These speculations, however, draw more on the context of the 
scene than on his body language. For he wears a small, noncommittal 
smile throughout and otherwise betrays no emotions.
 What about the rule of transience? Did the makers of The Office do 
something special to keep the instances of embodied transparency, such 
as the one above, brief?
 It turns out that they did, even if they don’t think about it in these 
terms. In their commentary to The Office Merchant and Gervais explain 
that they wanted to avoid the feel of “situation comedy,” so that their 
material would remain jumpy and raw. To achieve that, they made a 
point of cutting abruptly from one scene to another. Note, however, 
one important side effect of this editing technique: it ensures that when 
characters are forced into a state of embodied transparency, we typically 
don’t stay with them long enough for them to seize control of the situa-
tion and start performing their feelings.
 This really is an effective narrative trick. The Office doesn’t dwell 
on the same person for a long time, yet it leaves us under a strong illu-
sion that it does, by making us aware that we stare at the protagonists 
when they are embarrassed or making fools of themselves for longer than 
would be polite in real life. So we are made to feel (as we do with Dawn) 
that we have seen too much when, in fact, we have seen just enough to 
be convinced that the protagonists were caught off guard and didn’t have 
time to rally their spirits and put on a suitable performance.
Death or Fiction: Cinéma Vérité’s Choice?
With its treatment of embodied transparency the mock documentary oc-
cupies a peculiar position in relation to its grandparent genre of regular 
documentary and its parent genre, cinéma vérité.4 In its ambitions it takes 
after the parent, in the execution of these ambitions after the grandpar-
ent. The result is pure fiction: embodied transparency galore, and all of 
it fake. The documentary roots are important however. By looking at 
them we can reconstruct the history of a genre—in this case, of cinéma 
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vérité—struggling to maintain its claim to portraying “real” emotions in 
a culture suspicious of such claims.
 Cinéma vérité thrived on the spontaneous show of emotion—indeed 
actively looked for contexts that would allow for maximum transpar-
ency. As Hope Ryden, who wrote, directed, and produced documentary 
films from 1961 through 1987 and was part of the Drew Associate team 
that developed cinéma vérité / cinema direct in the early 1960s,5 puts it, 
“What we were doing was finding an upcoming event in which some 
character would have a great stake. At that moment they would either 
win or lose. And it didn’t matter whether they win or lose. What mat-
tered [was] that they cared a whole lot about what they were doing.”6
 And what this caring “a whole lot” meant for the movie was that no 
matter what the characters might do on camera during their make-or-
break moment, the viewer knew what they were really feeling. So if they 
showed emotions, such as anxiety, happiness, or disappointment, those 
emotions could be counted on as being authentic. And if the characters 
didn’t show any emotion, they would still be transparent, because the 
viewer knew that they were trying hard to conceal their feelings.
 In the words of Robert Drew, who directed the documentary Primary 
(1960), featuring presidential candidates Hubert Humphrey and John F. 
Kennedy during the Wisconsin primary elections: “The idea of capturing 
human emotion spontaneously as it happens was the key idea that made 
Primary work, that made all of our films work, and that is making ci-
néma vérité work today in many ways across the spectrum of television.7 
As historians of documentary film Jack C. Ellis and Betsy A. McLane 
put it:
[In] Primary, Humphrey and Kennedy were much more concerned 
with winning an election than with how they would appear on 
screen. . . . Mooney v. Fowle (1961, aka Football) builds up the cli-
maxes with a high school football game in Miami, Florida, between 
two rival teams. It concentrates on the players, coaches, immediate 
families—those most completely preoccupied with this contest. The 
Chair (1962) centers on the efforts of a Chicago attorney, Donald 
Page Moore, to obtain a stay of execution for his client, Paul Crump, 
five days before it is scheduled to take place. Jane (1962) concerns 
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Jane Fonda in the production of a play, from the rehearsal period 
through the negative reviews following its Broadway opening and the 
decision to close it.
Thus when in The Chair “the attorney breaks into tears and expresses his 
incredulity after he receives a phone call from a stranger offering support 
for him in his efforts to save his client’s life,”8 we cannot possibly doubt 
that we see the man at his most transparent, that his body language pro-
vides direct access to his mind.
 The creators of cinéma vérité seemed to have achieved the impossi-
ble: a representation of real feelings—not a carefully arranged tableau of 
involuntary emotions (as in paintings), not a description of spontaneous 
body language of people who never existed (fiction), not a performance 
of unmediated emotional responses by professional actors (theater and 
movies) but actual transparency exhibited by actual people yet carefully 
observed and recorded by the camera.
 But, as we’ve seen, once a culture is aware of a seemingly reliable 
representational context for embodied transparency, that context is ren-
dered suspect. Theater becomes a place where spectators fake their ex-
alted emotional reactions, horse races—where they fake lively interest in 
horses. We learn to read emotional fakery into a show of feelings that 
yesterday we took at face value.
 The history of cinéma vérité can be viewed as an attempt on the 
part of documentary filmmakers to stay ahead of this particular learning 
curve. They knew from the beginning that their claims of direct access 
were fragile. Ideally, their subjects should “reveal what they really felt 
and were like when unselfconsciously relaxed or deeply involved in some 
activity.”9 In reality, however, the presence of the camera must still have 
influenced emotional responses of even the most unselfconscious sub-
jects. As Jean Rouch, the director who originated the term cinéma vérité, 
saw it, “the camera acts as a stimulant. It causes people to think about 
themselves as they may not be used to doing and to express their feelings 
in ways they ordinarily would not.”10 Performance worms its way into 
the vérité (however much vérité there was to begin with).
 It was only a question of time, then, before viewers would grow 
skeptical and start distrusting the whole genre. And if we assume that 
directors wanted to anticipate this reaction, then we can look at certain 
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films made between the late 1960s and now as their attempts to find new, 
reliable contexts for embodied transparency.11
 Among such attempts we should count documentaries that depict 
people killed during rock concerts (e.g., Gimme Shelter, 1970), victims 
of war in Vietnam (Hearts and Minds, 1974), people dying of AIDS (The 
Broadcast Tapes of Dr. Peter, 1994), and people literally growing up on 
camera (Michael Apted’s “Up Series” of 1970, 1977, 1984, 1991, 1998, 
and 2005). All of these films depict physiological processes that cannot 
be faked; hence, they elicit a very strong feeling that, at least on some 
level, these bodies provide direct access to the minds. For instance, Ap-
ted’s subjects, whom he filmed every seven years, can say whatever they 
want about themselves, but we find it particularly gratifying when we can 
correlate what we hear or see (e.g., voice pitch, posture, makeup) with 
the fact that they are now seven years older than they were in the last 
installment.
 It’s striking how many of these films portray death: the ultimate in-
stance of embodied transparency. Of course, with the exception of cer-
tain unique circumstances, such as those created by the epidemic of AIDS 
in the 1980s and 1990s,12 the directors did not and could not set out ex-
pecting to film that kind of transparency. (For instance, Albert and David 
Maysles and Charlotte Zwerin could not know that a person would be 
killed on camera during the performance of the Rolling Stones in their 
film Gimme Shelter.)13 It is interesting, then, that the 1970s saw a number 
of productions appearing to be documentaries shot in cinéma vérité style, 
such as No Lies (1973), a “staged film about rape,” and Rushes (1979), 
a staged film about suicide.14 In the wake of the original cinéma vérité of 
the 1960s these fake documentaries demonstrated the genre’s intuitive 
awareness that “deliberate and extraordinary measures”15 might eventu-
ally be needed to sustain its claims to direct access. And they were right to 
the extent to which, in the years to come, the real cinéma vérité did turn 
to death and other unfakeable physiological experiences, such as grow- 
ing up.
 But where is a genre to go in order to retain its claim to emotional 
authenticity after it has reached the point of documenting unfakeable 
physiological experiences? Crossing over into the realm of fiction seems 
almost inevitable. So the mock documentary is an offshoot of cinéma vé-
rité’s obsession with direct access to emotions crossbred with techniques 
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for creating illusions of such access that are actually alien to cinéma 
vérité.
 For instance, while cinéma vérité merely hoped to catch at least some 
moments of embodied transparency and looked for situations likely to 
produce such moments, a mockumentary actively transforms every situa-
tion into an occasion for embodied transparency. As one brief illustration 
of how this transformation happens, consider Gervais’s commentary on 
the “talking heads” of The Office. He refers to the scenes in which the 
protagonists are interviewed individually and thus can presumably put 
on any attitude or personality:
I really love the talking heads in the show. Because we shot it like a 
documentary, we couldn’t do things people wouldn’t do in front of 
the camera. They can’t shut the door and take a line of coke. Or they 
can’t blurt out things they’re thinking.
 But, ironically, when they’re by themselves and they’re just being 
filmed, they’re a little bit more honest. People do let their guard down 
because it’s flattering. When a camera’s pointed at someone, they 
think, “This is my chance, this is my platform. I can tell the world 
my all great philosophies on life” [sic]. And of course, they open their 
mouth and they blow it and can’t take it back.
 Note what just happened here. The least likely moment for reveal-
ing one’s true thoughts is turned into its opposite. It’s one thing to be 
caught on camera as Dawn is in the scene with David and the two job 
candidates; it’s quite another to be invited into a separate room to be 
filmed during a formal interview. In the latter case you have all the op-
portunities in the world to prepare well and to put forth your better self. 
After all, many early cinéma vérité directors prided themselves on never 
interviewing their subjects. Interviews were the mainstay of stodgy tradi-
tional documentaries—they spelled out performance. But in The Office 
this context-for-performance par excellence becomes yet another context 
for transparency. The protagonists “blow it and can’t take it back,” and 
they know that their audience will be able to tell that they are not happy 
about it.
 On this and other occasions, thrusting the camera into people’s faces 
is a technique of old documentaries that cinéma vérité abhorred but that 
is crucial to The Office. Ironically, The Office needs it in order to capture 
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“real” emotions—which is what cinéma vérité wanted to capture, too, 
except that cinéma vérité hoped that its subjects would forget about the 
presence of the camera, while The Office makes sure that nobody ever 
forgets about it. This is why the signature “real” emotion that The Of-
fice captures—acute embarrassment prompted by the awareness of being 
watched in a socially awkward situation—would be alien to the world 
of cinéma vérité. Not to mention that this embarrassment is fictitious, 
anyway . . .
 Fake self-consciousness—is this what cinéma vérité has come to with 
The Office? Tangled are the ways of a genre that pursues embodied trans-
parency in a culture that seems to consume formerly reliable contexts for 
transparency faster and faster.
Death and Photography
Embodied transparency in photography deserves a separate chapter, with 
subsections on candid photography and street photography, on Henri 
Cartier-Bresson and Arthur Fellig (Weegee), on Susan Sontag and Roland 
Barthes. I don’t deal with photography in this book, though, and bring it 
up now only briefly as a point of comparison for my discussion of cinéma 
vérité’s gradual turn to unfakeable physiological experiences in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
 Generally, photographers seeking to capture unmediated emotions 
face even greater challenges than do documentary filmmakers. Unlike 
the latter they don’t have the advantage of a narrative that leads up to 
the presumed moment of direct access and thus assures viewers (at least 
to a point) that the emotions they see weren’t merely performed for the 
camera. This may explain why photography often turns to subjects that 
come with their own, built-in, so to speak, embodied transparency, such 
as infants and young children (see fig. 21 as an illustration of the ease 
of arranging a shot that captures a child’s “true” feelings, such as, in 
this case, his absorption in a puppet); attendees of engrossing perfor-
mances and athletic events (such as Weegee’s “Teen Age Audience”); and 
people whose range of likely thoughts and feelings has been drastically 
narrowed by famine, impending execution, and other life-threatening cir-
cumstances.
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 This means that when photographers explicitly set out to record 
“true” mental states, they can expect, unhappily, one of the two follow-
ing reactions from their audience. On the one hand spectators are always 
eager and ready to interpret photographic instances of direct access as 
still somewhat fake, that is, constructed, staged—importing emotions 
into a context instead of merely recording them. The reason for this sus-
picious attitude is the same that I discussed earlier: because we evolved to 
perceive the body as the best yet most unreliable source of information 
about mental states, we remain skeptical about any context that promises 
us guaranteed access to mental states.
 On the other hand, if we do have a context backed up by the ulti-
mate guarantee—that is, if a photograph depicts a life-and-death situa-
tion, which often means that the subject will die as soon as the picture 
FIGURE 21. A child with a puppet. Photo courtesy Brian Connors Manke.
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is taken or is already dead—and the photographer, therefore, cannot be 
suspected of staging a particular context or emotion, she can be accused 
of not acting to prevent the death that she was recording. She won’t be 
prosecuted, but the impression of cruelty and collusion will linger.
 In other words embodied transparency in photography is often either 
not convincing enough—unless it’s too simple, as in pictures of babies—
or morally indefensible. It’s hard to get a shot of a “real” feeling in a 
socially complex and non-life-threatening situation.
Death and Stand-Up Comedy
To abandon the screen and other flat surfaces for the stage, one can ar-
gue that the fragility of any established cultural context for embodied 
transparency is what drove the career of the brilliant American stand-up 
comedian Andy Kaufman. Kaufman built his onstage presence around 
transparency, exploiting various social contexts in which a person must 
inadvertently show his true feelings: for example, pain and disappoint-
ment after being heckled by the audience; acute embarrassment when 
things don’t work out the way they are supposed to; quiet happiness after 
a profound spiritual experience changes one’s life and allows an almost 
dead career to take off again. All of these contexts were faked, of course. 
In fact, in a paradoxical act of reversing the roles of the observer and 
observed, Kaufman must have enjoyed the transparency of his spectators 
as he watched them growing uncomfortable, impatient, or angry during 
his stage antics. (Think: if Dawn from The Office could see us squirm 
in front of the television as we watch her being painfully embarrassed, 
who’d be more transparent then—she or we?)
 As time went by, however, audiences wised up to Kaufman’s strat-
egy of provoking them. According to one biographer, by the early 1980s 
“fewer and fewer were fooled and fewer still would care to be.”16 In 
response Kaufman felt compelled to come up with more and more outra-
geous scenarios to convince people that this time they really could see 
into his soul. And, inevitably, after a while, nothing short of being physi-
cally hurt or dying would seem to have sufficed to prove that his body 
provided at least some access to his true feelings.
 Kaufman’s friend and collaborator, Bob Zmuda, remembers Kaufman 
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saying, “with boyish enthusiasm,” after reading one “particularly vi-
cious” review of his work: “This one says I’ve gone as far as I can go, 
short of actually killing myself on stage. What do you think?”17 In 1982 
Kaufman confided to the producer of Saturday Night Live, Bob Tischler, 
“You know, the hoax I’d really like to pull off is my death. But I’m afraid 
of doing it—because when I do these things, I do them for real, and so 
I wouldn’t even be able to tell my parents. And I wouldn’t want to hurt 
them.” At that time he was already talking to his friends and relatives 
about wanting to pretend “to have cancer or something.”18 This was 
after the Jerry Lawler episode—when Kaufman convincingly pretended 
to be seriously injured by the angry professional wrestler—but before he 
was actually diagnosed with lung cancer, in December 1983.
 Predictably, many people thought that he faked his subsequent death 
in May 1984 and staged his own funeral. Once doubt creeps in, even the 
ultimate embodied transparency can be compromised.
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In which emotions build up delightfully  / a bachelor turns down a girl (who 
promptly blames herself)  / individuals who don’t like reality TV show 
their true faces  / a Fox TV executive claims that people like being humili-
ated  / American Idol is mentioned all too briefly  / and a lot of mental en-
ergy is spent on strangers.
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Reality TV
Humiliation in Real Time
Overwhelmed by Emotions
Now what about reality shows? Clearly, embodied transparency is a huge factor in their appeal. That said, the term reality show 
covers such a variety of formats and approaches that we should be care-
ful about claiming that all they do is cultivate moments when people’s 
bodies betray their feelings. This is in direct contrast to my discussion 
of such shows as The Office. Because mock documentaries represent 
only a small segment of television programming, I feel justified in saying 
that they literally exist to cultivate moments of embodied transparency. I 
would not, however, make the same overarching claim about the rapidly 
expanding universe of reality shows. Mine is a more modest claim: the 
concept of embodied transparency and the cognitive framework that un-
derlies it offer us useful tools for understanding certain recurring features 
of these shows.
 One such feature involves a buildup toward a predictable emotional 
response. That is, some shows are so arranged that as we watch them, 
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   117 3/2/12   12:44 PM
118          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
we get closer and closer to one pivotal moment at the end of the episode 
when a participant will feel a particular emotion. There is no surprise in 
it for us: we know exactly what that emotion will be. For instance, in
 Coming Home, a series featuring unexpected military reunions, we 
know that spouses, parents, and children of returning soldiers will be 
overcome by joy and relief at the sight of their loved ones. Just so in Ex-
treme Makeover: Home Edition, we know that the owners of a rundown 
house will be overwhelmed with delight and gratitude when they first see 
the dream home built for them by the remodeling crew. Our knowledge, 
however, does not dampen our eager anticipation and subsequent plea-
sure as we watch the participants finally experiencing that emotion. In 
fact, our pleasure is the pleasure of knowing for sure—and having imag-
ined all along—what the participants really feel as they cry, or laugh, or 
just stand there dumbstruck.
 Now think of trailers used to promote reality shows. Sometimes we 
see the face of a participant going through a strong emotion, like crying. 
Given the context of this series—say, if it’s a dating show, such as Bach-
elor, in which several women compete for the same man—we can infer 
that the participant has not been chosen by the desirable bachelor and is 
now bitterly disappointed and dissatisfied with herself. Note how we are 
being lured in by this glimpse of embodied transparency—by the promise 
of perfect access to the participant’s feelings.
 A closely related trailer strategy is to show a participant at the mo-
ment when his body language is relatively muted while the voice-over 
explains that we are witnessing a very particular social situation—for 
example, that somebody has committed a social faux pas, which has put 
our protagonist in a strikingly awkward position. We know that were 
we to find ourselves in this position, we would experience very strong 
feelings of surprise, humiliation, or anger, So we infer that he is, in fact, 
surprised, humiliated, or angered but, because of social conventions, can-
not express it just now. So the participant is doubly transparent to us: not 
only do we know the gamut of negative feelings he is experiencing, but 
we also know that he labors mightily to refrain from displaying them.1 
Again, this is a bait that we may find hard to resist (i.e., a glimpse of 
direct access to a complex mental state), which is the reason that this mo-
ment is chosen to advertise the episode.
 Note, by the way, that by saying we so often I don’t want to imply 
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that reality shows are irresistible for everybody. Some people don’t watch 
any of them. What I mean is that, while like any form of entertainment, 
they appeal more to some people than to others, they build their appeal 
around techniques that tap human cognitive universals, such as our abil-
ity, need, and desire to read minds in social contexts. The same argu-
ment can be made about reading novels, admittedly a more respectable 
cultural pastime: novels are built around our theory of mind, but not 
everybody is an avid novel reader.2
Humiliation: Pleasure or a Means to an End?
Humiliation comes up frequently in public discussions of reality shows. 
In 2003 the Museum of Television and Radio in Los Angeles sponsored 
a seminar titled “The Past, Present, and Future of Reality Television.” 
Humiliation was the subject of one of the first questions that the modera-
tor, Barbara Dixon, asked the panel of reality television producers and 
broadcast executives. As she put it, “Do we take pleasure in seeing people 
humiliated? What is that about? What goes into that formula that makes 
it seem so popular?”
 In response, producer, Scott A. Stone, noted that contemporary re-
ality shows’ precursors, such as Queen for a Day and Candid Camera, 
were about humiliation as well. According to Stone, this is “just part of 
the audience for television: they want to see humiliation.” Mike Dar-
nell, executive vice president of alternative programming for Fox TV, 
disagreed, observing that participants themselves do not feel put down: 
“the more humiliating the program seems to be, the more people show 
up for auditions.” In Darnell’s view it’s not humiliation that attracts the 
audience; it’s “a voyeuristic desire to see people go through emotional 
struggles.”
 Stone’s and Darnell’s views are actually not as different as they seem 
once we consider embodied transparency as something that producers 
of the show want to achieve. (Not, of course, that they think about it in 
these terms.) That is, if the goal of the producers is to put participants 
into a situation in which their thoughts are obvious to the audience even 
as they struggle to conceal them and maintain their cool, then creating a 
context in which participants are humiliated is one obvious and winning 
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strategy. So we can agree with Stone when he insists that television audi-
ences want to see humiliation, but we can also say that it’s not humili-
ation per se that they are after but access to participants’ thoughts and 
feelings. Humiliation is a direct path to that access, a means to the end.
 And that’s why what Darnell is saying is perfectly compatible with 
Stone’s view. We want to see “people go through emotional struggles” 
because this gives us access to their feelings, and being publicly humili-
ated necessarily involves an emotional struggle. To repeat, humiliation is 
not the only strategy for making people struggle with themselves, thus 
becoming transparent to the audience, but it happens to be reliable and 
effective, so it’s used a lot. Think of my earlier discussion of restraint. Just 
as there is nothing irresistibly attractive about restraint when it comes to 
movies, there is nothing intrinsically fascinating about humiliation when 
it comes to reality shows—both work to bring about transparency, and 
that’s why they appeal to directors and producers.
 Moreover, there is no reason that the same program cannot combine 
one particular strategy with another. Contest shows, such as American 
Idol, use humiliation and a buildup of predictable emotions. They humil-
iate their participants early on, during the auditions, and they also build 
up to the exhibition of strong emotions in the finale, when the winners 
rejoice and the runners-up break down in tears or struggle to hide their 
disappointment (as we all along expected they would!).
Why Watch Reruns?
Note, by the way, how the claim that I am making here is different from 
a closely related claim, often made about reality shows, which is that we 
like watching them because we like watching people’s emotions. On the 
one hand I agree with this completely and can further say that we spend 
time, energy, and money to put ourselves in situations in which we can 
do just that (by renting movies, by going to theaters and museums, etc.). 
On the other hand, unless we bring in research on theory of mind, we 
have no answer to a simple follow-up question: why do we like watch-
ing people’s emotions? It’s only when we start thinking of mind reading 
as our most crucial and constant preoccupation (though not consciously 
so) as a social species that we can say that we like watching displays of 
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emotion because they promise access to people’s thoughts, feelings, and 
intentions, and we evolved to value such access tremendously.
 Moreover, reality shows seem to offer their viewers a form of mind 
reading not available in movies and plays because they focus on emo-
tional reactions of ordinary people and not professional actors. The as-
sumption here is that participants of such shows are not good at faking 
or concealing their feelings. In fact, they might be quite bad at it (an im-
pression lovingly cultivated by strategic close-ups of their faces). Putting 
people who are not trained to perform their emotions in situations that 
surprise, unsettle, or humiliate them thus seems to guarantee that what 
we will get is unmediated access to their true mental states, which is a 
valuable and difficult-to-come-by social commodity.
 A completely useless commodity in this particular case, since we are 
not engaged in any direct social interaction with the participants in the 
shows. Our mind-reading adaptations, however, do not quite “get” this 
disconnect from reality. They evolved in an environment that didn’t have 
television sets, which means that people whose intentions and feelings we 
had to figure out were, in fact, our (potential) mates, friends, rivals, and 
enemies. Successes and failures of our mind reading back in the Pleisto-
cene had immediate and serious repercussions. This is why today we not 
only hang upon every twitch of a brow of an anonymous passerby set 
up by the cast of The Joe Schmo Show, but we also do it repeatedly, via 
reruns. As Sheryl Longin, a columnist at Pajamas Media, writes in her 
essay “Confessions of a Reality Junkie,”
I asked my daughter why she liked to watch these same episodes 
over and over. She stated the obvious fact that real people are more 
interesting to watch. True enough, voyeurism is humanity’s guilty 
pleasure. But there is nothing unpredictable or shocking about the be-
havior exhibited by the participants in these shows. In fact, the oppo-
site is true. They are fun to watch precisely because they are familiar 
character types we have all encountered in our daily lives. And any 
rare unexpected behaviors they do exhibit are no longer surprising on 
second viewing. Yet the fascination remains.3
 The fascination is bound to remain because as a mind-reading spe-
cies we are uniquely vulnerable to representations that seem to give us 
direct access to people’s minds; because professionals who create such 
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representations use a variety of editorial techniques and scripts to inten-
sify this illusion of access; and because there was no concept of reruns in 
the Pleistocene. That is, there simply had been no circumstances in which 
people would perfectly replicate their emotional displays, which might 
have conditioned our mind-reading adaptations to treat such displays as 
meaningless the second time around.4 Hence, when faced with reruns, 
these adaptations continue to enthusiastically process participants’ body 
language, picking up (or imagining) new cues and nuances, and making 
us feel that we engage in a social activity that is important and meaning-
ful.
 Of course, we may feel guilty afterward, when the faces of our “so-
cial partners,” which we’ve been attending to so intently for the last hour, 
are replaced by commercials and we almost wake up to the fact that we 
just wasted a lot of mental effort on total strangers. Come next episode, 
however, we are back: back to knowing exactly what goes through their 
minds—brilliant social players that we are made to feel by the show’s 
producers. What chance do we have, really, we with our prehistoric 
mind-reading adaptations, against an industry that is daily figuring out 
new ways to make these adaptations hum with pleasure?
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In which Colonel Pickering can hear Higgins in My Fair Lady, but Emile 
can’t hear Nelly in South Pacific  / Sky Masterson slows down time in Guys 
and Dolls  / Audrey Hepburn walks in on one eleven o’clock number, and 
Rosalind Russell takes her turn for another  / “Mr. Cellophane,” in Chicago, 
is shown not to be that transparent  / Sondheim turns it backward in Merrily 
We Roll Along and inside out in Sunday in the Park with George  / a student 
and a girl talk up a storm in a thirteenth-century Chinese opera  / Evan Ra-
chel Wood complains about singing and acting at the same time  / and the 
author timidly puts forth a suggestion.
EIGHT
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Musicals
(Particularly around 11 pm)
Sing Your Heart Out
The expression “sing your heart out” is a cliché, but it captures perfectly an intuitive mind-reading expectation we have about 
singing in stage and screen musicals: singing gives us direct access to 
characters’ hearts, revealing their secret thoughts, feelings, and desires.1
 Of course, not every instance of belting out a song provides a di-
rect pathway to hidden feelings. That mostly happens when the scene 
is arranged in such a way that other characters—even those standing 
right next to the character who is singing—cannot hear her. To clarify 
this point, remember that there are three distinct ways of introducing a 
song into a play. According to theater historian Scott McMillin, one way 
is to have characters “deliberately perform numbers for other charac-
ters.” There is a whole tradition of “backstage” musicals—stories about 
performers who put on musicals: “Since the characters are show people 
whose job is song and dance, much of the singing and dancing is called 
for by the book.
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 Show Boat is about entertainers, so they sing and dance. . . . Phantom 
of the Opera uses an-opera within-the-musical device—the plot occurs at 
the Paris Opera where various operas, including one by the Phantom 
himself, are being rehearsed and staged. Follies takes place at a reunion 
of former Follies showgirls, who perform some of their old numbers for 
one another.”2
 Another way to introduce a song into a musical is to have a character 
sing as he speaks to other characters. For instance, when in the opening 
scene of My Fair Lady (1964), Higgins sings “Why Can’t the English 
[Teach Their Children How to Speak],” he directs his harangue at Colo-
nel Pickering, Eliza, and everybody within earshot in Covent Garden. 
And when toward the end of the musical, he sings, “Why can’t a woman 
be more like a man?” he is addressing, first, Pickering and, then, his own 
housekeeper.
 In both cases—when a character deliberately performs a musical 
number and when he sings while talking to others—other people onstage 
hear him.3 In contrast, a character can burst into a song that seems to 
“come from out of the blue” and that nobody else in the world of the 
play can hear.4 Such songs are essentially thoughts: as long as the charac-
ter is singing, we know what he is thinking.
 As an example of this kind of embodied transparency in a musi-
cal, consider the 1958 film version of Rodgers and Hammerstein’s South 
Pacific. To make it abundantly clear that what we get is neither a song-
as-performance nor a song-as-conversation but a song as the direct and 
exhaustive report of the protagonists’ thoughts and feelings, they are 
shown at one point “singing” with their mouths shut. This is the scene in 
which Nellie Forbush is visiting Emile de Becque’s plantation and there 
is a pause in their conversation as he goes toward the table to pour the 
wine while she gazes at the ocean. Neither says a word, but we hear their 
respective “thoughts” sung as voice-overs:
nellie. Wonder how I’d feel living on a hillside,
Looking at an ocean, beautiful and still.
emile. This is what I need. This is what I longed for:
Someone young and smiling, climbing up my hill.
nellie. We are not alike. Probably I’d bore him.
He is a cultured Frenchman. I am a little hick.
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emile. Younger men than I, officers and doctors,
Probably pursue her. She could have her pick.
nellie. Wonder how I feel jittery and jumpy.
I am like a schoolgirl waiting for the dance.
emile. Should I ask her now? I am like a schoolboy.
What will be her answer? Do I have a chance?
 This is a delightful moment for many reasons; it doesn’t hurt, for 
example, that the actors, Mitzi Gaynor and Rossano Brazzi, are attrac-
tive and charismatic. A crucial factor, however, that contributes to our 
feeling of pleasure as we watch it is the pattern of mind reading that 
the scene imposes on us. When Nellie sings in the voice-over, “He is a 
cultured Frenchman. I am a little hick” (fig. 22), and we see her first turn 
ever so slightly in the direction of Emile and then turn away with a barely 
perceptible frown at “hick,” our mind-reading adaptations must be most 
happily occupied by matching her body language with her thoughts. This 
matching continues as Emile pauses with a concerned look, a wine bottle 
FIGURE 22. Nellie (Mitzi Gaynor) thinks in song in Rodgers and Hammerstein’s 
South Pacific (South Pacific Enterprises, 1958).
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in one hand and a glass in another (fig. 23), thinking of the younger 
men who “probably pursue” Nellie. The matching continues still as Nel-
lie half-smiles, comparing herself to a romantic schoolgirl, and as Emile 
pauses once more and gives another tiny frown as he compares himself 
to a schoolboy.
 We match, we correlate, we infer. That is, we engage in an inten-
sive cognitive workout. Not only does this experience simulate everyday 
mind reading, but it also provides us with an improbably perfect cor-
respondence between body language and thought. We infer that Nellie 
frowns because she is thinking that she is a little hick, and that’s exactly 
why she frowns. Wow—we are good!
 If this seems too obvious, consider that in real life when you think 
that you know why you just frowned and will readily explain it to any-
body who asks, there is a possibility that something else was on your 
mind: some vague complicating nuance that was too tangled or boring 
to go into when another perfectly plausible explanation was at hand. Or, 
just as likely, there might have been something else behind it, something 
you yourself were not aware of at the time. In other words it’s not at all 
clear that we can reliably talk about knowing our own “real” mental 
states—much less those of other people (again, life-threatening situations 
excepted).5
FIGURE 23. Emile (Rossano Brazzi) thinks in song in Rodgers and Hammerstein’s 
South Pacific (South Pacific Enterprises, 1958).
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   128 3/2/12   12:44 PM
M U S I C A L S           129
 This doesn’t mean that all human communication is travesty—we 
manage to get through the day, and even accomplish something now 
and then, without making our inner thought processes transparent to 
ourselves and to others. This does mean, however, that a scene from a 
musical, such as the one above, can create an illusion of complete and 
exhaustive correspondence between the mind and the body in a complex 
social situation that has no analogue in real-life communication and must 
therefore feel like an unusual treat to our theory of mind.
 Once again, this scene temporarily turns us into improbably brilliant 
social players. For even though Emile’s and Nellie’s body language is far 
from neutral, it is not very expressive either. In fact, it is self-consciously 
subdued. No other character present on the scene would’ve guessed from 
their pauses, half-turns, half-smiles, and half-frowns what is going on in 
their heads. Moreover, given that both of them feel quite insecure, they 
must be making an extra effort to appear casual and not show just how 
far they have gone in their hopes. They even stand with their backs to 
each other, perhaps to better conceal their feelings. Yet we see through 
their attempts at concealment. We know exactly what lies beneath. Just 
now our social competence is superlative and effortless.
 It fades away slowly. Traces of superior social discernment linger af-
ter the song is over, influencing our interpretation of what happens next. 
When Nellie and Emile resume their conversation and Nellie observes, “I 
bet you read a lot,” we read anxiety into her tone—certainly more anxi-
ety than she lets on—because we know that a moment ago she thought 
that as a “cultured Frenchman” Emile would soon get bored around an 
uncultured “little hick.” Emile, of course, doesn’t even notice her com-
ment about his reading prowess, and we suspect why: he must still be 
preoccupied with all those images of younger suitors pursuing Nellie. Or 
perhaps he is thinking of what he is about to say to her? We are mov-
ing back to the realm of informed guesses and speculations. The perfect 
transparency is over.
 This brings us to the peculiar treatment of time in musicals. Charac-
ters seem to remain transparent as long as their song lasts, which can be 
three minutes or even longer. Does this violate our “rule of transience,” 
according to which moments of embodied transparency are supposed to 
be brief?
 As a matter of fact, it doesn’t. The musical’s time moves according 
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to laws of its own. Songs-as-performances and songs-as-conversations 
unfold mostly in real time, but for songs-as-thoughts, time can stand 
still or slow down. One technique used by directors to make it seem that 
the song-as-thought (i.e., the moment of transparency) lasts less than the 
time it takes to actually sing it, is a freeze-frame. When in Guys and Dolls 
Sky Masterson (Marlon Brando) sings “Luck Be a Lady Tonight” (fig. 
24), the actual song lasts three minutes. The scene is done in such a way, 
however, that it seems that for other gamblers, who are impatiently wait-
ing for Sky to roll his dice, less than three minutes elapses: perhaps half 
as much of that time. Their body language slows down—even freezes to 
some extent—while we are inside Sky’s mind, listening to his plea to Lady 
Luck.6 Because no other characters are present in the scene from South Pa-
cific when Nellie and Emile sing out their thoughts, the directors don’t 
have to use any special techniques to show that time has slowed down. 
We assume that their songs take as much time as their thoughts do. Or as 
little time—for when it comes to thoughts (and dreams) we often have no 
way of knowing how long they actually last.
“To be or not to be” (an Aside)
Here is another important exception to our rule of transience: the rule 
applies mainly when others are present. When a character is alone (or, as 
in the case of South Pacific, with another equally transparent character), 
they can be transparent for a great length of time. This is how traditional 
theatrical soliloquies work, too. “To be or not to be” presupposes a pro-
tagonist standing alone on the stage and remaining transparent as long as 
the soliloquy lasts—for what we are hearing are his thoughts.
 Of course, not all directors opt for an unambiguous transparency 
lasting this long, and the concept “alone” can be stretched and manipu-
lated to complicate our impression of direct access. Thus, in Laurence Ol-
ivier’s Hamlet Olivier recites most of the monologue out loud, except for 
the part starting from “to die: to sleep; / No more” and until “perchance 
to dream,” which comes in a voice-over. This creates a peculiar effect of 
a hierarchy of access. The thoughts that we hear in the voice-over, when 
Hamlet’s lips are not moving and his eyes are closed, are somehow more 
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“inner,” more “true” than the rest, because nobody can possibly hear 
them. This is a bit ironic because nobody should be able to hear the rest 
of the monologue either—Hamlet recites it on a solitary rampart by a 
raging sea—yet by closing his mouth and eyes, Olivier intensifies the im-
pression of being alone: of having no audience and thus no social incen-
tive to perform his feelings for others.
 Every version of Hamlet that I’ve seen answers somewhat differently 
the question of how much direct access to the protagonist’s feelings this 
monologue should provide. If in Olivier’s version the “voice-over” parts 
of the soliloquy create an illusion of deeper transparency than the other 
parts, in Kenneth Branagh’s version, transparency feels compromised 
throughout because Hamlet delivers his monologue standing in front 
of a two-way mirror, almost nose-to-nose with Claudius and Polonius, 
who are watching him from the other side. With David Tennant’s Ham-
let, transparency is much less ambiguous. True, the room in which he is 
speaking is bugged, but Hamlet seems to have found a corner inaccessible 
to the secret cameras. As Olivier before him, Tennant closes his eyes on 
“to die: to sleep; / No more” (though his mouth keeps moving—in con-
trast to Olivier’s voice-over), thus intensifying our impression that we are 
reaching deeper into the character’s thoughts. A character who speaks 
with closed eyes in an empty room is not performing his feelings for oth-
ers.
FIGURE 24. The freeze-frame shot behind Sky Masterson (Marlon Brando) in 
Joseph L. Mankiewicz’s Guys and Dolls (Samuel Goldwyn, 1955).
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 Or so this convention used to imply. Perhaps you can already think 
of some play or movie in which it’s been subverted.
Eleven-O’clock Transparency
This is Henry Higgins singing in the final scene of My Fair Lady:
 I’ve grown accustomed to her face.
 I’ve grown accustomed to the trace
 Of something in the air.
 Accustomed to her face.
Now that Eliza Doolittle has left him, he realizes how much she means to 
him. As a private revelation, this song contrasts sharply with his earlier 
blustering speeches about the ungrateful “thing” that he “created out of 
the squashed cabbage leaves of Covent Garden.” It also contrasts with 
Higgins’s deliberate performance of nonchalance a moment later, when 
Eliza comes back. When she enters the house, catching him as he listens 
to her voice on the recording machine, he pulls his hat over his face, sinks 
deeper into the chair, and inquires, “Eliza, where the devil are my slip-
pers?” presumably to show his cool and incorrigibility. The transparent 
lyrical Higgins of “I’ve Grown Accustomed to Her Face” is gone (fig. 25). But it’s a tricky business with that hat. Intended to save face, it also 
hides his face. Perhaps Higgins knows that he has no control over his ex-
pression right now and doesn’t want to be seen in such a vulnerable state. 
If that’s the case, then Higgins’s gesture implies restraint, which makes 
him almost as transparent with the hat over his face as he was a moment 
earlier, in the midst of his solitary lyrical musings.
 But whether we read Higgins’s body language as indicative of re-
straint (and thus transparency) or nonchalance (and thus performance 
put on for Eliza), nothing is the same after his song and the glimpse into 
his soul that it has allowed us. We know how he “really” feels about 
Eliza, and so does he. The moment of direct access brought about by 
the song has changed the dynamic of the story. Of course, the story is 
over; this is the last scene. But, as critical responses to My Fair Lady 
show, we continue to think about what will happen next between Hig-
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   132 3/2/12   12:44 PM
M U S I C A L S           133
gins and Eliza, speculating about their relationship in light of what we’ve 
just learned.7
 Theater critics actually have a special term for a song “in which 
the main character has some kind of revelation or undergoes a major 
emotional moment that brings the musical to a climax.” They call it an 
eleven-o’clock number—a “holdover from the days when all musicals 
started at 8:30 pm and had to have a climactic song around 11:00, be-
cause it was desirable to have audiences leave not long after 11:00.”8 
Higgins’s “I’ve Grown Accustomed to Her Face” is one well-known ex-
ample of an eleven-o’clock number; “Rose’s Turn” from Gypsy is an-
other.9 According to Mark Sheskin (the cognitive psychologist and the-
ater enthusiast who introduced me to this term), some recent musicals 
have experimented with moving up their eleven-o’clock numbers, thus 
making the protagonists undergo their epiphanies in earlier acts.10 But 
wherever epiphanies are to be found, we can safely say that although not 
all musicals have eleven-o’clock numbers, all eleven-o’clock numbers are 
instances of embodied transparency.
FIGURE 25. Rex Harrison and Audrey Hepburn in George Cukor’s My Fair Lady 
(Warner Bros., 1964).
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Playing with Conventions
So far I’ve kept it simple. To illustrate the neat three-way division—song-
as-performance, song-as-conversation, and song-as-thought—I have used 
examples from musicals made in the 1950s and 1960s. Things got more 
complicated, however, in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in the work 
of Stephen Sondheim. Sondheim seems to delight in blurring boundar-
ies among the three, introducing embodied transparency into songs-as-
conversations, and performance into songs-as-thoughts. (Actually, things 
weren’t that simple in the 1950s and 1960s either. Classic musicals ex-
perimented with crossing these boundaries, too. It’s just that this experi-
mentation became more common in recent decades.)
 Think of the famous “Franklin Shepard Inc.” number at the end of 
the first act of Sondheim’s Merrily We Roll Along (1981), when Char-
ley Kringas, Frank Shepard’s collaborator and friend, has an emotional 
breakdown during a live television broadcast. An interviewer asks Char-
ley how he and Frank work together (Charley as a scriptwriter, Frank as 
a composer), but instead of giving a cute or pat answer, Charley bursts 
into an angry complaint about the disintegration of their collaboration 
and friendship. It’s clear that Charley is as shocked about his outburst 
as everyone else around him (“Oh, my God, I think it’s happened, / Stop 
me quick before I sink”), but he can’t stop venting his pent-up grief and 
frustration over what Frank’s selling out has done to their professional 
and personal relationship.
 “Franklin Shepard Inc.” is an eleven-o’clock number moved up to 
the beginning of the play. Though, as Sheskin notes, “this is an interest-
ing case because the musical is told in reverse order. The number occurs 
towards the beginning of the audience’s night, but at the chronologically 
correct time in the story.”11 That is, on some level we can still think of 
this song as an emotional upheaval concluding the play.
 What makes “Franklin Shepard Inc.” unusual as a case of embod-
ied transparency is that it is simultaneously a song-as-thought, a song-
as-conversation, and (though to a lesser degree) a song-as-performance. 
Charley is experiencing the anger and grief that he is singing about; he is 
talking to Frank and their interviewer; and he is performing (for this is a 
live TV broadcast, and, at least in the beginning of his song, when Char-
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ley is more in control of his feelings, he makes a lovely show of evoking 
the sounds of a piano and a typewriter).
 Here is another example of Sondheim’s taking a song-as-thought—
and a striking instance of embodied transparency—and complicating it 
with elements of performance. When in Sunday in the Park with George 
(1984), George Seurat’s model and mistress, Dot, gets tired of posing, she 
steps out of her rigid Victorian dress as one would out of a closet and 
prances around the park in her underwear, singing about her career as a 
model and her love for George (fig. 26). On the surface this is a brilliant visual exploitation of our mind-body 
dualism in the service of embodied transparency. We get direct access to 
Dot’s mind via her song while other characters in the play (George and 
the people walking through the park) get none: they are stuck with the 
body. All they can see is the motionless Dot, encased in her cumbersome 
dress, looking out at the water, posing for her exacting lover (fig. 27).
FIGURE 26. Dot (Bernadette Peters) next to her dress in Stephen Sondheim’s 
Sunday in the Park with George (Broadway, 1984).
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 Yet something else is happening here. As Dot is singing about what it 
means to be a professional model—one gets no “respect,” “attention,” or 
“connection” during her life but “some more public and more permanent 
expression of affection” after death—she keeps striking mock poses for 
her imaginary audience. These are poses that George would have no use 
for in his paintings but that other people may associate with modeling.
 Are these the imaginary spectators who give her “no respect” while 
she is alive? Perhaps they don’t understand George’s art either—if they 
think that he is the kind of artist who needs his models to assume these 
ridiculous postures. Yet Dot engages these people in her song, giving 
them what (she thinks) they can immediately appreciate—a sexy girl in 
frilly underwear—while also knowing that they (or other people who 
think like them) may reevaluate their present biases in the future (i.e., 
FIGURE 27. Dot (Bernadette Peters) poses for George (Mandy Patinkin) in Stephen 
Sondheim’s Sunday in the Park with George (Broadway, 1984).
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after both George and Dot are dead and his art gets the recognition it 
deserves). Dot thus plays both with their current perceptions of artists 
and their models and their future realization that modeling for the great 
Seurat must have been a different experience and called for a very special 
kind of woman.
 There is, in other words, a strong element of performance in Dot’s 
transparency. Her song is still clearly a thought—the empty dress stand-
ing in for her visible body doesn’t let us forget that the disrobed Dot 
is singing out her “innermost” feelings—but it’s also a complex act of 
mind-reading: giving people what they (presumably) want now in order 
to shape their future views of her and George. Dot is transparent and ma-
nipulative at the same time; Sondheim is brilliant at such mind-reading 
mashups.
 We find a similar dynamic of mixed mind reading throughout Rob 
Marshall’s movie Chicago (2002), the revision of John Kander, Fred Ebb, 
and Bob Fosse’s stage musical of 1975. Roxie Hart’s number “Funny 
Honey” is simultaneously an expression of her private thoughts about 
her husband, Amos, and her imaginary performance in front of a night-
club audience (fig. 28). And when, later in the play, Amos Hart sings 
“Mister Cellophane,” he is both reflecting in private on his social insig-
nificance and performing these sad private thoughts onstage (perhaps the 
same imaginary stage that his wife inhabits in her dreams). I believe that Roxie and Amos are still transparent in these scenes 
because their songs-as-performances are contained within their songs-
as-thoughts. Take Roxie. We know exactly what’s on her mind. She is 
thinking that her husband is a sap, and she is imagining how she would 
look were she to sing about her sap husband in a glamorous nightclub. 
But even though she hopes her imaginary spectators adore her, she can’t 
be absolutely sure. So while Roxie is letting us in on her most private 
feelings, she is working hard to put her audience into a certain state of 
mind: to woo and seduce them. Once more, the musical stage opens up 
an opportunity for a wonderfully mixed mind-reading experience: social 
complexity inside transparency.
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What Is It about Theory of Mind and Singing?
Playing with a convention does not mean doing away with it. If anything, 
it means just the opposite. Discovering that a song that is supposed to 
be a thought is also a performance is titillating precisely because we ex-
pected transparency. And this expectation is as strong as ever. Our de-
fault assumption still is that if a character sings a song that is not clearly 
marked as a performance (as in a backstage musical) or as a conversa-
tion, she is revealing private thoughts and feelings.
 But why should it be so? This is a question that scholars of the musi-
cal don’t ask but that, as a cognitive cultural critic, I must ask. Is there 
some kind of a special relationship between singing and theory of mind? 
What is it about a body caught in the act of singing that makes it easy for 
us to believe that we have direct access to the character’s mental state?
 If you tell me that this is a mere convention and that we stick with 
it because it has been around for so long, I have to disagree. I disagree 
FIGURE 28. Renée Zellweger as Roxie Hart and John C. Reilly as Amos in Rob 
Marshall’s Chicago (Miramax, 2002).
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because I am struck by how persistent and cross-cultural the connection 
between singing and transparency is. In fact, this persistence makes me 
wonder about the special physical and mental effort that the act of sing-
ing requires. Can it be that the awareness of this effort influences the lis-
teners’ perception of the singer’s emotional transparency? Let us consider 
this argument in detail.
 First, think of other genres in which singing is associated with direct 
access to thoughts and feelings. So far we have discussed the musical, 
but, of course, there is also opera. There the default expectation is that 
characters sing their hearts out for significant periods of time, and, as 
opera scholars have noted, nobody else onstage can hear them when they 
do.12 Moreover, that expectation holds not just for the European operatic 
tradition. For instance, it is the same in Chinese opera, in which qu songs 
generate moments of intense lyricism by expressing characters’ innermost 
feelings while nobody else onstage can hear them.
 Two things are particularly striking about the embodied transpar-
ency in the Chinese opera: first, qu songs are full of references to other 
well-known cultural narratives; second, the body language of actors is 
highly stylized. In other words it may seem difficult for characters to ap-
pear spontaneous in their emotional expression when they are constantly 
evoking other songs and poems and going through complex sequences of 
elaborate symbolic gestures. Yet, as a scholar of classical Chinese litera-
ture, Kang-i Sun Chang, observes, out of those verbal and physical refer-
ences emerges an emotional display that spectators consider particularly 
delectable.13 The actors are expected to achieve such a mastery over the 
stylized body language and literary heritage that they become second na-
ture. The spontaneous emotions of characters thus “shine through” the 
formulaic gestures and abundant literary and historical quotes.14
 So when in The Story of the Western Wing (the thirteenth-century 
classic by Wang Shifu), Student Zhang sees beautiful Oriole walking at 
some distance in a monastery garden and is immediately smitten by her, 
his song certainly represents a spontaneous outpouring of his private 
feelings, even though it also happens to demonstrate his knowledge of 
history, mythology, and drama. Zhang is dazzled and “speechless,” yet 
he still speaks learnedly of a mythical realm of bliss, the “Tushita Pal-
ace,” and “the heaven of Separation’s Regret,” an imaginary abode of 
thwarted lovers, typically evoked by drama of the period:
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 Stunning knockouts—I’ve seen a million;
 But a lovely face like this is rarely seen!
 It dazzles a man’s eyes, stuns him speechless,
 And makes his soul fly away into the heavens.
 She there, without a thought of teasing, fragrant shoulders bare,
 Simply twirls the flower, smiling.
 This is Tushita Palace,
 Don’t guess it to be the heaven of Separation’s Regret.
 Ah, who would have ever thought that I would meet a divine sylph?
 I see her spring-breeze face, fit for anger, fit for joy,
 Just suited to those flowered pins pasted with kingfisher feathers.15
 Neither Oriole nor anybody else in the garden can hear Zhang when 
he sings about Oriole’s “spring-breeze face” and compares the monastery 
to the Tushita Palace. Were they to hear him, they would be offended by 
his forwardness. This contrast between ordinary speech and the song as 
a private thought is emphasized a moment later when Zhang stops sing-
ing, turns to a monk who happens to be nearby, and blurts ecstatically, 
“Monk! Guanyin just materialized!” to which the monk replies reason-
ably, “You’re babbling. This is the young daughter of Chancellor Cui” 
(121).
 Wang also includes songs meant as performances (when Zhang and 
Oriole exchange improvised couplets [140]) and songs meant as con-
versations (when Oriole’s servant, Crimson, advises Zhang not to fear 
Oriole’s mother [130]). In other words The Story of the Western Wing 
employs the same three strategies for introducing songs into a play as do 
classic Western operas and musicals. Qu songs are clearly predominant, 
however. Again, in this respect, Chinese opera prefigures Western opera, 
in which the majority of songs render characters transparent.
 Consider now another representational tradition, roughly coeval 
with the period to which The Story of the Western Wing belongs: me-
dieval European romances, with their frequent insertions of song into 
narrative. Once more, some of these songs are public performances—as 
when a minstrel entertains courtiers at a fashionable gathering—but the 
majority are used to express private romantic longings.
 In 1993 the literary critic Maureen Barry McCann Boulton exam-
ined “every lyric insertion” in each of the seventy-two French narratives 
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composed between 1200 and 1400 that contained such insertions. She 
found that the “attribution of a song to a character for the purpose of ex-
pressing or analyzing his (or occasionally her) sentiments . . . eventually 
became the most successful application of the device.” Particularly when 
used as part of the interior monologue, the songs were “the principal 
device for revealing the inner thoughts of a character.”16
 Boulton did not write her book merely to confirm the view that songs 
in French medieval stories expressed the hidden emotions of characters. 
In fact, it was the opposite. She wanted to question this view by remind-
ing her readers that many of these songs contained extended references 
to other well-known performances. As she saw it, what this tradition of 
recycling and conscious referencing must mean is that we cannot con-
tinue to regard those lyrical insertions as spontaneous outpourings of 
characters’ private thoughts.17
 You can see why I can’t quite agree with Boulton’s argument. Think 
again of the Chinese opera. Its qu songs are full of references to other 
songs, myths, and historical narratives, yet this does not render them 
less lyrical. That is, to use the definition of lyricism offered by Chang, qu 
songs still contain a “sustained expression of [characters’] emotions, felt 
in the present.”18 So, to return to Boulton’s analysis of medieval lyrical 
insertions, it seems to me that the abundance of references and direct bor-
rowings does not by itself invalidate our association of a song with direct 
access to a character’s mind.
 This brings us to our everyday freestanding song. Our default expec-
tation about such a song, an unspoken rule, is that it reveals the feelings 
of the persona assumed by the singer. (The word persona is crucial here: 
I do not claim that a song gives us access to the mind of the singer—only 
to the character assumed by her for this particular performance.)
 There is, of course, an important exception to this rule: a narrative 
ballad. Instead of focusing on mental states of the protagonist (“Oh, I 
believe in yesterday”), it tells us about the relationship between several 
characters, whose actions we can follow but whose minds we can’t read, 
or, at least, not right away. Thus Bob Dylan’s “The Lonesome Death of 
Hattie Carroll”:
 William Zanzinger killed poor Hattie Carroll
 With a cane that he twirled around his diamond ring finger
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   141 3/2/12   12:45 PM
142          G E T T I N G  I N S I D E  YO U R  H E A D
 At a Baltimore hotel society gath’rin’
 And the cops were called in and his weapon took from him
 As they rode him in custody down to the station
 And booked William Zanzinger for first-degree murder . . .
Because the singer explicitly sets out to tell us a story, a narrative bal-
lad is a stand-alone equivalent of Higgins’s “Why Can’t the English?” 
That is, it’s a song as a speech—not a song as a thought—even though 
it may contain the singer’s mental states, as well as the mental states he 
attributes to his listeners, as in the last three lines of each stanza of “The 
Lonesome Death”:
 But you who philosophize disgrace and criticize all fears
 Take the rag away from your face
 Now ain’t the time for your tears.
 So, if we imagine a full continuum of embodied transparency in-
duced by singing, it will look as follows. On one end there will be lyrical 
songs implying complete transparency of the character assumed by the 
singer, such as “I’ll Never Smile Again.” On the opposite end there will 
be songs with the least transparency: narrative ballads featuring several 
nontransparent minds, as in “Raggle Taggle Gypsy-o.”19 In between there 
will be operatic arias, songs from musicals, lyrical insertions from medi-
eval romances, and an endless variety of other musical numbers. Within 
each of these categories some songs will gravitate toward one end of the 
spectrum and others toward the opposite end. As a whole, however, the 
spectrum will be weighted heavily toward transparency. That is, in spite 
of the range of differences within the categories, each category as a whole 
will have more songs creating contexts for embodied transparency than 
those featuring unreadable minds.
 Why should it be this way? I am returning now to my earlier sugges-
tion that there is something about the act of singing that makes it easy 
for us to believe that the song is revealing the true feelings of the persona 
assumed by the singer. At this point I can only speculate why it might 
be so.
 The starting point for my speculation is the testimony of performers 
whose roles demand that they act and sing simultaneously. As the actress 
Evan Rachel Wood, who started out in musical theater, puts it, “The 
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hardest part is singing live and acting at the same time. You have to sing 
emotion and sing the song well.”20 Opera singer Natalie Dessay concurs: 
“It’s almost impossible to sing and really act at the same time.”21 The fact 
that performers do frequently combine singing and acting may obscure 
the hard work and compositional skills involved. As Sheskin points out, 
the best musical writers, such as Sondheim, know how to construct a 
scene to make the sudden eruption into song easier for an actor, that is, 
how to gradually ratchet up emotions to such a pitch that at some point 
switching to a different vocal mode feels almost natural (or even neces-
sary).22
 One possible explanation for why simultaneous singing and acting 
might be difficult is that singing is effortful. It requires a sustained shift 
in vocal tone, pitch, and rhythm. So perhaps we intuitively expect greater 
access to the “true” feelings of people when they are in this changed vo-
cal mode because we are aware that they are already expending a lot of 
energy and thus may not be able to shoulder the additional cognitive load 
of pretending. This is, obviously, a highly speculative suggestion, but, 
even if it is wrong, the strong association between singing and transpar-
ency is still an intriguing cognitive phenomenon that we need to address.
 And meanwhile narrative ballads, songs as performances, and songs 
as conversations intuitively rely on this association and subvert it. Take 
Lou Reed’s “Walk on the Wild Side” or Billy Joel’s “Piano Man.” Were 
I to put in words the pretend-game that the personas assumed by per-
formers who sing such songs play with our mind-reading adaptations, 
it would go like this: “Yes, I am in the vocal mode that must give you 
immediate direct access to my thoughts and emotions. Yet something else 
seems to be going on. Continue looking around. In spite of the evidence 
of your senses, you can’t really know what I am up to. You will have to 
figure out what I am thinking and feeling by further engaging with the so-
cial situation at hand, that is, by paying attention to other minds around 
me and to my perception of those other minds.”
 So without concluding that singing is “all and only” about mind 
reading, I still say that, at least to some significant extent, the pleasures of 
singing and listening to songs are sociocognitive pleasures. To the degree 
to which mind reading is a crucial cognitive feature of our social species, 
different musical numbers offer us different ways to read minds.
 We will never get enough of them—neither minds nor songs.
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In which bubbles are blown and card castles are built  / rules for hating ab-
stract art are delineated  / extreme measures are taken, and emotions run 
high  / benevolent sons-in-law step into the breach, but some people still 
sneer  / da Vinci lurks  / Rubens takes a stroll in the garden  / and the author 
waxes sentimental about a football memoir.
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Painting Feelings
Absorption as Transparency
It’s warm outside. Spring blossoms brush against the house. Leaning over the windowsill, propping his right hand with his left, a young 
man is blowing bubbles. Just now a particularly large bubble is trembling 
at the tip of his blowpipe.1 The man is holding his breath. The world is 
standing still (fig. 29). The Soap Bubble is one of Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin’s “paint-
ings of games and amusements” done in the 1730s.2 His subjects build 
card castles, sketch, and play knucklebones. They are so completely ab-
sorbed in what they do that they are unaware of being watched, and they 
draw us in precisely with their peculiar obliviousness to our presence, 
their utter lack of performance.
 Absorptive paintings are both irresistible and difficult to create. This 
is the argument of Michael Fried in Absorption and Theatricality: Paint-
ing and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. Following the development of 
French genre painting from the 1730s to the early 1780s, Fried shows 
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how artists tried to minimize the self-awareness of art. To resist the “pri-
mordial convention that [art is] made to be beheld,” they depicted people 
not aware of the presence of the beholder.
 3 He also shows how quickly the established methods of representing 
absorption would become stale and how desperately artists would cast 
about for new ways to convince audiences that the people in paintings 
did not care about their gaze.
 Published in 1980, Absorption and Theatricality continues to influ-
ence art historians and cultural critics. I personally find its argument ex-
citing because I see absorption as embodied transparency (with one small 
exception, to be discussed in the next chapter).4 We know exactly what 
FIGURE 29. Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin, The Soap Bubble, c. 
1733–34. Oil on canvas, 24 ! 247⁄8 in.
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the young man in Chardin’s painting is feeling. His whole attention—his 
whole mind—is on that bubble. And we also know that as soon as the 
bubble bursts (in just a matter of seconds) his mind will move to other 
things, and he won’t be transparent anymore. Remember the rule of tran-
sience?
 I am running ahead of myself. Before we get to see how the rule of 
transience and the rule of contrasts play out in absorptive paintings, I 
want to consider, if only briefly, the larger question of the relationship 
between theory of mind and art. And, even before that, I want to say that 
another reason I am excited about Absorption and Theatricality is that 
Fried had neither background nor interest in cognitive science when he 
wrote his book. This is important to me because I am always happy when 
I find studies in art history, literature, or cultural studies compatible with 
research in the cognitive sciences. If we are all in the business of figuring 
out how the mind works, then arriving at complementary conclusions 
while starting off from very different disciplinary perspectives is a good 
indication that we really are on to something.
Theory of Mind and Art: Whose Mind Do We Read When We Look at 
a Painting?
It turns out that even deciding whether an object can be considered art is 
a mind-reading decision because it depends on our understanding of the 
intentions of the person behind the object.
  Cognitive psychologists Susan Gelman and Paul Bloom have found 
that, already at the age of three, children pronounce a blob of paint to be 
a painting only if there was a particular mental state behind its creation: 
“We showed the children a blob of paint on canvas . . . and either said 
that it was created by a child who accidentally spilled his paint or by a 
child who used his paint very carefully. As predicted, this made a differ-
ence: When told that it was an accidental creation, children tended to 
later describe it using words like ‘paint’; but when told that it was created 
on purpose, children tended to describe it as art—as ‘a painting.’ ”5
 As Bloom observes, the traditional view in developmental psychol-
ogy was that children name pictures they draw based on their appear-
ance. That is, “for a child, the word ‘airplane’ should refer to something 
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that looks like an airplane.” However, as Bloom and his graduate stu-
dents have established in a series of studies, the
names aren’t driven by what pictures look like; they are chosen on the 
basis of the pictures’ histories. . . . Even three-year-olds would name 
their pictures based on what they were intending when they created 
it. We also found that the same holds for pictures that other people 
draw. If a three-year-old watches someone stare at a fork and draw a 
scribble, she will later name the scribble “a fork”; if the same scribble 
was created while the person looked at a spoon, she will call it “a 
spoon.” In more recent studies [we] found that even 24-month-olds 
are sensitive to a drawing’s history when deciding what to call it.6
 Different eras in art have different ways of experimenting with our 
intuition about the importance of intention behind an object. Marcel Du-
champ pushed this intuition to what must have felt like its logical end 
point in 1917 with his Fountain, a urinal submitted to the exhibition of 
the Society of Independent Artists. I am writing this having just come 
back from a retrospective of Francis Alys at the Museum of Modern Art. 
Alys’s filmed endeavors include “pushing a block of ice around Mexico 
city until it melted; walking around the same town with a large pistol to 
see what would happen (he was arrested after eleven excruciatingly long 
minutes); [and] enlisting five hundred people, in Peru, with as many shov-
els to move part of a mountainous sand dune.”7 Because the relocation of 
the sand dune was intended as art and not, say, a public-works project, it 
can be considered an object of art. Not that it necessarily will be—many 
other culture-specific stars have to align in certain lucky ways—but a 
starting point (i.e., the intention) is in place.
 I like Alys’s work for the same reason I like the work of many other 
conceptual artists: it makes me see the world differently. I wouldn’t char-
acterize it as beautiful, though. This distinction is important because, 
when I say that attributing a certain mental state to a person behind an 
object is a prerequisite for considering it a work of art, I am not talk-
ing about aesthetics. There is a gap between calling a blob of paint a 
“painting” because it was created intentionally and figuring out its aes-
thetic value, and I am not bridging this gap here.8 My focus is on the 
sociocognitive dynamics of art. I want to understand whose minds we 
read and why, when we encounter works of art, particularly—given that 
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ultimately I will come back to embodied transparency—those depicting 
human bodies.
 Consider an art museum as one particular haunt of greedy mind read-
ers. Its existence depends on complex acts of mind attribution involving 
the curators, the public, and the artist. To touch on just one aspect of 
this mind attribution, the curators recognize the intention of the artist to 
create an art object and hope to elicit certain mental states in people who 
will come across it in the museum. In some cases the curators insist that 
an object not initially intended as a work of art be perceived as such by 
the public (e.g., home appliances that at a later period, or in a different 
context, are seen as peculiarly stylistically expressive).
 Moreover, once an object—say a painting with human figures in it—
is exhibited in a museum, its reception will necessarily involve additional 
attribution of mental states. The main question at that point is who gets 
the lion’s share of mental states—the people in the painting (i.e., its sub-
jects), the artist, or the audience—and the answer depends both on the 
content of the artwork and on the context in which it’s viewed. Let’s look 
at these three options—the subjects, the artist, and the audience—sepa-
rately.
 By portraying bodies, artists portray minds. That is, we make sense 
of a painting by attributing mental states to the people depicted in it. 
We do so by observing their body language, by interpreting the body 
language of other people in the painting who interact with them, and 
by turning to cultural narratives that exist independently of the painting 
but may have influenced it. Although we do some of it consciously—we 
remember, for example, the biblical story behind da Vinci’s The Last Sup-
per—much of it happens outside of our conscious awareness.9
 If a painting actively prevents us from attributing mental states to 
its subjects, we may turn to the artist. Think, for instance, of surrealist 
paintings that depict human figures, or claim to do so in their titles, but 
that make it impossible to read the body language of their subjects, such 
as de Chirico’s The Uncertainty of the Poet; Ernst’s Family Excursions, 
Approaching Puberty, Woman, Old Man, and Flower, Loplop Introduces 
a Young Girl, and The Robing of the Bride; or Picasso’s Young Tor-
mented Girl and Silhouette of Picasso and Young Girl Crying.10 Quite of-
ten in such cases, we try to learn as much as we can about the intentions 
of the artist and about the life events and aesthetic influences that might 
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have shaped these intentions. What did he or she mean, we ask, focusing 
most of our mind-reading energies on the artist.
 The third possibility: we can speak about a mood or feeling that a 
painting creates in us, which means that we try to make sense of it by at-
tributing mental states to ourselves. This works even in those situations, 
and perhaps particularly in those situations, when a painting is baffling 
to the point of being irritating. Let’s say I saw an abstract piece that I 
absolutely hated: I didn’t understand it, I couldn’t see anything in it, I 
felt like I wasted my time, and I decided that I don’t ever want to look 
at anything by this artist again. My negative response seems to indicate 
a lack of engagement with the painting, but note all the references to 
mental states in my diatribe: all this talk about hating, understanding, 
feeling, wanting, and deciding. Where is it coming from, and what is it 
doing here?
 These references to thinking and feeling must mean that I am still 
making sense of the painting by exercising my theory of mind—except 
that, unable to read the minds of the subjects of the painting and unwill-
ing to read the mind of the artist, I have transferred my mind-reading 
impulse onto myself and focused on the wishes, attitudes, and intentions 
that the painting prompted in me. It is as if we approach each painting 
ready and eager to attribute states of mind, and if something prevents us 
from attributing them to the subjects of the painting, we turn with the 
same eagerness to the artist and start thinking about her mind, and if we 
can’t do that, we begin to attribute mental states to ourselves. We will 
read minds, our behavior on such occasions seems to say; we know that 
by approaching a work of art we enter into an environment in which 
there are minds to be read, and we will do so, come what may!11
 I first came across Lyonel Feininger’s The Green Bridge II in a Whit-
ney Museum exhibit, on a rainy day. It took my breath away. I still don’t 
know why I liked it so much—it might have something to do with its 
colors and view of the world—but all I wanted to do was to keep looking 
at it or, even better, keep coming across it unexpectedly after looking at 
other things. (That’s why it’s now on the cover of this book.) It is as if 
I wanted to experience again and again that feeling of having the wind 
knocked out of me. My gut reaction to something in the painting ex-
pressed itself as a keen awareness of my mental state and a wish to keep 
myself in that particular mental state.
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 Yasmina Reza’s play Art depicts mind reading prompted by a paint-
ing that doesn’t allow one to attribute mental states to anybody in the 
painting or to the artist: a white canvas with three off-white lines in the 
middle. So the three protagonists of Art spend the whole play attribut-
ing complex mental states to themselves and each other. The painting 
becomes a catalyst for their anxieties about social status and friendship. 
In the following excerpts, typical for Art in this respect, note with what 
gusto Marc, Serge, and Yvan discuss each other’s mental states while 
ostensibly talking about the painting.
marc. You paid two hundred thousand francs for this shit?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
serge. You have no interest whatsoever in contemporary painting, you 
never have had. This is the field about which you know absolutely nothing, 
so how can you assert that any given object, which conforms to laws you 
don’t understand, is shit?
Marc. Because it is. It’s shit. I’m sorry.
Serge, alone.
serge. He doesn’t like the painting.
Fine . . .
But there was no warmth in the way he reacted.
No attempt.
No warmth when he dismissed it out of hand.
Just that vile, pretentious laugh.
A real know-all laugh.
I hated that laugh.12
 And on a different occasion:
yvan. We had a laugh. . . .
marc. He wasn’t laughing because his painting is ridiculous, you and he 
weren’t laughing for the same reasons, you were laughing at the painting and 
he was laughing to ingratiate himself, to put himself on your wavelength, to 
show you that on top of being an aesthete who can spend more on a paint-
ing that you earn in a year, he’s still the same old subversive mate who likes 
a good laugh.13
Indeed it seems that when it comes to abstract art, viewers attribute men-
tal states mostly to the artist and/or to themselves.14 This is in contrast, 
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say, to absorptive paintings, which seem to confine our mind reading to 
the mental states of their subjects.
 That, too, may change, though, depending on the context in which 
one views them. For the sake of this discussion I have considered sepa-
rately the three types of mind-reading attribution that engagement with 
a work of art may prompt in a viewer. But in reality it’s often a balance 
of the three, while a specific historical, academic, or personal context 
defines what kind of mind attribution takes precedence. For instance, I 
am sure you can think of different contexts in which you would attribute 
mental states mostly to the subject of Mona Lisa, mostly to da Vinci, or 
mostly to yourself.
 Moreover, artists may intuitively experiment with our theory of mind 
by working with a genre that is expected to stimulate a particular kind of 
mind reading and subverting this expectation. Think, for instance, of sev-
enteenth- and eighteenth-century conversation pieces such as Hogarth’s 
The Assembly at Wanstead House, Zoffani’s Charles Towneley in his 
Sculpture Gallery, or Devis’s Sir George and Lady Strickland in the Park 
of Boynton Hall—paintings that depict well-to-do families and, some-
times, their friends engaged in pleasant social activities. Conversation 
pieces typically contain enough rich information about the mental states 
of their subjects for us to dwell on those mental states contentedly and at 
length without wondering about the artists’ intentions.
 Now think of Rubens’s Self-Portrait with Hélène Fourment in Their 
Garden (1630–31?) and Velazquez’s Las Meninas (1656), also conversa-
tion pieces. Both artists manage to subvert this mind-reading pattern by 
integrating themselves into their paintings. Rubens leans forward from 
behind Hélène, looking directly at the viewer (fig. 30); Velazquez pauses 
next to the easel with the brush in hand, his eyes resting on the viewer 
(or, depending on which interpretation of Las Meninas you prefer, on the 
king and queen of Spain).15 In each case we almost have no choice but to start thinking about the 
intentions of the artist even though the genre of the painting—conver-
sation piece—typically doesn’t call for attributing mental states to any-
body outside the painting. I suspect that our mind-reading expectations 
are similarly short-circuited (while our interpretations enriched!) when 
we come across unexpected integrations of artists into their paintings in 
other genres. (Of course, this applies not just to paintings. How does it 
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make you feel when you recognize that a portly man crossing the street 
in an enthralling mystery movie is Hitchcock himself?)
 But no matter what genre convention a given work of art subverts, 
or in what context we happen to view it, there is no engagement with 
a work of art that is somehow theory of mind–free. From recognizing 
something special about the intent of the person drawing animals in char-
coal on the wall of a cave thirty-two thousand years ago,16 to walking in 
puzzlement around an object cordoned off by a wire on the floor of an 
art museum, to following the gaze of a young woman who is observing 
an interaction between two older women in a conversation piece, art has 
always been and will remain a product of a culture of greedy mind read-
ers.
FIGURE 30. Peter Paul Rubens, Self-Portrait with Hélène Fourment in Their 
Garden, c. 1630. Oil on panel, 51.6 ! 39 in.
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Whose Mind Do We Read When We Look at an Absorptive Painting?
This man wants his bubble to last another moment. That woman is lost 
in her studies. That boy hopes to add another card to his card castle 
without having it tumble down. This woman is startled by the arrival of 
her son. This man is asleep.
 Absorptive paintings focus our attention on the mental states of their 
subjects and provide us with direct access to their minds. (The two don’t 
have to go together. Think again of Mona Lisa: the more we focus on her 
mental state the less we know about it.) Yet even with absorptive paint-
ings and their lure of embodied transparency, our attention does not stay 
confined to the mental states of their subjects for long. Art critics and art 
historians ensure that it doesn’t.
 By convincing us to think of absorptive paintings in terms of their 
subjects’ attitude toward the beholder, Fried shifted our mind-reading 
balance. To the extent to which we perceive the sleeping hermit (fig. 31) 
as not noticing the beholder (us), we read our own mental states as part 
of our engagement with the picture. That is, instead of merely seeing the 
hermit as asleep, we are now also conscious of our awareness of not be-
ing noticed. This is what art criticism does—it introduces more mental states into 
our perception of an artwork.17 In the case of absorptive paintings the 
very act of recognizing a particular piece as “absorptive” immediately re-
distributes our mind-reading energies three ways: we think of the mental 
state of its subject (the hermit is asleep), of our own mental state (we are 
aware of not being noticed), and of the mental state of the artist (Vien 
must have intended to depict the hermit as completely oblivious to the 
outside world).
 At certain historical junctures this distribution of mind-reading effort 
may become a zero-sum game involving the subject of the painting and 
the artist. For instance, if we start finding the subject’s absolute focus on 
what he is doing less convincing—for instance, if we are not sure we can 
read his mind—we focus more and more of our mind-reading attention 
on the artist. We begin to speculate not just about the artist’s intention to 
render her subject absorbed but also about her intention to anticipate her 
audience’s skeptical response to her work.
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 I discuss this zero-sum game below, when I turn to the inevitable 
moment when a culture becomes aware of the seemingly reliable con-
text for embodied transparency and begins to treat such a context with 
skepticism. But first let us see how the rules of transience, contrast, and 
restraint fare with absorptive paintings.
FIGURE 31. Joseph-Marie Vien, The Hermit, 1750. Oil on can-
vas, 87 ! 58 in.
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Two Rules in One (but No Restraint)
Absorptive paintings cultivate transience. Here is a long quote from 
Fried, in which he comments on the artist’s “uncanny power” to make 
us think that the moment of absorption will not last, that what we are 
seeing right now is about to change:
Chardin’s paintings of games and amusements, in fact, all his genre 
paintings, are also remarkable for their uncanny power to suggest the 
actual duration of the absorptive states and activities they represent. 
Some such power necessarily characterizes all persuasive depictions of 
absorption, none of which would be persuasive if they did not at least 
convey the idea that the state or activity in question was sustained for 
a certain length of time. But Chardin’s genre paintings, like Vermeer’s 
before him, go much further than that. By a technical feat that almost 
defies analysis—though one writer has remarked helpfully on Char-
din’s characteristic choice of “natural pause in the action which, we 
feel, will recommence a moment later”—they come close to translat-
ing literal duration, the actual passage of time as one stands before 
the canvas, into a purely pictorial effect: as if the very stability and 
unchangingness of the painted image are perceived by the beholder 
not as material properties that could not be otherwise but as manifes-
tations of an absorptive state—the image of absorption in itself, so to 
speak—that only happens to subsist. The result, paradoxically, is that 
stability and unchangingness are endowed to an astonishing degree 
with the power to conjure an illusion of imminent or gradual or even 
fairly abrupt change.18
Chardin’s paintings intuitively play up our mind-reading uncertainties. 
They make us believe that we have direct access to these people’s minds 
now by making us expect to lose this access any second. They effec-
tively reinforce our anxious suspicion that other people’s minds are never 
transparent by presenting this moment of transparency as an exception, 
an accident, a fluke. By doing so, they make us value this fluke—they 
encourage us to seize the moment and to look and look and look at it 
while it lasts.19
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 Note something else about the transience of absorptive moments. 
Whereas in fiction we can talk separately about the rule of contrasts and 
the rule of transience, in absorptive paintings the two blend together. 
Visual transience implies contrast. If a painting succeeds in creating the 
impression that in a couple of seconds the absorbed person will not be 
absorbed anymore—so we won’t know what she is thinking—it means 
that on some level we are already imagining that person as not transpar-
ent. Her present transparent self is contrasted with her future nontrans-
parent self.
 While the rules of transience and contrast are central to absorptive 
paintings, the rule of restraint is not. In fact, it seems to be largely ab-
sent in stand-alone paintings, as opposed, that is, to sequential art, such 
as comic strips, graphic novels, or other forms of visual art in which a 
narrative unfolds in a series of images. When I try to think of restraint 
as embodied transparency in stand-alone visual representations, what 
mainly comes to mind are book illustrations accompanying the moments 
of embodied transparency in fictional narratives. (And, of course, these 
are not exactly stand-alone pictures either, since they are embedded in 
books. Let’s agree, then, for the sake of this argument, that stand-alone 
means “distinct from a series.”)
 Imagine, for example, an illustration facing the page from Pride and 
Prejudice in which Mr. Darcy is described as trying to conceal his anger 
and disappointment at Elizabeth’s rejection: “His complexion became 
pale with anger, and the disturbance of his mind was visible in every 
feature. He was struggling for the appearance of composure, and would 
not open his lips, till he believed himself to have attained it” (129). Such 
an illustration would not be able to capture restraint on its own. Instead 
it would show Mr. Darcy as looking angry or just focusing intently on 
Elizabeth’s face (see fig. 3 as an example and imagine that this is a stand-
alone picture, not a scene from a movie).
 We would read restraint into the picture because we have the text 
in front of us, but were we to show that picture to someone not famil-
iar with Pride and Prejudice (or even someone who is familiar with it 
but doesn’t remember every detail of that specific moment), that person 
would not see Mr. Darcy as struggling with his emotions. Because re-
straint is dynamic yet brief—unfolding in time yet over almost instanta-
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neously—portraying a character who tries to look composed while his 
mind is disturbed presents an artist with a serious challenge.
“Deliberate and Extraordinary Measures”
We already saw this happen with another eighteenth-century artifact: 
the novel. When a cultural setting emerges as an established context for 
embodied transparency, that setting loses credibility. Occasions for the 
unpremeditated display of feelings become occasions for more devious 
performance. Once the strategy of bringing a character to the theater 
was recognized as a convention for letting other characters read his mind, 
theater became a place where Robert Lovelace (from Richardson’s novel 
Clarissa) could fake his deep emotional engagement with a play to im-
press whoever would care to observe him.
 It happened with absorptive paintings, too. Chardin’s canvases of the 
1730s, as well as Chardin’s, Greuze’s, Van Loo’s, and Vien’s works of the 
1750s, depicted people so caught up in praying, playing, sketching, learn-
ing difficult lessons, blowing bubbles, grieving, rejoicing, listening raptly 
to charismatic speakers, or simply sleeping, as not to be aware of being 
watched. By “negating the beholder’s presence” these paintings riveted 
their audiences.20 The sight of people so absorbed in what they are doing 
that they are unable to put on any special body postures or facial expres-
sions was mesmerizing. By the early 1760s, however, the subject matter 
had worn itself thin. It became increasingly difficult for artists to use the 
established contexts of absorption (reading, praying, sleeping, etc.) to 
convincingly exclude the beholder from the picture.
 The contexts for embodied transparency were becoming conven-
tional and as such—just like theater in fiction—vulnerable to subver-
sion.21 Imagine a portrait of a woman not merely blowing bubbles but 
Blowing Bubbles—intentionally engaging in an activity that is supposed 
to be absorptive—performing unselfconsciousness for the beholder and 
thus completely defeating the original purpose of the endeavor. This is a 
hypothetical image, but I suspect that the artists had in mind something 
along these lines when they felt that they could no longer rely on the es-
tablished contexts of absorption.
 So, as Fried tells us, “deliberate and extraordinary measures came 
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to be required in order to persuade contemporary audiences of the ab-
sorption of a figure or group of figures in the world of the painting.”22 
One such measure involved ratcheting up the drama. Greuze’s Le Fils 
ingrat (1777) and Le Fils puni (1778) depict a family so distraught over 
the rebellion of an ungrateful son and the resulting early death of his 
father that it is obvious that none of them would be able to gather their 
wits enough to look about themselves and realize that they are being ob-
served.
 Another measure involved opening a painting “to a number of points 
of view other than that of the beholder standing before the canvas.”23 In 
David’s Belisaire (1785) the “off-center perspective [places] the beholder 
to one side of the painting, away from [the central] figure of [Belisaire].”24 
(Compare this to The Soap Bubble, in which the beholder is squarely fac-
ing the subject of the painting.) We don’t care what you see, how you see 
it, or whether you can see it at all, such a perspective seems to say to the 
viewer; you may just as well not be there.
 Yet another way to create the illusion of absorption was to make the 
titular character blind, as in Vincent’s Belisaire (1777), David’s Belisaire 
(1781, 1785), Peyron’s Belisaire (1779), and David’s Homere endormi 
and Homere recitant (both 1794). The blind protagonist is by default 
unaware of the beholder.
 Fried calls these measures “extreme.” Indeed, the need to tap new 
contexts for absorption sometimes led to strained psychological dynam-
ics within the painting. Consider Vincent’s Belisaire, in which the pro-
tagonist, the famous general, now impoverished and blind, is receiving 
charity, while a younger officer is looking at him (fig. 32). According to 
Fried there is something forced about the posture of the young man. He 
“gazes anxiously, almost mistrustfully, at the sightless eyes of the great 
general.”25 Does he think that Belisaire is faking blindness? Why should 
he doubt the old warrior instead of, say, just pitying him? Fried interprets the young officer’s intense gaze as an indication 
that the artist is desperately trying to make both men seem completely 
absorbed in the present moment and thus oblivious to the presence of 
the beholder. The general cannot perform for the beholder because he 
is blind, and the officer cannot perform for the beholder because he is 
too preoccupied with figuring out what the blind man is up to. But it is 
precisely because the officer’s attitude is not entirely psychologically con-
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vincing that we infer that it must serve other representational needs (i.e., 
the need for absorption).
 The intensification of drama, the experimentation with different per-
spectives, and the introduction of blind historical and mythical figures 
all seem to testify that by the 1770s “the everyday as such was in an im-
portant sense lost to pictorial representation.”26 The absorptive charm of 
such mundane activities as listening, watching, daydreaming was broken. 
In fact, Fried argues that if we follow “the evolution of David’s art be-
tween 1780 and 1814,” we can trace in it “a drastic loss of conviction in 
[both] action and expression as resources for ambitious painting, that is, 
in the very possibility that either could be represented other than as the-
atrical.”27 In other words, “the persuasive representation of absorption” 
was something that artists still wanted to achieve, but, at least within the 
context of that specific period in French art history, their means for doing 
so seemed to have been exhausted.28
FIGURE 32. François-André Vincent’s Belisarius, 1776. Oil on canvas, 29 ! 23 in.
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 What David and other artists perceived as the specific representa-
tional crisis is actually an expression of a broader cognitive challenge 
involved in constructing contexts of embodied transparency. At any given 
historical moment there seems to be a very limited window of opportu-
nity within which audiences will buy the idea of the complete unself-
consciousness of people engaged in a certain activity or behaving in a 
certain way. Then the double perspective of the body reasserts itself with 
a vengeance. Spontaneity begins to feel calculated, sincerity fake, and 
sentiment sentimental.
But Who Decides Whether Something Is Sentimental?
Let’s revisit one extreme measure taken by the French artists in search 
of new contexts of absorption: the ratcheting up of drama. We really 
should call it the increase in social complexity. Blowing bubbles, play-
ing knucklebones, and sleeping make for visually compelling images, but 
there is very little social interaction to any of them. In contrast, making 
absorption emerge out of such situations as the rebellion and return of 
an ungrateful son (Greuze’s Le Fils ingrat and Le Fils puni) implies a 
manifold increase in social complexity.29 To make the moments of trans-
parency seem brief and spontaneous, artists now have to engage in in-
tricate backstage plotting. They enter the territory of fiction writers (for 
remember: writers create involved social situations to bring characters to 
a point at which their bodies reveal their minds), and not everybody is 
happy with it.
 Consider the contemporary responses to Greuze’s La Piété filiale 
(1761) (fig. 33). This painting features a paralyzed old man surrounded 
by his family at the precise moment when they all react emotionally to his 
interaction with his benevolent son-in-law. Fried recounts Denis Dider-
ot’s description of the painting: “The moment . . . chosen by the artist 
is special. By chance it happened that, on that particular day, it was his 
son-in-law who brought the old man some food, and the latter, moved, 
showed his gratitude in such an animated and earnest way that it inter-
rupted the occupations and attracted the attention of the whole family.” 
Diderot “seems almost to be saying that Greuze was compelled first to 
paralyze the old man and then to orchestrate an entire sequence of osten-
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sibly chance events in order to arrive in the end at the sort of emotionally 
charged, highly moralized, and dramatically unified situation that alone 
was capable of embodying with sufficient perspicuousness the absorptive 
states of suspension of activity and fixing of attention that painter and 
critic alike regarded as paramount.”30 If Diderot merely drew his readers’ attention to the amusing clash be-
tween the spontaneity of the moment depicted in the painting and the in-
tricate planning necessary for achieving this illusion of spontaneity, other 
contemporaries actually accused Greuze of a “mania for plotting.”31 And 
later critics went further and taxed him with sentimentality. According 
to Fried, “for a long time now it has been traditional, almost obligatory, 
to remark that we, the modern public, no longer find it in ourselves to 
be moved by the sentimentality, emotionalism, and moralism of much of 
Greuze’s production.”32
 I find this charge of sentimentality extremely interesting from the 
point of view of theory of mind. It seems that our first response when we 
initially encounter something that we may later consider sentimental is 
the excitement about prospective mind reading. We think that we are in a 
situation in which we have privileged access to certain people’s emotions. 
For instance, we read of a young woman’s blushing as she opens a letter, 
and we assume that we have caught her at a rare, and thus valuable, mo-
ment when her body betrays her feelings.33 But then something happens 
that dampens this initial excitement.
 We find out that this particular instance of privileged access is ac-
tually part of a cultural convention. In the case of the blushing young 
woman, we may learn (for instance, from a professor in class) that we are 
reading an eighteenth-century sentimental novel, in which it is expected 
that characters blush, pant, pale, and cry. This refocuses our attention on 
the author instead of the characters. Ah!—we say, as it were—this young 
woman blushes not because she is painfully self-conscious about the am-
biguous social situation in which she finds herself. She blushes because 
the author, writing that kind of novel, feels obligated to make characters 
blush with some regularity.
 So it almost doesn’t matter anymore that within the universe of the 
novel the character may still be transparent. Our perception of privileged 
access is now devalued. Instead of feeling like brilliant social players 
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(which we feel when embodied transparency is done convincingly), we 
feel like patsies manipulated by the author.
 Calling something sentimental may thus be a way for us to assert that 
we do not buy into its promise of privileged mind-reading, that we recog-
nize it as contrived, and that we will look for “truer” feelings elsewhere.
 The history of the word sentimental itself seems to reflect the same 
conceptual move from enthusiasm about direct mind-access to disillu-
sionment. The term underwent a change between 1740 and 1820. Origi-
nally neutral, “characterized by sentiment,” or positive, “characterized 
by or exhibiting refined and elevated feeling,” it acquired a pejorative 
meaning of “addicted to indulgence in superficial emotion.”34 It is as if 
when a culture goes through a phase in which it starts distrusting a par-
FIGURE 33. Jean Baptiste Greuze, La Piété filial, 1761. Oil on canvas, 21.5 ! 25.5 in.
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ticular set of ready-made displays of emotion (say, those used by novel-
ists), it needs a special term for its distrust.
 You can see how within this frame of thinking, it is easy to charge 
Greuze with sentimentalism. He seems to tell us a real story, but it’s a 
mere pretense because all he really wants to do is display feelings and 
make them convincing. Everything and everybody in the painting (and 
it’s a well-populated painting!) are but means to this end. Once you start 
looking at La Piété filiale from this perspective, all you see is a «mania 
for plotting» and «superficial emotion.» Greuze now seems to be truly 
on par with fiction writers—particularly authors of eighteenth-century 
sentimental novels.
 Fried does not settle for the easy tag of sentimentalism in his discus-
sion of Greuze. Indeed, the way he approaches these paintings makes 
his a protocognitive argument, ahead of his time. I have suggested that 
calling a painting or a novel sentimental is our shorthand way of making 
a rather complex judgment about its mind-reading dynamics, but Fried 
made a very similar point as early as 1980, observing that when we talk 
of eighteenth-century «sentimentalism, emotionalism, and moralism,» 
we don’t really explain as much as we think we do. For Fried sentimental-
ism is not an end in itself; instead, it fulfills the artist’s need to represent 
absorption: «[We] take those qualities at face value, as if they and noth-
ing more were at stake in his pictures; and that we therefore fail to grasp 
what his sentimentalism, emotionalism, and moralism, as well as his al-
leged mania for plotting, are in the service of, pictorially speaking—viz., 
a more urgent and extreme evocation of absorption than can be found in 
the work of Chardin, Van Loo, Vien, or any other French painter of that 
time.»35
 I call Fried’s argument protocognitive because I consider absorp-
tion to be embodied transparency. When he says that the French artists 
used techniques that we now call sentimental to plunge their subjects 
into absorption, I agree but add that, on a larger scale, what they were 
really after (without knowing it) was embodied transparency. That is, 
eighteenth-century writers and artists faced the same challenge that writ-
ers and artists always face: they wanted to construct convincing repre-
sentational contexts for making the body reveal the mind. The fact that 
we now group some of their methods under the unflattering rubric “sen-
timentalism” shows again how quickly those methods become outmoded 
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and how ready we are to suspect that there is an element of performance 
in any show of sincerity.
 But perhaps the negative connotations of the late eighteenth-century 
term sentimentalism show something else, too. Think of how many nov-
els, movies, and songs produced within any recent decade can be easily 
characterized as sentimental, not in the pejorative sense of the word but 
in the earlier eighteenth-century sense: as “characterized by sentiment.” 
Not to search too far, even Hornby’s football memoir Fever Pitch fits the 
bill with its emphasis on bodies caught in spontaneous emotional reac-
tion to the game. That kind of sentimentalism is here to stay because 
what it does, again and again, is correlate body with mind in convinc-
ing social contexts—and we can never get enough of such correlations, 
greedy mind readers that we are.36
 Now think of the effects of claiming that sentimentalism is an 
eighteenth-century phenomenon and that “we, the modern public, 
no longer find it in ourselves to be moved” by La Piété filiale the way 
Greuze’s contemporaries did. On the one hand common sense suggests 
that this claim is correct. Surely in the 1760s they must have responded 
to La Piété filiale somewhat differently than we respond to it now, just as 
audiences in the 1960s must have responded to Bobby Vinton’s “Roses 
Are Red (My Love)” somewhat differently than we may now:
 Roses are red, my love.
 Violets are blue.
 Sugar is sweet, my love,
 But not as sweet as you.37
 On the other hand, one practical effect of this claim is that sentimen-
talism begins to seem safely contained—sealed off as a relic of a long-
gone epoch associated with a very specific list of texts and works of art. 
And, so contained, sentimentalism becomes usable again. That is, what-
ever writers and artists do now can be sentimental, but it cannot add up 
to “sentimentalism,” for we have been done with that for more than two 
hundred years, haven’t we?
 And such containment and recycling are necessary, given that au-
thors are always in need of new ways to render the body convincingly 
transparent. The rubric sentimentalism covers a broad variety of repre-
sentational methods, many of which can never really go out of use. In 
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fact, we can say that, when one method of forcing the body into transpar-
ency is declared passé and appended with a proper condescending “ism,” 
it is an indication that this method is now on the way to being recycled in 
a different guise and reinvented by a new genre or group of artists.
Why We Like Absorptive Paintings
Throughout Absorption and Theatricality Fried remains interested in the 
interplay between psychology and history. Here, once again, though not 
a cognitive scientist himself—not even a fellow traveler—what he says is 
very compatible with the cognitive theory of mind reading. Indeed, his 
argument is better understood if we look at it squarely from a cognitive 
perspective.
 Fried begins with a strong assertion of the historical limits of his 
argument. “This study is exclusively concerned with developments in 
France,” he tells us on the first page. Then again on page 2: “I am con-
vinced that there took place in French painting starting around the mid-
dle of the century a unique and very largely autonomous evolution; and 
it is the task of comprehending that evolution as nearly as possible in its 
own terms—of laying bare the issues crucially at stake in it—that is un-
dertaken in the pages that follow.”
 By insisting that the French absorptive paintings should be consid-
ered on their “own terms,” Fried wants to distance himself from several 
interpretive traditions.38 Specifically, he disagrees with those art histori-
ans who think that by focusing on the human body in action, Chardin 
and others took an anti-rococo stance, reacting as it were against rococo’s 
emphasis on decorative elements and its indifference to historical figures 
and heroic endeavors. As Fried sees it, authors of absorptive paintings 
were not really interested in upholding “the doctrines of the hierarchy of 
genres and the supremacy of history painting as they were held by anti-
Rococo critics and theorists” (75). In his view the artists’ interest in the 
representation of absorption was not ideological or primarily concerned 
with the subject matter. Instead it was “determined by other, ontologi-
cally prior concerns and imperatives” (75). And these had to do, among 
other things, with the relationship, “at once literal and fictive, between 
painting and beholder” (76).
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 Such “ontologically prior concerns”—particularly when framed in 
terms of the relationship “between painting and beholder”—are bound 
up with the cognition of mind reading. The absorptive painting titillates 
us with embodied transparency. Our responses to this powerful illusion 
of direct access certainly draw on an idiosyncratic mix of personal ide-
ologies and aesthetics, but the sociocognitive—the drive to read minds 
and the anxiety about misreading minds—is inextricably there, heighten-
ing and shaping our interest in the painting.
 In other words if we approach Fried’s arguments squarely from the 
point of view of cognitive theory, we gain a better understanding of 
the intrinsic pull of absorptive paintings. Fried notes that “absorption 
emerges as good in and of itself, without regard to its occasion” (51). We 
can now say that a representation of absorption may feel “good in and 
of itself” because it flatters our mind-reading adaptations. Such represen-
tations titillate us with visions of perfect access to other people’s minds, 
and they intensify our pleasure by constructing plausible social contexts 
for these fleeting mind-reading feasts.
 So still without bridging the gap between mind reading and aesthet-
ics in visual art, we can say that sociocognitive satisfaction may under-
lie aesthetic pleasure. It does not define this pleasure: too many culture-
specific and personal idiosyncratic factors are at play in each case. In 
fact, as Fried demonstrates, a number of eighteenth-century critics found 
various faults with absorptive pieces, which means that a visual depiction 
of privileged mind access does not directly translate into a publicly ac-
knowledged aesthetic pleasure for everyone. Still, at least to some degree, 
it makes this pleasure possible.
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In which women first appear more inscrutable than men, but then men 
catch up, and everybody is mysterious all around.
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Painting Mysteries
Proposal Compositions
To portray somebody completely absorbed in what they are do-ing is an effective way to make their thoughts seem transparent 
to us, but it’s not the only way. I turn now to another pictorial tradition 
that achieves the same effect using a very different strategy. As in the 
case with Fried, I rely on the work of a cultural historian, himself remote 
from cognitive science, whose analysis, nevertheless, is compatible with 
insights about the workings of our theory of mind.
 Stephen Kern’s Eyes of Love identifies a striking pattern in Euro-
pean genre painting of the second part of the nineteenth century. When 
“French and English artists . . . depicted a man and a woman in the same 
composition [they] typically rendered the face and eyes of the woman 
with greater detail and in more light. Most important, the men are in 
profile, while the women are frontal.” These works exemplify what Kern 
calls a “proposal composition”:
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Such a composition highlights the woman’s moment of decision after 
the man has proposed that the relationship move to some higher level 
of intimacy. At such moments she must respond, whether it be to his 
searching look or friendly inquiry, or more significantly, to his seduc-
tive offer or proposal of marriage. Her eyes convey an impending an-
swer to the question Will she or won’t she? And because she is think-
ing about many possible consequences of her answer, her expression 
is especially intriguing. In contrast, the man has done his thinking 
and said what is on his mind. He wants to hear a
 Yes, so his face bears a more predictable and less interesting ex-
pression.1
 Kern makes a convincing case against the accepted critical view that 
visual representations of women—especially beautiful women—always 
objectify them. He argues that in proposal compositions, such as, for 
example, William Midwood’s At the Crofter’s Wheel (fig. 34), women 
“are not objectified by the male gaze but retain a commanding subjectiv-
ity that, in comparison to the man’s more erotically focused purpose and 
expression, conveys a wider range of thoughts and emotions” (228). More interesting, less predictable, especially intriguing, conveying a 
wider range of emotions—this is our rule of contrasts at work. Contrasts 
and degrees are at the heart of proposal compositions. Using the familiar 
social script of courtship, proposal compositions construct the context in 
which the body of one protagonist is maneuvered into embodied trans-
parency. We know what the man is thinking, his “erotically focused” 
purpose made even more obvious because it is contrasted with the “in-
triguing” thought processes of the woman.
 The rule of transience is also present. We know what the man is 
thinking, but this moment of transparency cannot last. Depending on the 
woman’s reaction, the man will soon adopt a different posture, attempt-
ing perhaps to conceal his disappointment if she says no or hesitates for 
too long. The same cultural narrative—the courtship narrative—that 
makes the instance of transparency convincing ensures that it is but an 
instance, serendipitously “caught” by the artist.
 Something else might be at work in sustaining this illusion of a ser-
endipitously caught moment of transparency: it steals upon the specta-
tor unexpectedly. After all, “proposal compositions” were not known 
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as such by their contemporaries. “Proposal composition” is a term in-
troduced by Kern to describe not a particular subgenre associated with 
a specific style but a recurrent compositional pattern and interpersonal 
dynamic that can be found across different schools, styles, and represen-
tational traditions of the second part of the nineteenth century.
 Contributing to this effect of unexpectedness are the titles of pro-
posal compositions. They rarely indicate that we are witnessing a scene 
of romantic inquiry and hesitation. Very few titles are leading, such as 
The Proposal, Pleading, or Showing a Preference. The majority are all 
over the place, referring to a setting, to a prominent artifact present on 
the scene, or to the protagonist: A Dance in the Country, Nameless and 
Friendless, Waiting for the Ferry, Effie Dean, A Rest by the Seine, Blos-
som Time, The Picnic, The Umbrellas, At the Crofter’s Wheel.2 Thus, 
FIGURE 34. William Henry Midwood, At the Crofter’s Wheel, 1876. Oil on can-
vas, 28 ! 36 in.
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because there is neither an explicit genre affiliation nor a title that would 
mark a proposal composition as such, viewers have to infer on their own, 
in the case of each specific painting, that it contains a deliberation in-
duced by a proposal of marriage or romantic liaison.
 So as contemporary spectators approached a painting, say, Renoir’s 
A Dance in the Country, Osborn’s Nameless and Friendless, or Horsley’s 
Blossom Time, they did not know beforehand that the body of one of 
its protagonists was supposed to be strikingly readable (even though, 
once they started looking at it, they could see it right away).3 Had it been 
known—that is, had the proposal composition indeed emerged as an es-
tablished subgenre with its own set of typical titles—the man’s transpar-
ency would have eventually become a convention and as such would 
have required extra effort to be rendered convincing (as seemed to have 
happened with eighteenth-century absorptive paintings). This did not 
happen, however: the impression of serendipity was not marred by the 
thought that in this artistic subgenre serendipity is a convention.
 I am not making any teleological claims about the history of pro-
posal compositions. That is, I am not saying that late nineteenth-century 
artists and art critics consciously avoided recognizing a new subgenre in 
their midst in order to continue crafting compelling narratives of embod-
ied (male) transparency. It seems, rather, that authors of proposal com-
positions differed widely from each other in their styles and sensibilities 
and did not give much thought to this particular common denominator, 
and neither did their audiences. We needed Kern’s book to finally see 
this common denominator, and we need research on theory of mind to 
see why we intuitively value the moments when bodies reveal minds so 
vividly.
Problem Pictures
While I was writing this book, I gave several talks about proposal compo-
sitions as an example of embodied transparency. My audiences were typi-
cally of two types: cognitive scientists and literary scholars. Afterward, 
both asked me an interestingly different version of the same question. 
Cognitive psychologists asked, Is it possible that male artists generally 
tend to depict women as more mysterious and that the proposal composi-
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tions reflect this tendency? Literary critics asked, Is it possible that, given 
the late Victorian period’s anxiety about female sexuality, contemporary 
artists did indeed portray women’s thought processes as particularly in-
triguing?
 In response to these questions I now turn briefly to another tradition 
in genre painting, one that partially overlapped with proposal compo-
sitions in time, was largely represented by male artists, and frequently 
focused on a conversation between a man and a woman. Although such 
paintings, known as “problem pictures,” are similar to proposal com-
positions, they neither depict women as more mysterious than men nor 
feature embodied transparency.
 To repeat: I am using problem pictures here to argue against the view 
that the reason proposal compositions portray women as more inscru-
table is the cultural anxiety, shared both by artists and their audiences, 
about women’s intentionality. (Though I certainly agree that this anxiety 
plays some role, I will address this issue later.) I believe that what is at 
stake specifically in proposal compositions—what makes them special 
and different from other genre paintings—is their emphasis on embod-
ied transparency. Hence, they portray women as more mysterious not 
because this reflects some general feeling about how women are to be 
portrayed but because by doing so they can make men seem much more 
readable. The women’s opacity, in other words, serves to create the con-
trast necessary for the construction of embodied transparency in men, 
and the cultural context of courtship makes this contrast socially plau-
sible.
 What are problem pictures? According to Pamela M. Fletcher’s study 
Narrating Modernity they “were an extraordinarily popular feature of 
the Edwardian Royal Academy. The term referred to ambiguous, and 
often slightly risqué, paintings of modern life which invited multiple, 
equally plausible interpretations” (1). Consider John Collier’s A Confes-
sion (1902), which depicts a “couple engaged in an emotional conversa-
tion,” in which the woman’s face is “in shadow, while the man, leaning 
forward with his elbows on his knees, brings his face into the light of the 
fire,”4 staring down and slightly to the viewer’s right (fig. 35). Drawn to the couple’s feelings yet unable to read them, the visitors 
to the academy turned their mind-reading energies to their own and the 
artist’s mental states. According to Collier he received “many inquiries” 
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about the picture’s subject. In one extant letter the “writer pleads: ‘Oh! 
Honourable John, I want to know very badly which (please tell me) is 
confessing in your Royal Academy picture—the man or the woman.’ ” In 
response to such queries the artist offered “multiple interpretations,” cul-
tivating “oracular ambiguity” along the lines of “the woman did it and 
the man confessed it.”5 In 1913 he revisited the subject with his Fallen 
Idol, in which a “woman kneels at a man’s feet, her upper body resting 
on his knees and her head bowed in an attitude of grief or shame. The 
man holds one of her hands in his, and stares directly out of the canvas, 
his face illuminated by a shaft of light.”6 As Fletcher reports,
Critical responses in the press were almost equally divided between 
those who read the story as completely open to interpretation, and 
those who assumed that the woman had “fallen.” The Daily Mir-
FIGURE 35. John Collier, A Confession, 1902. Oil on canvas, 44 ! 56 in.
9781421406169_Zunshine_Head_int_1pgs.indd   174 3/2/12   12:45 PM
PA I N T I N G  M Y S T E R I E S           175
ror, Queen, Reynolds’s, and the Daily Sketch all read the picture as 
ambiguous, predicting, “Lots of stories will be woven around this 
picture, and probably none of them the right one.” The Daily Mirror 
made the point by “quoting” two visitors: “ ‘Of course, he’s just con-
fessed something he’s done,’ said one woman yesterday confidently. 
‘She’s just been found out,’ said the next comer with equal assur-
ance.” (130–31)
 The spatial arrangement of the figures and the pattern of lighting do 
not consistently single out one sex as more mysterious than the other: the 
man is just as likely as the woman to be “in the position of the ‘prob-
lem.’ ”7 Also, time is not an issue. For instance, in A Confession there is 
no indication how long the man and the woman have been in their pres-
ent positions or how long they may continue in them. Because the artist’s 
goal is “antitransparency” (if I may put it this way), neither the rule of 
contrasts nor the rule of transience applies.
 If the earlier discussion of absorptive paintings has made you wonder 
whether any subject who is not aware of the beholder is transparent, the 
problem pictures answer this question in the negative. Neither the man 
nor the woman in A Confession seems to be conscious of any beholder, 
but they are certainly not transparent.
 Yet they are absorbed in their thoughts—which leads me to suggest 
that, even though the majority of absorptive paintings depict transpar-
ent subjects, there are some exceptions to this rule. If an artist succeeds 
in portraying a subject who is completely absorbed even as the object of 
her absorption remains a mystery to us—which, I suspect, is rather dif-
ficult—then we get absorption without transparency (and turn our mind-
reading efforts toward ourselves and the artist).
 Fletcher demonstrates that interpretations of problem pictures re-
flected some of the “most pressing issues of the early twentieth century, 
including the nature of modern marriage and motherhood, the emer-
gence and definition of the new professional classes, and the existence of 
a specifically feminine morality” (1). No doubt many of the same issues 
were in play in proposal compositions, but observe the crucial differ-
ence between their respective constructions of protagonists’ subjectivity. 
A problem picture leaves its subjects’ feelings largely open to interpreta-
tion and only somewhat constrains them within broad categories, such as 
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“distress” or “surprise.” In contrast, a proposal composition constructs 
one participant as decisively more readable.
 Fletcher’s emphasis on the cultural surround of problem pictures 
returns us to the earlier question of whether proposal compositions re-
sponded to their cultural surround, reflecting the late nineteenth-century 
anxiety about female sexuality. Now we can respond to this question 
with a yes, but a yes qualified by what we know about our mind-reading 
adaptations.
 In principle, every period in human history is characterized by an 
anxiety about female sexuality. It is but another component of our 
broader mind-reading uncertainty. Female bodies do not advertise their 
sexual intentions. To use just one example, the concealed estrus makes 
it impossible for men to be certain about paternity, which means that 
they have to second-guess their partners’ intentions of staying faithful to 
them.8 The endeavor to control female sexuality—which may take dif-
ferent forms in different cultures—is thus really the endeavor to control 
women’s intentions and thus to minimize this particular (i.e., related to 
paternity) aspect of mind-reading uncertainty.
 But this also means that a hypothesis that a given group of paintings 
featuring women reflects its time’s anxiety about women’s sexuality will 
be true about any group of paintings featuring women. It is thus trivially 
true because it does not predict anything about any specific painting or 
representational tradition. It cannot explain, for example, why in pro-
posal compositions women are portrayed as more mysterious than men 
while in problem pictures they are clearly not.
 To explain this difference, we have to turn to cognitive science and 
suggest that authors of proposal compositions and problem pictures have 
different goals in representing the thought processes of their subjects. 
Both are obsessed with mind reading—all paintings depicting people are. 
But authors of proposal compositions emphasize that we have unequal 
access to the minds of their protagonists, which results in a state of em-
bodied transparency of one protagonist but not another. (Not that they 
think in these terms, of course.) The mind-reading mode of problem pic-
tures is very different. The artists set themselves the challenge of creating 
a social context in which we have very little access, and this lack of ac-
cess keeps us enthralled by the painting, registering our own puzzlement 
about its subjects’ mental states and trying to guess the artist’s intentions.
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 I just used the word enthralled on purpose. I did it to echo the rheto-
ric of Fried in Absorption and Theatricality, in which he talks about the 
“enthrallment” of the viewer by an absorptive painting. I want to stress 
that there is no one correct or better way for a painting to engage our 
theory of mind and keep us riveted. Different paintings can do it differ-
ently; in fact, they can use diametrically opposite techniques to enthrall 
their spectators.
 Absorptive paintings and proposal compositions do it by cultivating 
embodied transparency—by making us think that we know exactly what 
some of their subjects think. Problem pictures do it by focusing us on the 
subjects’ state of mind yet preventing us from figuring it out, thus sending 
our theory of mind racing in three directions simultaneously (“What are 
they thinking?” “I don’t get it!” “What did the artist have in mind?”). 
We could look at a variety of other traditions and see how they experi-
ment with the balance between information about their subjects’ mental 
states that they give us outright and that they want us to keep guessing 
at, thereby turning us toward our own and the artist’s thought processes.
 And as we think about our thinking about a work of art, we may 
come to revise our understanding of what constitutes a particular rep-
resentational tradition. For just as there is no predicting what cultural 
forms mind reading will assume at a given historical moment, so there 
is no predicting what forms thinking about these forms will assume. A 
culture of greedy mind readers never ceases to supply and demand end-
lessly mutating, endlessly nuanced, endlessly new configurations of men-
tal states.
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Coda
social interactions.
distinguish between the mental states of real people and of fic-
tional characters.
-
ings, and reality shows, indulge our greedy theory of mind, giv-
ing us carefully crafted, emotionally and aesthetically compelling 
social contexts shot through with mind-reading opportunities.
stage, and canvas is to a significant degree a social pleasure. It’s 
an illusory but satisfying confirmation that we remain competent 
players in the social game that is our life.
intensify this pleasure is to present our mind-reading adaptations 
with fantasies of embodied transparency, that is, with complex 
social contexts in which people’s bodies seem to provide direct 
access to their minds.
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our perception of direct access to a person’s mind is usually in-
versely related to the complexity of the social situation at hand.
-
ied transparency may take at a specific cultural moment, certain 
patterns—such as transience, contrasts, and restraint—seem to re-
cur in its representation. These patterns hold more sway in some 
genres than in others; for instance, transience is more important 
for novels and paintings, restraint for movies.
representing embodied transparency, this niche is vulnerable to 
subversion and parody. Hence writers, artists, and, more recently, 
film directors and television producers are always on the lookout 
for new convincing ways to portray bodies as providing direct ac-
cess to minds.
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Notes
Preface
 1. For more information about the field of cognitive cultural studies, see Zun- 
shine, “What is Cognitive Cultural Studies.”
 One: Culture of Greedy Mind Readers
 1. Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness, 21. For foundational works on theory of 
mind as well as important recent studies, see Byrne and Whiten, Machiavellian Intel-
ligence and “The Emergence of Metarepresentation”; Dunbar, “Evolutionary Basis 
of the Social Brain”; Gomez, “Visual Behavior”; Frith and Frith, “Social Cognition 
in Humans”; Keenan at al, “An Overview of Self-Awareness and the Brain”; Nettle, 
“Emphasizing and Systemizing” and “Psychological Profiles;” Premack and Dasser, 
“Perceptual Origins”; Saxe, “Why and How”; Saxe and Kanwisher, “People Think-
ing about Thinking People”; and Stiller and Dunbar, “Perspective-Taking.”For a dis-
cussion of alternatives to the theory of mind approach see Dennett, The Intentional 
Stance.
 2. See Tooby and Cosmides, “The Psychological Foundations of Culture,”in 
Barkow et al., The Adapted Mind.
 3. For a critique of the term theory of mind as it is used in the social neuroscience 
literature, see Stone and Hynes, “Real-World Consequences of Social Deficits,” 462.
 4. Borenstein and Ruppin, “The Evolution of Imitation,” 229.
 5. Rizzolatti et al.,”Neuropsychological Mechanisms,” 662.
 6. See Bloom, Descartes’ Baby (113–15), for a discussion of mirror neurons in 
the context of empathy and compassion. For a discussion of the relationship between 
mirror neurons and theory of mind in the context of simulation theory see Goldman, 
Simulating Minds.
 7. Keysers et al., “The Mirror Neuron System and Social Cognition,” 530–31.
 8. Note, for instance, that, as Jochen Triesch and his colleagues observe, the 
evidence for mirror neurons in humans is indirect. Because “direct observation of [hu-
man] individual mirror neurons is impossible with today’s experimental techniques,” 
cognitive scientists have to infer it via converging data from “functional magnetic 
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resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and magnetoencephalog-
raphy (MEG) studies.” Moreover, “nothing is known about what experiences and 
interactions with the environment are necessary or sufficient for the emergence of 
mirror neurons” (“Emergence of Mirror Neurons,” 150–51). See also Triesch et al. 
for a discussion of recent experiments investigating the “question of whether mirror 
neurons are innate or whether they acquire their special properties through a learning 
process” (161); Hickok, “Eight Problems for the Mirror Neuron Theory of Action 
Understanding in Monkeys and Humans;” and Bauman et al., “The Neurobiology of 
Primate Social Behavior,” 692–93.
 9. Cognitive scientists thus begin to enter territory that has been extensively 
charted by philosophers and literary critics exploring mimesis (from Aristotle’s Poet-
ics, David Hume’s “Of Tragedy,” Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, and Walter Kaufmann’s 
Tragedy and Philosophy to the recent rethinking of mimesis and performativity in 
cultural studies), phenomenology (such as George Butte’s compelling reintroduction 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty into literary and film studies, I Know That You Know That 
I Know), and intentionality (such as Martha Nussbaum’s critique of the tradition of 
correlating “an emotion and a discernible physical state” [Upheavals of Thought,96]). 
Although the work on mirror neurons is still in a relatively early stage, one can see 
exciting possibilities emerging at the intersection of traditionally humanistic research 
and the inquiry into the neural basis of interpersonal subjectivity.
 10. Priborkin, “Cross-Cultural Mind Reading,” n.p.
 11. See Csibra, “Goal Attribution to Inanimate Agents”; Luo and Baillargeon, 
“Can a Self-Propelled Box Have a Goal?”; Song and Baillargeon, “Infants’ Reason-
ing”; Song et al., “Can an Actor’s False Belief Be Corrected”; and Baillargeon et al., 
“The Development of False-Belief Understanding.”
 12. Shany-Ur and Shamay-Tsoory, “Theory of Mind Deficits,” 936.
 13. Blair, “Theory of Mind, Autism, and Emotional Intelligence,” 419. Though, 
as Ralph Savarese reminds us, the ability to follow social rules depends also on ad-
equate control over one’s nervous system. As he puts it, “Which is decisive for proper 
comportment: awareness of those rules or having a body and a nervous system that 
allow actually following them? Someone with Tourette’s, for example, perfectly un-
derstands the inappropriateness of shouting “Fuck” at church but cannot stop himself 
from doing so” (personal communication, January 9, 2012).
 14. Kleiner, Gardner’s Art through the Ages, 277.
 15. See Kelly et al., “Social Experience.”
 16. Schultz, “Developmental Deficits,” 125. Interestingly, there seems to be a de-
velopmental shift in face-reading by infants between the ages of seven and ten months: 
“7-month-olds discriminate between facial expressions based on feature information 
rather than on affective meaning. On the other hand, older infants (10 months) are 
able to identify common affect among facial expressions and discriminate them from 
novel expressions. Additionally, it was shown that infants can use others’ angry and 
happy facial cues to disambiguate uncertain situations and regulate their behavior ac-
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cordingly” (Grossman et al., “Developmental Changes,” 35). For further discussion 
see Sorce et al., “Maternal Emotional Signaling.”
 17. See Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds.
 18. See Zebrowitz, Reading Faces; Zebrowitz and Zhang, “The Origins of First 
Impressions”; and Todorov et al., “Understanding Evaluation of Faces.”
 19. See Arendt, The Life of the Mind:”From the very onset, in formal philoso-
phy, thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing. . . . The predominance of sight 
is so deeply embedded in Greek speech, and therefore in our conceptual language, 
that we seldom find any consideration bestowed on it, as though it belonged among 
things too obvious to be noticed” (110–11). Compare this to David Michael Levin’s 
observation, drawing on Hans Jonas’s essay “The Nobility of Sight,” that “from the 
very dawn of our culture [sight] has been thought to be the noblest of the senses” 
(“Introduction,” 2).
 20. See Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness, for a discussion of mind reading in con-
genitally blind people.
 21. See Bering, “The Existential Theory of Mind,” 12.
 22. For a brilliant discussion of how and why we attribute mental states to peo-
ple who are dead, see Jesse Bering’s recent book, The Belief Instinct.
 23. See Dutton, The Art Instinct, for a response to critics who think that people 
from “other cultures” don’t have what we call art, particularly the part “But They 
Don’t Have Our Concept of Art.”
 24. See, for example, Alex Pentland’s Honest Signals, in which he suggests that 
people become convinced not by the strength of an argument but by the relative even-
ness of affect displayed by the person who is trying to convince them of something.
 25. Goffman, Strategic Interaction, 80–81.
 26. Theater historian Joseph Roach, for instance, has argued that performance, 
“though it frequently makes references to theatricality as the most fecund metaphor 
for the social dimensions of social production, embraces a much wider range of hu-
man behaviors. Such behaviors may include what Michel de Certeau calls ‘the prac-
tice of everyday life,’ in which the role of spectator expands into that of participant” 
(Roach, “Culture and Performance,”46).
 27. Our everyday mind reading turns each of us into a performer and a spec-
tator, whether we are aware of it or not. As Ellen Spolsky argues in “Narrative as 
Nourishment”: “The clues to which we sensibly learn to be attentive cannot be relied 
on absolutely because bodies themselves, the bodies that are evolved to give exter-
nal expression to internal states, learn to produce these clues within contexts dif-
ferentiated by cultural categories such as gender, age, social class, and occupation. 
Not only our interpretations of them but the evolved physical expressions themselves 
are enriched and/or distorted by social overlays, making both misinterpretation and 
deliberate deception possible” (48–49). Thus, a particular body can be viewed as a 
time-and-place-specific cultural construction, that is, as an attempt to influence others 
into perceiving it in a certain way. Compare this to Hegel’s argument about the insta-
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bility of the inner mental state when it is made visible: “The inner in thus appearing is 
doubtless an invisible made visible, but without being itself united to this appearance. 
It can just as well make use of some other appearance as another inner can adopt the 
same appearance. Lichtenberg, therefore, is right in saying: ‘Suppose the physiogno-
mist ever did have a man in his grasp, it would merely require a courageous resolution 
on the man’s part to make himself again incomprehensible for centuries’ ” (Hegel, The 
Phenomenology of Mind, 345).
 28. As Margaret Talbot observes: “Maybe it’s because we’re such poor lie de-
tectors that we have kept alive the dream of a foolproof lie-detecting machine. This 
February, at a conference on deception research, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Steven 
Hyman, a psychiatrist and provost of Harvard, spoke of ‘the incredible hunger to 
have some test that separates truth from deception—in some sense, the science be 
damned’ ” (“Duped,” 54).
 29. Again, compare this cognitive-evolutionary insight with the work done by 
cultural theorists ranging from Judith Butler to Peggy Phelan, who have written exten-
sively on the body as a constantly receding signified, a perennially contested deposi-
tory of reliable meanings. Think, for example, of Phelan’s observation that whereas 
“the living performing body is the center of semiotic crossings, which allows one to 
perceive, interpret and document the performance event,” we long to “return to some 
place where language is not needed,” an “Imaginary Paradise” where there are no 
“linguistic and visual distinctions between who one is and what one sees” (“Reciting 
the Citation of Others,” 15, 29). Think, too, that some of the resistance to the view 
of the body as always constructed and always performed can come from our hoping 
against all hope that it must be possible to carve some zones of certainty in the exas-
perating world where our favorite source of information, the body, is often untrust-
worthy in direct proportion to the extent to which we trust it.
 30. As Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt put it in Practicing New 
Historicism, the body always “functions as a kind of ‘spoiler’ . . . baffling or exceeding 
the ways in which it is represented” (15).
 31. And what you yourself are thinking, too (see Palmer, Fictional Minds).
 32. Compare this to Baron-Cohen’s description of Daniel Dennett’s view of 
the “intentional stance”: “Dennett is not committed either way on the question of 
whether there really are such things as mental states inside the heads of organisms. We 
ascribe these simply because doing so allows us to treat other organisms as rational 
agents” (Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness, 24).
 33. I concede that in a sci-fi movie this jump may mean that there was a magnet 
planted in the person’s body and that he was pulled up by aliens who use such magnets 
to reel in earthlings to their ship. Note two things, though. To counterbalance our 
immediate tendency to read a mental state into his behavior, I had to come up with a 
truly outlandish scenario. Theory-of-mind-free explanations apparently require quite 
a bit of work. And, furthermore, my explanation is not really completely theory-
of-mind-free. I didn’t manage to get rid of intentionality altogether. Only instead of 
ascribing an intention to the man, I ascribed it to aliens.
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 34. Spolsky, Satisfying Skepticism, 7; and Spolsky, “Darwin and Derrida,” 52.
 35. Sperber, Explaining Culture, 38.
 36. At least not initially. And, yes, I am speaking of Andy Kaufman.
 Two: I Know What You’re Thinking, Mr. Darcy!
 1. Austen, Persuasion, 66–67.
 2. For an important broader discussion of the effect of cultural representations 
on our evolved cognitive adaptations see Bloom, How Pleasure Works.
 3. The centrality of mind-reading to our enjoyment of fictional narratives con-
tinues to be borne out by ongoing studies in cognitive psychology (e.g., Barnes, “Fic-
tion and Empathy” and Barnes et al., “Reading Preferences”), although such studies 
would benefit from greater input from autistic individuals themselves, especially those 
labeled as “low-functioning” and who have learned to communicate by typing. For a 
discussion, see Savarese and Savarese, Autism and the Concept of Neurodiversity.
 4. As Alan Palmer puts it, “Novel-reading is mind reading. Fiction can only be 
understood in this way” (“Storyworlds and Groups,” 182).
 5. Having considered this view at length elsewhere to be a case of mild profes-
sional hypocrisy (see my “Cognitive Alternatives to Interiority”), I only want to point 
out here that we can’t make sense of fictional worlds if we don’t allow characters 
the same capacity for mental states as we do the people who surround us. Like it or 
not, we perceive fictional characters as having theory of mind and thus can’t avoid 
speculating about their mental states in this or that hypothetical situation just as we 
do about the mental states of real people.
 6. Taking a cue from the essayist Phillip Lopate, one should add impotence to the 
list of specifically sexual expressions of embodied transparency. As Lopate observes, 
for him “[the] power of the flaccid penis’s statement, ‘I don’t want you,’ is so stark, so 
cruelly direct, that it continues to exert a fascination out of all proportion to its actual 
incidence” (“Portrait of My Body,”333).
 7. See Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 107.
 8. Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 44, 21.
 9. Compare this to Ellen Spolsky’s argument in Gaps in Nature,a book strikingly 
ahead of its time.
 10. Kurzban, Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite, 5. For an important related 
argument see Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind.
 11. For a discussion of essentialist thinking see Zunshine, Strange Concepts.
 12. Sure, an author may claim to have no clue what her or his characters are 
thinking, but this is a kind of claim we are happy to believe in abstract, until we are 
faced with a concrete mind-reading mystery. For instance, do you think Nabokov 
really didn’t know if Charles Kinbote dreamt Zembla up or if it actually exists? He 
said he didn’t know, but I don’t believe him. As the philosopher Colin McGinn puts it 
compellingly, “Fictional characters have the mental states they are represented as hav-
ing; and the basic reason for this is that fictional characters have the characteristics, 
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mental or physical, they are said by their authors to have. Real people, by contrast, 
may not have the mental states they purport to have; it is always a mere hypothesis 
that they have the mental states you think they have (The Power of Movies, 122).
 13. For a detailed discussion see Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, esp. 71–72.
 14. For a discussion of Barthes’s and Foucault’s “Death of the Author” concept 
in the context of theory of mind see Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, 66–67.
 15. Compare to Sternberg’s observation about the writer’s “godlike privileges 
of unhampered vision, penetration to the innermost recesses of the [fictional] agents’ 
minds, free movement in time and space, and knowledge of past and future” (Exposi-
tional Modes, 257). See also Yu, Rereading the Stone, 166; and Booth, The Rhetoric 
of Fiction, 3.
 16. Gombrich, Art and Illusion,298.
 17. For a suggestive argument about Jane Austen’s use of contrasts see Woloch’s 
The One vs. the Many, chap. 1, “Narrative Asymmetry in Pride and Prejudice.”
 18. Fridlund,”Evolution and Facial Action,”30, 21, 37. See also Seyfarth and 
Cheney, “Signalers and Receivers”; Russell et al., “Facial and Vocal Expressions of 
Emotion”; Barrett et al., “On the Automaticity of Emotion”; Ekman, “Strong Evi-
dence”; and Ekman and Fridlund, “Assessment of Facial Behavior in Affective Disor-
ders.”
 19. See Zunshine, “1700–1775”; and Zunshine, “What to Expect.”
 20. Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 129.
 21. Compare this to Cohn’s discussion in Transparent Minds of E. T. A. Hoff-
mann’s Master Flea. Cohn writes that in Hoffmann’s story “the microscopic magician 
of the title gives to his human friend Peregrinus Tuss a tiny magic lens, that, when 
inserted in the pupil of his eye, enables him to peer through the skulls of all fellow 
human beings he encounters, and to discern their hidden thoughts. Peregrinus soon 
curses this ‘indestructible glass’ for giving him an intelligence that rightfully belongs 
only to the ‘eternal being who sees through to man’s innermost self because he rules 
it’ ” (3). Peregrinus thus forces “all fellow human beings” into a state of embodied 
transparency that can last infinitely—an ethically indefensible situation that is re-
solved to the extent to which Peregrinus is rendered unhappy by his privileged access. 
For a related argument see Spolsky, “Elaborated Knowledge.”
 22. Tiedens, “Anger and Advancement” (quoted in Butler and Gross, “Hiding 
Feelings,” 114).
 23. Fielding, Bridget Jones, 73.
 24. Hellman and O’Gorman, Fabliaux,111.
 25. Vitz, “Tales with Guts,” 157–58.
 26. Fielding, Tom Jones, 62, 63.
 27. Of course, one may suggest that Allworthy is smarter than he appears and 
that he is, in fact, at least partially aware of the doctor’s double game. This is an ap-
pealing reading, but we have no evidence for it in the text.
 28. Palmer, Fictional Minds, 10;see also McGinn, The Power of Movies, 122.
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 29. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 335.
 30. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 90.
 31. Austen, Emma, 123.
 32. Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, 12. For a brief related discussion of theory 
of mind and Hemingway’s style see Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, 23.
 Three: Sadistic Benefactors
 1. Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier, 70.
 2. For an intriguing related argument about theory of mind and fictional depic-
tions of “excessively cruel people” see Vermeule, Why Do We Care? 86.
 3. Fielding, The History of Ophelia, 1:252.
 4. See Wendy Jones for a fascinating discussion of cultural differences underly-
ing potentially conflicting perspectives on what constitutes philanthropy. As she puts 
it, “while sympathy in its technical sense as the recognition of emotion is a feature of 
cognition, cultures and individuals have developed countless ways to block or ignore 
sympathetic response: the torturer and the philanthropist will view pain very differ-
ently” (“Emma, Gender,” 332)
 5. Rousseau, Emile, 442.
 6. Palahniuk, Fight Club, 155.
 7. Using James Phelan’s categorization of unreliable narrators, we can say that 
Tyler underreports and underreads (219) Raymond’s mental states.
 8. For this and many other useful suggestions I am grateful to the anonymous 
reviewer from the Johns Hopkins University Press.
 9. It’s almost the exact opposite of the retroactive reading of body language in 
detective stories. There, we revisit facial expressions and gestures that were initially 
ambiguous and find out what they really meant. Here, we revisit facial expressions 
and gestures whose meaning we thought we knew only to realize that we will never 
know for certainwhat the characters really felt on those occasions. Detective stories 
begin with ambiguity and end with transparency, and unreliable-narrator stories begin 
with transparency and end with ambiguity.
 10. Compare to Foucault’s argument in Discipline and Punish about the asym-
metry of access implied by the respective positions of the prisoners and the guard in 
the Panopticon.
 Four: Theaters, Hippodromes, and Other Mousetraps
 1. Richardson, Clarissa, 640.
 2. Hornby, How to Be Good, 69.
 3. Richardson, Clarissa, 620.
 4. Ibid., 99.
 5. Siddons, Practical Illustrations of Rhetorical Gesture and Action,35–36. Sid-
dons’s book is an 1807 adaptation of Johann Jacob Engel’s earlier treatise Ideen zu 
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einer Mimik(1785). Part acting manual, part philosophical meditation on theater, it 
occasionally reads as a work of fiction, particularly when Siddons imagines various 
social situations involving performers and spectators.
 6. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 209–10.
 7. Hornby, Fever Pitch, 19–21.
 8. The British movie version was made in 1997. There is also an American ver-
sion made in 2005 that makes the protagonist a fan of the Boston Red Sox. The 
American Fever Pitch, however, does not foreground embodied transparency in any 
significant way.
 9. Absorption is a concept highly relevant to discussions of transparency, as my 
forthcoming chapter on paintings will show.
 Five: Movies: The Power of Restraint
 1. For recent and forthcoming investigations of literature, film, and the arts 
from the point of view of cognitive theory see Abbott, The Fine Art of Failure, 
“Conversion,” and “Reading Intended Meaning”; Aldama, “Race, Cognition, and 
Emotion”and Toward a Cognitive Theory of Narrative Acts; Anderson and Anderson, 
Moving Image Theory; Austin, Useful Fictions; Bortolussi and Dixon, Psychonar-
ratology; Branigan, Projecting a Camera; Carroll, The Philosophy of Motion Pic-
tures; Crane, “Surface, Depth, and the Spatial Imaginary”; Currie, Image and Mind; 
Easterlin, A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation; Flesch, 
Comeuppance; Fludernik, “1050–1500: Through a Glass Darkly”; Herman,Story 
Logic,Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, and “Genette Meets Vygotsky”; 
Hart, “The Epistemology of Cognitive Literary Studies”; Hogan, Cognitive Science, 
Literature, and the Arts,”Literary Universals,”Empire and Poetic Voice,The Mind 
and Its Stories, and Understanding Nationalism; Tony Jackson, “Issues and Prob-
lems”; Keen, Empathy and the Novel,Thomas Hardy’s Brains, and “Strategic Em-
pathizing”; Kramnick, “Some Thoughts on Print Culture and the Emotions”; Mc-
Conachie, American Theaterand Engaging Audiences; Palmer, Fictional Minds and 
Social Minds and the Novel; Plantinga and Smith, Passionate Views; Richardson, 
British Romanticism,The Neural Sublime,”Studies in Literature and Cognition,” and 
(with Ellen Spolsky) The Work of Fiction; Scarry, Dreaming by the Book; Spolsky, 
“Darwin and Derrida,””Narrative as Nourishment,”Gaps in Nature,Satisfying Skep-
ticism, and Word vs Image; Starr, Feeling Beauty,”Multisensory Imagery,” and “Po-
etic Subjects”; Turner, The Literary Mind; Vermeule, “God Novels,””Satirical Mind 
Blindness,”The Party of Humanity,and Why Do We Care; and Zunshine, Why We 
Read Fiction,Strange Concepts, and Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies.
 2. McGinn, The Power of Movies, 104.
 3. For a related discussion see the chapter on detective stories in my Why We 
Read Fiction.
 4. Lane, “Miles to Go,” 83.
 5. For a brilliant analysis of gambling in fiction, from a different theory-of-mind 
perspective, see Vermeule, Why Do We Care?
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 6. Remnick, “Exit Bin Laden,” 36.
 7. Mazzetti et al., “Behind the Hunt for Bin Laden,”n.p.
 8. Tapper, “Hillary Clinton Explains,” n.p.
 9. Quigley, “Maybe I Just Coughed,” n.p. See also Gevorkian, “Ne povod dlia 
tanzev.”
 10. Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 130.
 11. Tooby and Cosmides, “Consider the Source.”
 12. Pemberton, The Hottest Water in Chicago, 18, 13.
 Six: Mockumentaries, Photography, and Stand-Up Comedy
 1. Gervais and Merchant, The Office: The Complete First Series, disk 1. All 
references are to this edition.
 2. Ibid., commentary.
 3. Though, as Bloom notes in How Pleasure Works,”I know more than one per-
son who finds it hard to watch comedies that rely too heavily on embarrassment; they 
find it almost unbearable” (166).
 4. Here I use the terms cinéma vérité and direct cinema interchangeably, but 
there are important differences between the two. For an overview of these differences 
see Ellis and McLane, A New History, 216–18.
 5. Quoted verbatim from Hope Ryden’s official website, www.hoperyden.com/
disc.htm (accessed August 18, 2007).
 6. Quoted in Cinéma Vérité: Defining the Moment (dir. Peter Wintonick). Ryden 
wrote, directed, and produced documentary films from 1961 through 1987 and was 
a member of the Drew Associate team that developed cinéma vérité / direct cinema in 
the early 1960s (see www.hoperyden.com [accessed Oct. 20, 2011]).
 7. Wintonick, Cinéma Vérité.
 8. Ellis and McLane, A New History, 216, 219.
 9. Ibid., 217. And I love the fact that the language here is so similar to Michael 
Fried’s in his discourse on absorption (see Fried, Absorption and Theatricality).
 10. Ellis and McLane, A New History, 217. The other side of this issue is that 
such revelatory moments were carefully staged and edited. As Frederick Wiseman, a 
pioneer of direct cinema, puts it, “It’s all manipulation. Everything about that kind of 
movies is a distortion” (quoted in Wintonick,Cinéma Vérité). Wiseman refers to the 
manipulation of material done on his side of the camera, such as editing to intensify 
the drama, but other people have spoken of manipulation that occurs on the other 
side. Once the filmed subjects intuit that the value of the film consists in “capturing 
human emotion spontaneously as it happens,” the whole endeavor becomes vulner-
able to subversion. The protagonists may instinctively script their own moments of 
embodied transparency, and there is no knowing when they start and stop performing 
them.
 A telling case in point is Albert and David Maysles’sGrey Gardens (1976), a 
documentary that follows the daily routines of two Edith Beales, mother and daugh-
ter, former socialites, legendary beauties, and gifted singers, who now, aged eighty and 
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fifty-seven, live in isolation in their dilapidated mansion in the East Hamptons. On the 
one hand Albert Maysles describes the goal of “direct cinema” as recording “life as it 
is—no better, no worse,” the implicit premise here being that the emotions that we see 
on film arise naturally out of the course of everyday life, with moments of embodied 
transparency occurring spontaneously throughout. On the other hand the subjects of 
this particular film, both frustrated performers, whose careers onstage were cut short, 
thrive on living their emotions on camera. When they appear surprised, disappointed, 
or flustered, there is no telling how truly “transparent” they are. It is possible that they 
play up those moments of “direct access” for each other and their spectators.
 Not accidentally, when later accused of taking the Beales’s privacy “too far,” Al-
bert Maysles responded with the story that “Little Edie” told him about “Big Edie’s” 
death. When, at her mother’s deathbed, the daughter “asked her if she had anything 
more to say,” Big Edie “said it was all on the film. It was the performance of a life-
time” (quoted in Peter Keough, “Shades of Grey”). You can also hear it in Albert 
Maysles’s The Beales of Grey Gardens [2006]). In other words the Maysles were 
aware that the mother-daughter duo might be performing for their camera according 
to their own “scripts” and emotional needs.
 11. My argument here is directly influenced by Michael Fried’s Absorption and 
Theatricality—to be discussed in the last two chapters—specifically by his observation 
that Jacques-Louis David’srepeated portrayals of Homer and Belisaire, both blind and 
hence presumably unable to perform their body language for observers, were driven 
by David’s desperate search for new reliable contexts for absorption.
 12. The Broadcast Tapes of Dr. Peter (1994) and Silver Lake Life: The View 
from Here (1990) were made by filmmakers diagnosed with AIDS, who chronicled 
their fight with the disease until they died. For a discussion of these movies see Ellis 
and McLane, A New History,284–87.
 13. For a discussion of the history of that moment see Ellis and McLane, A New 
History, 290–91.
 14. See ibid., 236–37.
 15. I am lifting this phrase and its meaning directly from Fried’s Absorption and 
Theatricality (61).
 16. Zehme, Lost in the Funhouse, 256.
 17. Zmuda, Andy Kaufman Revealed!253.
 18. Ibid., 321.
 Seven: Reality TV
 1. I wonder if the first strategy is used more often with young female partici-
pants, who, in Western culture, are expected to express their emotions publicly and 
are forgiven for it, and the second, for older and male participants.
 2. For further discussion see Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction.
 3. Quoted at http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/confessions_of_a_reality_junki (ac-
cessed Oct. 21, 2011).
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 4. See, for instance, research on neurocognition of the human voice, according to 
which “a speaker never produces the same sound twice” (Belin, “ ‘Hearing Voices,’ ” 
387).
 Eight: Musicals
 1. See, e.g., Dunne, American Film, 79.
 2. McMillin, The Musical as Drama, 102–3. For an important related discussion 
of backstage musicals see Feuer, The Hollywood Musical, 5–14.
 3. Although it could be argued that when Higgins sings “Why Can’t the Eng-
lish,” Pickering, Eliza, and the random passersby hear his impassioned speech but not 
the accompanying orchestra. In fact, what the orchestra is doing might be different 
yet, for it may “sing” its own melody, inaccessible to characters. For a discussion of 
how this happens in musicals see McMillin, The Musical as Drama,130–45; for a re-
lated discussion of operas see Hutcheon and Hutcheon, “Narrativizing the End,” 443.
 4. As McMillin puts it, such songs “are not called for as numbers by the book 
but are forms of spontaneous expression by the characters” (112).
 5. See Kurzban,Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite.
 6. In the 1955 movie version, once Marlon Brando begins to sing, the lighting 
around him changes to emphasize that we are entering a different space and time.
 7. For a discussion of different interpretations of what will happen next see 
Miller, From Assassins to West Side Story, 187–88.
 8. www.rationalmagic.com/Bursting/Glossary.html (accessed on Feb. 21, 2008).
 9. Ibid.
 10. As Sheskin suggests, a number of musicals, particularly those “written in 
the epic-theatre (Brechtian) story telling tradition,” have their eleven-o’clock numbers 
earlier in the play. For instance, Sondheim’s Sweeney Todd has an “ ‘epiphany’ at the 
end of act 1, which fits the definition perfectly except that it occurs well before the 
conventional placement near the end of act 2.” One can see “how the main character 
comes to a revelation (‘They all deserve to die’) and how emotional it is (swinging 
back andforth from anger at the world to sadness over his loss)” (email communica-
tion, Oct. 18, 2007).
 11. Sheskin, email communication, Feb. 22, 2008.
 12. See Citron, Opera on Screen, 56, 102, 227; Newcomb, “Once More,” 234; 
Abbate, Unsung Voices, 24, 26, 69, 119–23, 157; Hutcheon and Hutcheon, “Nar-
rativizing the End,” 442; and Taruskin, “She Do the Ring,” 196.
 13. I am deeply indebted to Kang-i Sun Chang for my discussion of the Chinese 
opera. As she puts it, “the readers (or audiences) always believe that qu songs express 
the genuine feelings of the authors/characters” (email discussion, Oct. 17, 2007).
 14. Compare to Yu’s observation that “the one continuous thread of argument 
running through what might be called the Confucian view of the arts is this contradic-
tory desire for spontaneity and calculation, freedom and control” (81–82).
 15. Wang, The Story of the Western Wing, 120–21, 120nn23–24.
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 16. Boulton, The Song in the Story, 19, 20.
 17. Ibid., 20, 24. Note that Boulton’s argument is somewhat similar to that of 
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren in Understanding Poetry (1938), where they 
suggest that a Japanese haiku cannot be viewed as providing a “sudden and fleeting 
insight” into the mind of the speaker. As they see it, to a Western reader using a trans-
lation, a certain image may look as a “sudden and fleeting insight” that provides “a 
profound revelation,” but “as the authorities on such poetry tell us, to the mind that 
is saturated with the rich symbolism of the East, the images of such poems are rich in 
specific association” (70).
 18. Kang-i Sun Chang, The Evolution of Chinese Tz’u Poetry, 19. Compare this 
to Susan Lanser’s observation that in lyric poetry we tend to identify the “I” of the 
narrator with the poem’s author (“The ‘I’ of the Beholder,” 207).
 19. I am grateful to Evelyn Birge Vitz for reminding me how unreadable the 
minds in some versions of “Raggle Taggle Gypsy-o” can be.
 20. Freydkin, “To Wood.”
 21. Mead, “The Actress,” 54.
 22. Sheskin, personal conversation, Oct. 3, 2007. Compare to T. S. Eliot’s dis-
cussion of the moments when “we touch the border of [the] feelings which only music 
can express” (Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, 87; quoted in Yu, 97).
 Nine: Painting Feelings
 1. As Fried describes it, “the transparent, slightly distended globe at the tip of 
his blowpipe seems almost to swell and tremble before our eyes” (Absorption and 
Theatricality, 51).
 2. Ibid., 51.
 3. Ibid., 157.
 4. See the section on problem pictures in chap. 10.
 5. Bloom, How Pleasure Works,143–44.
 6. Ibid., 139.
 7. Schjeldahl, “For Laughs,” 84.
 8. See Bloom’s How Pleasure Works for a compelling attempt to bridge that gap.
 9. In fact, there have been some interesting speculations on what mirror neu-
rons—a possible neural foundation of our intentionality attribution—might be doing 
while we observe people in paintings. See, e.g., Freedberg, “Empathy, Motion and 
Emotion”; and Lindenberger, “Arts in the Brain.” For, it could be argued (not an un-
controversial argument, but one worth considering) that we cannot grasp the meaning 
of any painted gesture unless these neurons are activated. This means that the uncon-
scious mental processes involved in mind reading are constantly interacting with our 
conscious observations and interpretations. They reinforce and influence each other as 
we are looking at the painting and thinking about it.
 10. For a discussion of surrealism and theory of mind see Zunshine, Strange 
Concepts.
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 11. Something very similar happens when we read a work of literature that 
challenges our theory of mind. Imagine a fictional story that opens with two long 
paragraphs describing a mechanical gadget, a description strikingly lacking in any lan-
guage of intentionality. If you don’t stop reading after the first paragraph and abandon 
the story for good, you will start asking yourself what kind of narrator we are dealing 
with here. What are her intentions? What is shetrying to achieve with this off-putting 
opening? Or—a closely related possibility—what kind of author is this? Is sheknown 
for writing experimental fiction? Is that what she is up to here—playing with your 
expectations, seeing how long you will stick it out? And—now the attribution of 
intentionality shifts to you as the reader—should you trust this author and continue 
reading? Should you hope that she knows what she is doing and will reward your 
perseverance with some lovely literary gambit?
 In other words, if we can’t attribute minds to somebody or something within a 
narrative known as a work of fiction we go right on attributing them to some entity 
around the edges of the narrative (i.e., the narrator) or outside the narrative (i.e., the 
author or ourselves). If there seem to be no mental states in the opening of the story, 
our mind-reading adaptations may try building on that dreary opening to generate 
some anyway.
 12. Reza, “Art,” 4.
 13. Ibid., 16–17.
 14. Once more, mine is a deliberately limited approach to abstract art, focusing 
only on its sociocognitive aspects. For an insightful and very different perspective on 
cognition and the aesthetics of abstract art see Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain, 
esp. chaps. 7 and 8.
 15. In the context of the argument to follow, this raises an interesting question: 
is it ever possible for a character to look directly at the viewer and still be perceived 
as transparent? It seems not, but I will be happy to stand corrected if you find any 
examples to the contrary.
 16. See Chauvet et al., Chauvet Cave. Also, for an insightful argument on “mak-
ing special,” see Dissanayake, What Is Art For?
 17. Literary criticism does it, too, of course, making us imagine, for example, 
what Freud, or Foucault, or Jameson would think of this or that text. For a discussion 
see Zunshine,”Cognitive Alternatives to Interiority.”
 18. Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 50. See also Fried’s discussion of time 
in modernist art, which, as he argues, seeks to “defeat theater . . . by virtue of [its] 
presentness and instantaneousness” (“Art and Objecthood,” 167).
 19. Or as Fried puts it, amplifying the view of Diderot and his contemporaries,a 
painting has “first to attract . . . and then to arrest . . . and finally to enthrall . . . the 
beholder, that is, a painting [has] to call to someone, bring him to a halt in front of 
itself, and hold him there as if spellbound and unable to move” (Absorption and The-
atricality, 92).
 20. As Fried puts it, “only by establishing the fiction of [the beholder’s] absence 
or nonexistence could his actual placement before and his enthrallment by the paint-
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ing be secured” (Absorption and Theatricality,103). Compare this to Fried’s argument 
in his earlier essay, “Art and Objecthood” (1967), in which he called his readers’ “at-
tention to the utter pervasiveness—the virtual universality—of the sensibility or mode 
of being . . . corrupted or perverted by theater” (161).”Art and Objecthood” focuses 
on works of modernist art that “defeat theater” by their quality of “presentness,” 
that is, by their apparent ability to just be there independently of the perspective of 
the beholder. As Fried puts it in the famous last sentence of that essay, “presentness is 
grace” (168).
 21. And, no, I will not construct a glib “historicist” argument of “influence” 
(e.g., an argument about the French absorptive paintings somehow “informing” the 
English novel, or vice versa). Each genre can be historicized based on its own cultural 
history and perennial mind-reading tensions. Although exploration of cross-genre in-
fluences is generally a fruitful endeavor, such influences should not be overrated.
 22. Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 61.
 23. Ibid., 159.
 24. Ibid., 156.
 25. Ibid., 152.
 26. Ibid., 61.
 27. Ibid., 176.
 28. Ibid., 13.
 29. On fiction and sociocognitive complexity see Zunshine, “What to Expect.”
 30. Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 55–56.
 31. Ibid., 55.
 32. Ibid., 55.
 33. For a fascinating discussion of blushing “as an honest signal of how one 
feels” and its treatment in fiction, specifically from an evolutionary perspective, see 
William Flesch’s Comeuppance, 103–4.
 34. OED,2nd online edition (1989), s.v. “sentimental.”
 35. Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 55.
 36. Incidentally, by “convincing” I do not mean “realistic”; for example, an oth-
erworldly setup of a science fiction story can be completely socially convincing but not 
realistic in the conventional sense of the word.
 37. For a very interesting instance of autobiographical probing of how one’s for-
mer musical tastes would be considered sentimental today see Terry Castle’s memoir, 
The Professor. Castle talks about the songs she liked in the 1970s, which she now sees 
as “treaclefest[s],” redolent of their “genre’s gauzy inanities” (159), even as she admits 
to herself that they still have the power to hit “the thirty-year-old emotional love-spot 
with warmth and precision” (165).
 38. For a cognitive take on the discussion of Fried’s resistance to the theory of 
influence (which I don’t discuss here) see Zunshine, “Theory of Mind and Michael 
Fried’s Absorption and Theatricality.”
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 Ten: Painting Mysteries
 1. Kern, Eyes of Love, 7.
 2. I am using the titles of paintings from Kern’s lavishly illustrated study.
 3. Kern discusses these paintings in some detail; see ibid., 71, 93, and 65 respec-
tively. I have purposely chosen proposal compositions of very different styles.
 4. Fletcher, Narrating Modernity, 62.
 5. Ibid., 63.
 6. Ibid., 129.
 7. Ibid., 62.
 8. It’s true that in some societies it is now possible to check paternity by testing 
DNA, but this invention is too recent to have any influence on the psychology of mat-
ing.
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